Palestinians are being expected to negotiate an end to their extermination.

In today’s digital age, we are confronted with a paradox on multiple levels; while online platforms are saturated with religious content, the souls of many believers remain empty. This phenomenon has also become pronounced within Muslim communities, where many are inundated with religious lectures – be they in the form of videos or various messages on social media platforms. The substantial volume of such content does not necessarily entail the existence of genuine cognitive and spiritual fulfillment or authentic living of faith. Therefore, in this context, the question of the importance of institutional versus individual approaches gains particular significance.

Mosques, Islamic centers, madrasas, and colleges traditionally served as the bedrock of religious life and the collective identity of the Muslim community. These institutions provided environments where Muslims gathered for prayers, Quranic and Sunnah studies, knowledge exchange, and support. However, despite their importance, an increasing number of people are turning to religious internet influencers in search of spiritual inspiration, education, and guidance. Such influencers offer an appealing alternative to the institutional approach to faith. Their immediacy, accessibility, and ability to reach the masses worldwide make them attractive to many who feel disconnected from traditional institutions.

The Paradox of Popularity and Spiritual Fulfillment

The key question that arises is: Why are so many people drawn to such internet influencer profiles while simultaneously losing trust in institutions? One of the answers lies in the realities of contemporary lifestyles. People are often burdened by speed, seek instant gratification, and lean towards individualized approaches to understanding religion and living out faith. Internet influencers tailor their content to this mode of thinking, providing concise and inspirational messages that are easily consumable and shareable.

Religious influencer culture [PC: Steve Gale (unsplash)

Many young Muslims worldwide feel that institutions have not adapted to contemporary challenges and needs and do not provide enough space for their active participation and expression. This can result in feelings of distance and disconnection from institutions. Additionally, influencers often focus on issues that are relevant and close to youth, such as identity, mental health, and social justice.

However, while internet influencers may provide immediate inspiration, institutions have the potential for long-term, sustainable religious development. Through their activities, institutions promote a deeper understanding of faith, continuous support and mentorship, and integration of religious values into daily life. They also provide stability, authority, and continuity, which are lacking for individuals who often come and go through the internet.

The Importance of Accountability

One of the key differences between institutions and individuals is the issue of accountability. While institutions have mechanisms for maintaining accountability and oversight of their actions, internet influencers often operate independently and are not answerable to anyone. This can lead to a lack of transparency, integrity, and authenticity in their messages.

Moreover, influencers often use their popularity to sell books, courses, and other products. This can be beneficial if used as a means for further education and spiritual development of their audience. However, it is important for influencers not to use their popularity solely for commercial purposes but to promote authentic and relevant messages that contribute to the spiritual growth of the community.

It is also important to recognize that many Muslims face a lack of basic media literacy and struggle in the digital world. This can result in difficulties in recognizing relevant information and perspectives and developing critical awareness of the content they consume. Therefore, even when Muslims strive to find information about faith, they may encounter challenges in filtering and evaluating that information, further hindering their spiritual development.

Rhetoric and Influence in the Digital Age

In his text “The Purpose of Rhetoric,” Ivo Škarić, a prominent Croatian linguist and expert in rhetoric, emphasizes the importance of the ability to express oneself and communicate: “Let everyone learn how to express their thoughts, their stance, their interests! Let everyone be a good speaker so as not to be endangered by speakers.” This statement highlights the importance of the ability to express oneself and communicate in order to protect one’s own views and interests from the influence of others. In the contemporary digital age, we can expand this idea by adding: “Let everyone be a good influencer so as not to be endangered by influencers.”

Furthermore, the statement by Dr. Husein-ef. Kavazović, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Reisul-Ulema), further illustrates the contemporary challenges we face: “The populism we indulge in does not respect the values of religion, family, nation, and tradition, nor does it care about the historical memory of our people. Educated people, scientists, philosophers, and scholars are not appreciated. Populists have taken the stage, catering to the masses, giving them salty water after which they feel even thirstier.”

The Role of Institutional Authorities in Preserving Religious Integrity

The credibility and continuity of institutional authorities are crucial for preserving the integrity of religious teaching and practice. While individuals may bring new ideas and perspectives, institutions play a key role in preserving tradition and ensuring consistency in the interpretation of religious texts and practices. Therefore, it is more important to follow institutions than individuals, as institutions represent the collective heritage of the religious community passed down through generations. They have a broader context of knowledge and experience that helps interpret religious principles in ways that are relevant to contemporary challenges and community needs.

The Quran emphasizes the importance of seeking knowledge and following those who have it. Allah says in the Qur’an:

“And We sent not before you except men to whom We revealed [Our message]. So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know.“ [Surah An-Nahl: 16;43]

This verse underscores the necessity of turning to learned individuals and institutions for guidance.

Pursuing long-term spiritual fulfilment [PC: Aldrin Rachman Pradana (unsplash)]

The Prophet Muhammad also highlighted the significance of seeking knowledge from reliable sources. In a hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah , the Prophet said: “Whoever follows a path in the pursuit of knowledge, Allah will make a path to Paradise easy for him.” [Sahih Muslim]

This hadith emphasizes the importance of seeking knowledge through proper channels and institutions.

