Jean Quatremer denies Gaza genocide.

Israel stands in the way of our simplest wishes.

For many Muslim students, college is not just a time of academic rigor; it’s a crucible of conflicting ideologies, challenges to faith tradition, and unprecedented personal tests. And when things fall apart – when Islamophobia hits campus, when spiritual doubts creep in, when burnout begins – it often feels like there’s no safety net.

This is where Muslim chaplaincy could make all the difference.

Too often, teenage students are forced to shoulder immense emotional and spiritual labor for themselves and their communities. The demands of leadership roles in on-campus Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) can quickly escalate far past what they were initially meant to be. What would it look like if Muslim students had someone trained, trusted, and spiritually grounded to turn to? How beneficial might it be if students had someone beyond their own peers to take advice from? Someone embedded in the institution who could guide them not just in times of crisis, but through the quiet work of faith formation?

Such an individual is a reality for far too few Muslim students in the United States. However, the presence of a Muslim chaplain in this role could revolutionize the experiences of hundreds of thousands of Muslim undergraduates across the nation, helping build a generation of highly educated students who effectively integrate their faith identity into their day-to-day lives.

This model of care and mentorship is not foreign to our tradition. Our beloved Prophet Muhammad was not just a leader and lawmaker – he was a murabbī, a healer of hearts and soother of souls. Countless stories from the sīrah detail his compassion for the needy, ill, and impoverished. As the Qur’an says:

“There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent example for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Last Day and [who] remembers Allah often.” [Surah Al-Ahzab: 33;21]

Emulating the Prophet goes beyond just observing rituals of prayer and worship; it means fostering communities rooted in mercy, emotional health, and spiritual resilience. At its essence, chaplaincy carries forward this Sunnah of emotional and spiritual caregiving.

The Landscape: Muslim Students on Campus

The presence of Muslim students as an organized body on US campuses is a recent development. Although Muslim student organizations were founded as early as the 1940s, the modern MSA system began at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1963. Muslim chaplaincy did not exist until 30 years later when the first part-time Muslim chaplain was hired at Wellesley College. Six years later, at Georgetown, the first full-time Muslim chaplain was introduced1.

“The growth of the Muslim student population – and their increasing visibility on campus – has outpaced institutional support available to them.” [PC: Kawah Kaos Dakwah (unsplash)]

This progression mirrors the increasing Muslim population in the United States, from approximately 100,000 American Muslims in 1960 to nearly 4 million today. However, the growth of the Muslim student population – and their increasing visibility on campus – has outpaced institutional support available to them. Many student bodies still struggle to maintain a dedicated prayer space, have access to ḥalāl food options in dining halls, and receive accommodation for religious events such as Eid. MSAs consistently advocate for the rights of Muslim students, but the inherently transient nature of university student bodies and their relative isolation from larger communities often leads to a lack of continuity or sustained change. Ultimately, while MSAs have and continue to serve as spiritual hubs, event organizers, and advocacy spaces, they were never designed to bear the full weight of students’ religious and emotional needs. What began as grassroots community-building has, over time, become an essential but overstretched safety net.

Impacts of Participation in Campus Religious Life

Though research is limited regarding Muslim university students specifically, numerous studies confirm that spiritual care and chaplaincy play a significant role in maintaining student mental health and overall well-being across Christian and interfaith communities during college years. Faith community support, in particular when directly led via chaplaincy, is integral in proactively addressing distress points for college students.

A comprehensive study by Saliba (2024) underscores the multifaceted contributions of university chaplains to mental health within the context of suicide prevention. Chaplains surveyed across international communities were reported to engage in various preventive practices, such as referring students to mental health professionals, offering community life services, providing support during exam periods, and discussing images of God or other religious figures. These activities not only address spiritual distress but also foster a sense of belonging and support among students, which are crucial factors in mitigating suicidal thoughts and behaviors2.

Beyond addressing student distress from a spiritual perspective, participating in an active, chaplain-led faith community may indirectly alleviate academic distress as well. A 2021 study undertaken at Baylor University found that Christian students who attended on-campus church services at least once per week had higher GPAs, reported improved mental focus and academic resilience, and were less likely to engage in academic dishonesty than those who did not3. A study conducted by UCLA of over 100,000 incoming freshmen at institutions across the country found that students with high religious engagement had significantly higher rates of being able to find meaning in hardship and feeling at peace, indicating a greater ability to deal with hurdles in both their academic and personal lives4. Though data is ultimately limited on the direct influences of chaplains on student wellness, it stands to reason that chaplaincy involvement generally leads to a stronger and more active on-campus faith community, which is indicated to increase student wellness across multiple sectors of life.

However, while such involvement may be a reality for Christian communities on campuses, Muslim representation is sadly lacking. As universities have expanded religious life offices to serve Christian, Jewish, and interfaith populations, Muslim students were often left without a parallel advocate or advisor. While the aforementioned chaplaincy roles established at Wellesley and Georgetown in the 1990s and early 2000s marked a turning point—not only as acknowledgments of Muslim student presence, but as acts of institutional responsibility—significant work remains to be done.

Research conducted by a chaplaincy consulting firm confirmed the presence of approximately 150 Muslim chaplains across the over 4000 colleges in America, meaning less than 4% of US college communities have access to a chaplain5. This creates a vacuum in moments where spiritual care is most needed.

The Role of a Chaplain

Such an absence of spiritual care and leadership can leave a significant void in the lives of college students as they navigate critical stages of identity development and moral alignment. Having an adequately trained and engaged spiritual leader is integral for guiding Muslim students towards healthy, deen-centered lifestyles.

“Muslim chaplaincy stands out as a vital resource that bridges faith and modern