By respecting institutional authorities, believers can avoid the pitfalls of subjectivity and personal interpretations and rely on reliable sources of religious learning and practice. This does not mean that individuals should completely relinquish their autonomy and critical thinking, but rather approach faith with respect for authorities dedicated to preserving its foundations and values.

Conclusion: Embracing Institutions for Spiritual Fulfillment

While religious internet influencers play a significant role in today’s digital age, institutions remain vital for the long-term spiritual development and stability of the Muslim community. Balancing the benefits of both can lead to a more holistic and fulfilling religious experience.

To achieve this balance, it is essential for individuals to actively engage with their local mosques and Islamic centers. Here are some steps to consider:

1. Attend Courses: Enroll in classes offered by your local mosque or Islamic center to deepen your understanding of the Quran, Sunnah, and other aspects of faith.
2. Participate in Community Events: Join community events and activities to build connections with fellow Muslims and strengthen your sense of belonging.
3. Seek Mentorship: Establish relationships with knowledgeable scholars and mentors within the institution for continuous guidance and support.
4. Volunteer: Contribute your time and skills to support the activities and initiatives of your local institution, fostering a sense of ownership and commitment.
5. Promote Accountability: Encourage transparency and accountability within the institutions to ensure they meet the community’s needs and uphold Islamic values.

By aligning with institutions, believers can benefit from the stability, authority, and continuity they provide while also gaining the immediate inspiration and accessibility offered by internet influencers. This integrated approach will enable a more profound and sustained spiritual journey, ensuring that faith is lived authentically and comprehensively.

 

Related:

– Drawing a Line in the Sand: Student-Teacher Relationships in the Digital Age

– Podcast: Damage Control With Digital Dinosaurs – On The Fiqh of Social Media | Omar Usman

– Blurred Lines: Women, “Celebrity” Shaykhs, and Spiritual Abuse

The post The Case For An Institutional Approach To Faith In The Era of Religious Internet Influencers appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

A father with a severely autistic son dreams of going to Hajj, but will it ever happen?

Previous Chapters: Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3

Author’s Note: The last part of this chapter, in which the family sees a meteor shower, was mistakenly published previously as part of Part 1. It belongs here. And I added a bit to it.

Give Your Auntie a Kiss

The next day they went to Murid’s parents’ house for Junaid’s birthday party. There were twenty people at the party, which was too many. It was too much stimulation for Junaid, and would not end well. Mina was opening the presents one by one, and thanking the guests.

Murid had cautioned her beforehand to keep her normally sharp tongue in check, and she was doing a wonderful job, mashaAllah. Each time she opened a gift, Junaid would come and pick it up, then take it to the floor where he had lined up the gifts in a line. Sometimes he shuffled the items around in the line. He paid no attention to anyone else, in spite of Murid’s parents entreaties to him to, “Give your auntie a kiss,” or, “How about a little smile for your uncle?”

Murid watched the boy playing his game. Junaid would not appreciate anyone trying to join him, Murid knew. In fact it would upset him. He was a handsome boy, average sized for fourteen, with glowing mahogany skin and straight black hair that came to just below his ears. His eyes were wide, his nose straight and prominent. He would grow into a good looking man.

It was hard to pinpoint his mental age, however. Severely autistic kids had a disconnect between the external world and their internal reality. It was possible that he was in fact quite intelligent, but unable to bring his intelligence to bear upon the world around him. In general, other people did not interest him. He could spend long periods of time patrolling the internal perimeter of a house, as if mapping it out or calculating the square meters. He might lie down and rock from side to side while humming, or even just flap his hands.

On the other hand, he had an extraordinary memory. Murid had once tried to teach Junaid to play memory – the card game where all the cards would be placed in a grid face up. The player would study the cards for a moment, then turn them all face down. Turning one up, the player would try to remember where the matching cards were located. Murid had given up after a week of trying, because Junaid kept taking the cards and lining them up in a chain.

A few days later, he’d watched as Junaid, on his own, set the game up, began to play, and proceeded to match every card perfectly from beginning to end.

One of Murid’s deepest wishes was that he could have a conversation with the boy. If, just for ten minutes, Junaid could be granted the ability to speak – no matter what he said – it would be the happiest moment of Murid’s life.

Going to Hajj

At some point Murid noticed that his mother had disappeared. She tended to do this. Knowing that she was prone to depression, and knowing what he would find, Murid went looking for her, though not before leaning over Mina and whispering, “Keep on being nice.”

He found her sitting in the sunroom, weeping silently with a box of tissues in her lap and used tissues scattered about her feet like little goslings waiting to be fed. The room was clean but smelled musty. His mother waved him off, but he sat beside her on the floral-patterned sofa and put an arm around her shoulders.

“It’s okay Mama,” he said. “Everything is fine.”

“I just want more for him, that’s all,” she replied through her sniffles.

Murid wanted to say, “Don’t you think it makes me sad too? I need you to reassure me. I need for someone to say to me, ‘Don’t worry, this is all part of Allah’s plan. Junaid is happy and physically healthy. Be grateful for what you have.’”

But Murid did not say these things to his mother. He should have simply given her shoulders a squeeze and returned to the party, but instead he blurted out, “I’m going to Hajj.”

His mother’s weeping stopped as suddenly as a summer rainshower. “What about the kids? You’re going to leave them with us? You know I haven’t been well, and your father has a temper. We can’t take care of two kids. You could have at least -”

“I’m not leaving them with you. Juliana will stay with them. I’ll only be gone for ten days.”

His mother’s eyes widened in outrage. “You’d leave them with a stranger instead of us?”

He smiled. “She’s not a stranger. She knows Junaid’s needs very well, and she’s patient with Mina.”

Mother’s eyes narrowed. “You cannot marry that woman.”

Murid patted her shoulder. “I’m not going to marry her.” He definitely was not about to tell her about the proposal from Abu Ali to marry Hiba. One shock at a time.

The Hair

Murid’s aunt Ganya was studying the children with that mean look she sometimes got, like a bird might watch a fox that had just stolen its food.

Time to go, Murid thought. We managed to get through most of the party, it’s a miracle. He was just about to thank everyone for coming and for the gifts, and tell them that he had to get the children home to rest, when Aunt Ganya’s glinty bird gaze turned into speech:

“Murid, you need to control your son. At least get him to give us a kiss. And what is going on with Mina’s hair? It’s a mess, it looks like a bird’s nest.”

Oh shoot, Murid thought. He began to turn to Mina with a restraining hand, but it was too late.

“At least,” Mina retorted, “I don’t smell like stale cucumbers dipped in menthol. And I’m not a mean old biddy who got engaged four times but never married. As for my hair, it’s naturally curly and I’m not driven by a sense of cultural inferiority to iron it out, like most of the women in this family. I’m down with being brown.”

Aunt Ganya sputtered, then attempted to snatch up her walker but instead knocked it over. She began to shout, “I need my walker! I need to get away from this horrible child!”

Murid’s father shouted at Mina, one of the other aunts yelled at Junaid himself, and a dish of mixed nuts on a side table was knocked over. The dish shattered, and a mixture of nuts and ceramic slivers scattered across the floor. Other family members took one side or another, and finally – of course – Junaid put his fingers in his ears and began to cry.

Murid weighed his options. Take Junaid upstairs to the bedroom and spend three hours holding him until he calmed down? While leaving Mina to contend for herself amid this crowd of emotional terrorists? Or take him home, crying all the way, and try to calm him there?

He opted to take the kids home. Lifting Junaid up – something he could barely do at this point – he dragged Mina by the hand, leaving all the presents behind.

Shooting Star

Junaid keened in the backseat, hands over his ears and tears streaming down his cheeks. Murid wanted to drive like he was racing the last lap at the Indy 500, in order to get Junaid home and soothe him, but they were on Mission Gorge Road where it topped the hills on the way south to San Carlos. It was windy, and Junaid gripped the steering wheel as the gusts shoved the car back and forth on the road. As they crested a low mountain pass, Junaid fell silent.

“Baba, look!” Mina was pointing out of the rear window. Murid glanced at his side mirror and saw something orange streak across the night sky, then another. He pulled off the road into a truck weighing stop, shut off the engine, and all three exited the car.

Murid stood on the cold asphalt, holding his children’s hands. The cold wind snatched at Murid’s clothing. A white streak flashed across the sky, turning orange as it passed by, startlingly low and close. Then another came and another.

“It’s a meteor shower,” Mina said. “I’ve never seen one before.”

Murid looked at Junaid. He was entranced, his liquid eyes wide. Tears stood on his cheeks, and as a meteor shot by, the fire of its passage was reflected in Junaid’s eyes and in the tears themselves, as if his face were a mirror to the glory of the heavens. His hair whipped in the wind, but he paid it no mind. What was the boy thinking, Murid wondered? Did he know what he was seeing? Or did he think it was some kind of show put on just for him? Perhaps a group of teenage angels were messing about in the sky, shooting off Chinese fireworks for fun?

Knowing Smile

Sensing his father’s eyes upon him, Junaid turned and met Murid’s gaze. A slight smile came to Junaid’s eyes. He often looked at Murid this way, and it was haunting, because it was as if he were smiling in a knowing way, like one magician regarding another and saying, “I know it’s all an act, but the show must go on.” It made Murid feel like Junaid was about to pick up a cane, don a top hat, and begin a slow dance, ending in the release of a pair of doves from his sleeves. Then he’d speak and say, “I love you, Baba. I was just waiting for the right moment to tell you.”

But of course that wasn’t going to happen. It was an illusion, just like Junaid’s knowing smile, his secret air of knowledge shared, was an illusion. This reality, at times, nearly wrecked Murid.

Then Junaid turned his eyes back to the actual magic show going on – the cosmic show in the night sky – and the moment was lost.

The meteor shower lasted a full five minutes and was the most incredible thing Murid had ever seen. The last one was the brightest, so low in the sky that Murid imagined he could feel its heat, the way one could close his eyes and feel the heat of a hand passing in front of his face.

Mina squeezed his hand. “I’m cold. And we’re standing on the side of the highway in the dark. This is spectacularly bad parenting.”

This made Murid laugh for some reason. They returned to the car and drove off, Murid still chuckling.

“Allah sent that for Junaid,” Mina said. “To calm him down.”

“And for you too.”

“No, Junaid is the star. We’re the understudies.”

“Why do you say that?” But no answer came, and when Murid looked in the rear view mirror, both children were asleep.

Did she mean that Junaid was the star of their family because their activities revolved around his needs? Or did she mean that he was in his nature a shooting star, and that the ones they’d seen were his cosmic cousins? Junaid never got an answer to that question.

Part 5 will be published next week inshaAllah

Reader comments and constructive criticism are important to me, so please comment!

See the Story Index for Wael Abdelgawad’s other stories on this website.

Wael Abdelgawad’s novels – including Pieces of a Dream, The Repeaters and Zaid Karim Private Investigator – are available in ebook and print form on his author page at Amazon.com.

Related:

Day Of The Dogs, Part 1 – Tiny Ripples Of Hope

No, My Son | A Short Story

The post The Things He Would Say – [Part 4]: The Birthday Party appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

Ali al-Aswad could no longer recognize his cousin in the rubble and had to identify him by his clothing. 

“Hold your family close every night, hoping it won't be the last time.”

The Abu Khater family was overjoyed when they found their home still standing after Israel’s invasion of Khan Younis. But this joy was short-lived. 

By Ibrahim Moiz for Muslim Matters

Previous Parts: Part 1

Harvard Was The Dumpster Fire And Columbia Was The Villain

After the tumultuous 2023-24 school year, where American students protesting against the Israeli genocide in Gaza were vilified and repressed across the country, MuslimMatters interviewed chaplains Omer Bajwa of Yale University and Abdul-Muhaymin Priester of Grinnell College for their thoughts on these momentous events. In this second part of a five-part interview, the imams relate their personal experiences of institutional responses to the student protests and Zionist counterprotests.

Ibrahim Moiz: You mentioned that Yale has generally not been like Columbia with the crackdown. How has your overall experience been with the administration, for example? Have they tried to suppress anything or try to put pressure on you to say this or do that, anything like that?

Omer Bajwa: I think that many people understandably lump the Ivies together, and the Ivies are a preexisting cohort and consortium… But having said that, the Ivies are also quite different, in that Columbia is nothing like Yale, which is nothing like Harvard. I think the point is that they’re definitely watching each other’s moves, right, so…they’re definitely comparing notes, like what’s going on down the road, what’s going on at this school, on that campus, etc. And what they want to do is they want to learn from each other’s mistakes, right?

So in that way, Harvard was the dumpster fire of the fall, when Harvard made all these horrible mistakes. And Harvard became a huge target because they have these real, you know, shaitanis like Bill Ackman on their board…and then Columbia became the villain of the story in the spring because they have, you know [Minouche] Shafik the president there, got called before Congress…So all that’s to say, Yale was kind of, “Yo, don’t be Harvard in the fall, don’t be Columbia in the spring”. This, I can tell you from behind the scenes, is definitely the chatter up at the top.

I Can Talk To The Top

(Omer Bajwa continues…) Now to answer your question directly. Alhamdulillah, after sixteen years of investing in relationships…you know, people take your word seriously, they want to know what you have to say, they know that you have that vertical [relationship] like I can talk to the top. I mean, Alhamdulillah, for what it’s worth, I had very direct blunt conversations with the senior administration, like literally the three most important people – the president, the vice president, the provost. They know where I stand, they know where my community stands.

I don’t know if Imam Ebad [Ebadur-Rahman, the Columbia Muslim chaplain] is able to have that at Columbia, I don’t know if my colleagues at other schools are able to have that. That’s just – each school is structured differently, but I think it’s also because of the relationships that you build over time…“You have the mike now, tell us what you want to say.” You have to be honest, right? This is the moment of speaking truth to power.

The second part of your question is, do they always listen? No, I give recommendations, I say, “Look, what you’re doing is XYZ wrong for these reasons, don’t do this.” Then the committee goes and they talk about it, and then they take some of what we say, theoretically, and then they also make other missteps. But I can keep going back and be like, “Didn’t I tell you? We talked two weeks ago, I told you not to do this, now look at the consequences.”

Now, the difference is that the president doesn’t answer to me, and the vice president doesn’t answer to me, they answer to the board of trustees. And that’s ultimately the problem…the way these modern institutions work – it’s about donors, it’s about influential trustees who can twist the arm, etc.

But they have not censored me, to answer your question, personally at Yale. I mean…the vice president’s come to my Jummah, right, I’m going to say, “This did not start on 10-7, this is seventy-six years of occupation, right? This is a settler colonial apartheid system that we’re seeing.” I can say that, Alhamdulillah. Does that infuriate the Hillel and some of the rabbis and Zionist students? Of course it does! And God knows what they’re saying about me on their channels. But, for what it’s worth, I’m able to say that and the administration isn’t going to stop me from censoring it.

Strategically There’s A Better Way

(Omer Bajwa continues…) I think one thing that I will add to it, and I hope this comes off the right way and not the wrong way, is that – you know…I was a grad student when 9-11 [11 September 2001 attacks on the United States] happened. We all marched in grad school against the Iraq invasion in ‘03, right? You learn, life experience teaches you, there’s a strategic way of reading the Sunnah and of implementing this, that the jazba, the twenty-one-year-old today, who’s screaming at the rally – you’re just like, “Strategically, there’s a better way to do this, right?”

Princeton pro-Palestine protesters

But now they’re going to be like, “Listen boomer, we appreciate your khutbah calling out genocide and murder and all that, but, like, we’re going to do what we’re going to do.” And I’m like, “It’s all good, man.” You know, like, “you do you”…Because you’re the student, and you know you have a positionality, and …I’m a staff member of the university, I’m on the level of [talking to the] dean and director…we’re all adults, and you know we understand what Allah Taala gives us through, just, life experience over time.

Many of them have this conception that if you’re not making noise all the time in the most in-your-face, aggressive way possible, then that means, “We question your loyalty to the cause.”

And so what happens then is they cast aspersions, not just at Yale but other schools as well, they’ve cast aspersions against faculty and staff and administrators – Muslims, presumably allies – that are quiet. And what we gently, gently, lovingly, tenderly try to bring them to the awareness [of] is – just because they’re not making noise on the picket lines or the protest lines doesn’t mean that they’re not working very effectively and secretly behind closed doors. Some of the most powerful people are doing their work behind closed doors, pulling levers of power, and consequential conversations that are not going to be on the picket line.

And that’s what I think faculty can do is you have a tenured faculty member that has a lot of respect, hard-earned respect. The administration takes what he or she says very seriously. And they can literally pick up the phone and scream – and I’ve seen this – scream at the president, and be like, “You’ve completely screwed up how you’ve handled this situation.” Now students don’t know that, but I know that, because I’m privy to a whole series of behind-the-scenes movements. So that’s, I think, a nuance that is worth noting.

Abdul-Muhaymin Priester: I think one of the things that made the larger schools as amplified as they were – outside of the fact that they were larger schools, Ivy League schools, top-league schools – is the fact that there’s a lot more money going into these institutions.

The voices that can threaten their independence, if you will, are much louder than what we come to at Grinnell. Somebody’s giving you as many millions of dollars a year and you have an endowment that’s probably tied into their hedge fund or something like that, they can be like, “Hey, we’re not going to have any of your business no more.”

So it makes it much more difficult for them. They can have a much more positive response [to pressure].

[Next in Part III: Why Zionists Were Given the Land Of Filastin]

 

Related:

American Muslims, Gaza, and the White House Iftar: Do Protests Matter

Podcast [Man2Man]: From The Frontlines Of Gaza | Dr. Jawad Khan And Omar Sabha

 

The post University Chaplains’ Perspective On Campus Protests [Part II] – The Moment Of Speaking Truth To Power appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

The end, when it came, was swift. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s latest, longest, and most lethal stint in power (2008-24) ended with an ignominious flight, after months of student-led protests that had lasted the summer against a violent crackdown. Having long milked, and abused, the legacy of her family and party in Bangladesh’s foundation, in the end, it was Hasina who was forced into flight after overplaying her hand.

In her latest tenure in power, Hasina had often exploited both her Awami League’s role in Bangladesh’s foundation and its secularist nature to crack down on dissidents. The latest trigger was a law that reserved quotas for the families of the “freedom fighters” of Bangladesh’s independence over fifty years ago; in essence this institutionalised economic privileges for a long-abusive Awami League that had already systematically and often viciously dismantled organized political opposition. Particularly to a younger generation that lacked their parents’ and grandparents’ emotive attachment to the Awami League’s role in independence and linked it to Hasina’s corrupt regime, the “liberators” of yesterday had become the tyrants of today.

A Long History Of Student Protest

Bangladesh has a long history of student protest that predates even the country’s foundation: students mobilised what was then called East Bengal against the British Raj, against discrimination and inequality in the subsequent era as East Pakistan, and even after Bangladeshi independence against successive predatory rulers. Hasina’s father Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman had himself led student protests against Pakistan, whose brutal crackdown in 1971 precipitated Bangladeshi independence. Assorted economic and linguistic injustices by a centralist Pakistani regime that tended to view Bengalis with disdain had led to a number of Bengali student protests. Opposition to Pakistani policies came from Bengali ethnonationalists – who varied from wanting the Bengali language institutionalized, to calling for a decentralization to calling for an irredentist union with the West Bengal of India – as well as from leftist, religious, and populist circles.

Children on the premises of the Ganabhaban on the occasion of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s birthday on March 17, 1975 [PC: Scroll.in]

Mujibur-Rahman had shot to fame through these protests, but no later than the late 1960s he had also secretly opened links with India at which many Bengali dissidents would have baulked. These links were partially facilitated by the minority Hindu business class, which has often been a strident supporter of the Awami League since. Nonetheless, his popularity forced the junta to permit him to run in the 1970s, and with virtually the entire East Pakistani electorate rallying behind him he won. This put the Pakistani junta, which had bet on a split Eastern vote, in a quandary: eventually, they arrested the election winner and savagely cracked down on much of the Bengali populace, students and Hindus in particular, in a campaign where thousands were killed. Large numbers of Bengali soldiers deserted to join a mounting insurgency. In late 1971 India seized the opportunity with a full-scale invasion to “liberate” Bangladesh, with Mujibur-Rahman as its leader.

Few Bangladeshis mourned the end of the dysfunctional marriage with Pakistan. However, Bengali Islamists, particularly the Jamaat party, who were otherwise critical of Islamabad had nonetheless refused to break up a Muslim country and had fought on the Pakistani army’s side in 1971. This made them ripe targets after independence, but they were not the only ones. Faced with the natural disasters that had also imperilled the late Pakistani period and with a large number of armed militias over which he had little control. The Bengali nationalism that he had ridden often manifested itself in ugly ways: as early as 1970-71 his Awami League’s armed wing had ethnically targeted non-Bengalis, who with the exception of the southeast hills were almost expelled outright from Bangladesh. He also faced the same natural disasters with which his Pakistani predecessors had suffered.

But perhaps most damaging was Mujibur-Rahman’s increasingly obvious vassalage to India, which outfitted and supplied a thuggish personal militia that his family used, supposedly to maintain control. This vassalage pleased neither Bangladeshis who wanted meaningful independence; nor irredentists, who wanted the unification of Bangladesh with India’s West Bengal province; nor Marxists, who tended to support India’s rival China; nor Islamists; nor the critical military defectors from the Pakistan army, who had fought against India just a few years earlier. Mujibur-Rahman’s progressively repressive regime ended in a brutal assassination that wiped out much of Hasina’s family. In the power struggle that followed, military factions led by army commander Lieutenant-General Ziaur-Rahman and his successor Hossain Ershad would take over.

Though military rule stabilised Bangladesh and generally lacked the brutality of Awami rule, a small elite continued to rule: Ziaur-Rahman’s Jatiyabadi Party and Ershad’s Jatiya Party are both led by their families to this day. When Hasina and Ziaur-Rahman’s widow Khaleda Zia rode a populist wave to end Ershad’s military rule in 1990, the succeeding democratic period continued to alternate rule among parties defined by patrimonial politics. Hasina, who returned to power in 2008 after a brief military rule had ousted the increasingly popular Khaleda, added brute force to this elitism.

A Venomous Elitism

The Awami League’s strident secularism, in the age of “the war on terror”, was particularly useful in beating down dissent. An early paramilitary mutiny was tendentiously blamed on Islamist infiltration and supposed Pakistan links – claims that were eagerly parrotted and repeated worldwide by Hasina’s Indian suzerains. She also proceeded to reverse her own father’s rehabilitation of the Islamist Jamaat, which was essentially vilified for having picked the Pakistani side during the 1971 war and banned, its elderly leadership executed as “war criminals” during a spree of show trials in the mid-2010s. Khaleda’s Jatiyabadi party, as Hasina’s main contender, was also persecuted. The worst episodes came during a series of massacres in the spring of 2013 when protests against these dubious sentences were bloodily crushed. Rather than focus on the actual bloodshed, much of the international media focused on the claims of government-friendly liberal bloggers who claimed intimidation by “radical Muslims”: this in an overwhelmingly Muslim country.

The now-ousted ex-PM of Bangladesh [PC: AFP/Getty Images]

It became fashionable at one point to highlight Bangladesh’s economic growth under Hasina. But this masked the reality that the state, particularly its security, had been outsourced as a barely concealed client of India, and that the economic and social benefits were reaped by a small and increasingly ruthless elite. Disappearances, abductions, and murders were frequent and rarely discussed. State institutions, including even an army that had historically had a sizeable number of opposition sympathisers, were purged in favour of the prime minister’s men: her last army commander, General Wakerul-Zaman, is a relative by marriage. Perhaps most notorious was the ruling party’s student wing, which was infamous for its brutality and impunity. Bangladesh’s political scene only narrowed, with Hasina’s election wins coming against either Jatiya members – Ershad’s widow Rowshan and brother Ghulam Qader – or by disgruntled Awami League leaders, such as former foreign minister Kamal Hossain. Whatever their respective merits and flaws, the process was hardly representative or participatory.

It was in an attempt to reward her supporters, by cementing quotas for the families of “freedom fighters” – in other words, for loyalists – that Hasina overstepped. The protests against this, led by Naheeb Islam, were quickly subjected to violent crackdown on her orders until it became clear that violence would no longer work. Hasina had misread the discontent of Bangladesh’s public, particularly its youth: appeals to the Awami role in the “freedom struggle” would no longer work. Having milked its role in 1971 for so long, the Awami League was utterly unaware that to a critical mass of the population, it had become the oppressor of the day.

What Now?

India, where she fittingly fled, has been most obviously dismayed by Hasina’s ouster, masking their loss of a pliant vassal with tendentious claims of threats to Bangladeshi Hindus – who themselves have largely dismissed these threats, and whom the opposition has vowed to safeguard. But its frequent rival China, which has always favoured stability even at the cost of repression, is not particularly enthused for its part. A surprisingly positive note came from India’s close ally the United States. Having long turned a blind eye to Awami misrule, Washington had been particularly concerned since Hasina cracked down on an opposition leader, Muhammad Yunus, who had a long track record of working with Washington and in particular the Clintons. Today Yunus sits as, effectively, prime minister of an interim regime.

The interim government, where Awami leader Mohammad Shahabuddin still maintains the titular presidency and Hasina’s relation Wakerul-Zaman leads the army, is by no means thrilled at the prime minister’s ouster. It may be, as in so many countries over the last decade, that the establishment will make a comeback. Or it may be that one particularly predatory party is exchanged for another, or another power finds a willing vassal at the expense of the Bangladeshi populace in Dhaka. Nonetheless, Bangladesh’s youth has done what years of repression had rendered unthinkable: caution need not be mutually exclusive with a justified celebration.

 

Related:

– Over Five Decades On: Bangladesh’s Crisis Of Islam, Politics, And Justice

– From Cairo To Dhaka: Exploring The Impact Of The Arab Spring On Bangladesh

 

The post The Downfall Of A Tyrant: Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina Forced Into Flight After 15-Year Reign appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

Hamas calls Washington a “full partner” in Israel’s crimes.

The party sowed division during the Blair years – and according to its Muslim members, the stain of prejudice remains

“If we don’t make the white vote angry, he’s gone,” wrote the campaign staffer. “Go strong on the militant Moslem [sic] angle,” while making Tory voters fear “they are being used by the Moslems”. You may think the above writings are an example of a particularly vicious British National party intrusion into our democratic process. But this was the 2010 campaign of Phil Woolas, Labour’s immigration minister under Gordon Brown.

The result? A leaflet asking voters to stand by their candidate, claiming the Lib Dems wanted to “give hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants the right to stay” and warning of the “extremists” winning, accompanied by images of angry Islamist protesters clutching banners such as “Behead those who insult Islam”.

Owen Jones is a Guardian columnist

Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.

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• Perhaps oddly, given where I live, I am no fan of Tottenham cake (sold in Greggs’ London shops). I do, however, frequent Greggs (Zoe Williams, 6 August). I enjoy its sausage breakfast baps, and – unlike some fast food chains – it is fully unionised. That definitely makes the food taste better.
Keith Flett
Tottenham, London

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A man clutches his groin after being hit by a brick thrown by fellow rioters during the Southport mosque attack. Source

Last week, following the murder of three young girls in Southport, Merseyside, who attacked a number of other girls and their teachers at a Taylor Swift-themed dance class, gangs of racist hooligans have been on the rampage in a number of towns and small cities across the UK, particularly the north. In Southport itself they attacked a mosque (injuring 39 police officers), in Liverpool they set a library and community centre on fire, causing serious damage; in Sunderland and Rotherham they besieged hotels housing asylum seekers and started fires. In other places they attacked shops (some but not all perceived as ‘ethnic’), looting some and burning others, smashed house and car windows, and attacked random Black and Asian people both walking and in their cars. During all this, we have had politicians, columnists (notably Nigel Farage, Matthew Goodwin and Isabel Oakeshott) and an elected police chief in the UK tell us that these thugs are a “protest against mass immigration” by “the people” who are “sick of being gaslit” and that while of course they don’t condone violence, especially against police officers (naturally), these people are not “far right thugs” at all but ordinary people protesting, and the solution is to crack down on “mass immigration” as they want, rather than on violent hooliganism and the organised gang behind it.

The way the violence erupted last Tuesday should disabuse anyone of the idea that this wasn’t racist violence. After the Southport attack last Monday, rumours began to spread (allegedly sown by Russia, although people seem to blame them for any misinformation that goes around these days) that the attacker was a Syrian asylum seeker or refugee, a group widely blamed for all sorts of things from “stealing people’s houses” to sexual harassment; when the media did not report the attacker’s name, which is normal as he was under 18 (though only just) and had yet to be charged, accusations started to be made that the authorities were sitting on the information to protect asylum seekers or to hide the ‘link’ between asylum seeking or mass immigration and this tragedy. Finally last Thursday the courts did issue his name; he is in fact the British-born son of refugees from Rwanda, born in Cardiff though raised in Southport. By that time, there had already been a mob attack in Southport itself; once any link with Islam or Muslims was disproved, the mobs continued to descend on one town and city after another, with their media crypto-allies continuing to spout the “mass immigration” excuse. The notorious serial hooligan Tommy Robinson (Stephen Yaxley-Lennon), who founded the English Defence League whose slogans have been heard in the streets this past week, has been stirring the pot via Twitter from his sunbed in Ayia Napa, Cyprus, advertising locations of forthcoming ‘protests’ and claiming that Muslims were “roaming the streets in armed gangs” attacking random “whites”.

Various right-wing talking heads have been telling us since the violence started that we should not call the attackers “far-right thugs”, as the Prime Minister did, or dismiss them as racists when they are really voicing public disquiet about “mass immigration”. All this is nonsense. A thug is a person who uses violence, or willingly gives the impression he is able and willing to do so. This is quite an apt description of those who staged these riots. As for the “saying what people really think”, we have seen no large demonstrations against this, or against us accommodating asylum seekers (as we are bound to by international law), only violent, organised mob attacks. By comparison, an actual mass movement such as the campaign against the genocide in Gaza and ongoing western political and military support for it has organised demonstration after demonstration around the UK since last October, particularly in London, which have resulted in very little disorder and nothing on the scale of the past week. The most recent one resulted in two arrests, both for speech offences. The repeated partial defences of the rioters have come from the losing side in the recent election, namely the Tory party and Nigel Farage’s Reform UK vehicle, which does suggest that, having lost a democratic election (progressive parties between them scored well over 50%, even if Labour’s vote share was only around 35%), that part of the political spectrum is resorting to violence to get their way.

Someone mentioned that the Zionists on social media had been quiet since the start of the riots, but on a closer examination it turned out that they were a bit quieter but not silent. Stephen Pollard penned an article for the Jewish Chronicle complaining that people who attended the riots but did not riot were condemned, but “those who attend the hate marches alongside antisemites are described as ‘decent’”. The “hate marches” he refers to are the marches against the Gaza genocide, of course, none of which have threatened or advocated any violence against Jews just because they are Jews, or have attacked synagogues, Jewish shops, individual Jews, Jewish graves or anything else Jewish; they call for a ceasefire in Gaza, or for western powers to stop arming Israel with weapons to use on civilians. Meanwhile, the fellow travellers with the racist rioters are still complaining about “their country” being taken over, or demanding that we shut the door to refugees; a different situation altogether. Melanie Phillips, on her Substack, mouths the usual disapproval of the violence itself, but complains of “public services overwhelmed by uncontrolled immigration” when anyone involved in those services will tell you that they have been weakened by 14 years of the Tories starving them of funds. The same Tory government that refused to accept that the Far Right were a significant threat, despite intelligence warnings, choosing to focus on Muslims and environmentalists instead, also downgraded our ability to respond to a lethal contagious virus.

The media also have been timid about naming the problem. The “new Right” TV stations such as GB News and Talk TV have been full of thinly-veiled egging on of the rioters (disapproval of the violence itself but continual harping on “mass immigration”, for example) and the BBC has persistently referred to the attacks as “protests”, including in headlines; some of their reporters were seen calling them things like pro-British or anti-immigration protests, as if the people attacked were not British (which in a lot of cases they in fact were); they make no distinction between British Black and Asian people and legal or illegal immigrants (not that either deserve to be lynched or burned to death, but it shows that it is racist violence, not protests against large-scale immigration). A letter in yesterday’s Guardian noted that when the thugs came to Bristol, they would attack people immediately; there had been “no slow build-up of tension” and “no attempt to make a political point”.

As for why these riots occurred when they did, the immediate reason is that an organised gang of racist hooligans used the Southport tragedy as a pretext, but without several years of politicians and the media using ‘immigrants’ as a scapegoat for problems that were of politicians’ making, the attacks could have been brought under control much more quickly and there would have been no debate as to what kind of problem we were dealing with. Brexiteer politicians capitalised on discontent about the large wave of immigration from eastern Europe that took place in the mid-2000s; in the few years after Brexit, politicians continually complained that they had not been able to bring the numbers down despite shutting the door on new worker migrants from Europe. The prime minister spoke from behind lecterns bearing the slogan “stop the boats”, referring to the refugees (and no doubt others) coming across the Channel in small boats, and the same slogan was heard being repeated during last week’s riots. The media, including the BBC, have amplified the voices of anti-immigrant politicians, including Nigel Farage who, despite persistent pleading that Brexit was all about sovereignty, invariably diverted any discussion onto immigration. There has been more subtle agitation on social media: people reminding us of “how things used to be”, with videos on YouTube and promoted posts on Facebook consisting of pictures or footage from decades past contrasted with today (such as a thriving shopping centre in the 70s contrasted with the same mall in a run-down state today) with a comments section full of people blaming the changes on immigrants (again, meaning simply non-white people) rather than, say, online shopping or the local council going bankrupt in large part because central government starved it of funds — something that did not happen before the Tories came to power in 2010.

Racist thugs are not the only kind of racists. The people stirring this up are wealthy or at least middle-class people in the media, politics and in some cases academia. They are the ones telling us that the goons who attacked police officers, shopkeepers and ordinary people and tried to destroy mosques and shops represent “ordinary people” or at least ordinary people’s fears, that it’s only the “metropolitan liberal elite” who do not share their suspicion towards Muslims, their xenophobia or their fear of “mass immigration”. None of these people want real solutions to people’s material problems; they just want to focus people’s anger on scapegoats so they can carry on enriching themselves. Most Muslims in this country are working-class people. We don’t hate or despise working-class people of any race. We regard racists as a threat to us, because of their behaviour as demonstrated this past week. It’s a choice to be racist, and a choice to be a thug.

Possibly Related Posts:

• It’s Islamophobia, thank you
• Ask a loaded question …
• Thanks Wes, but take a stand on Gaza!
• Mosque at the Trocadero is good for it and the community
• The need for a representative academia

Israel gave us the misery of a caged life before 7 October. It has deprived us of any of the advantages of a simple life since.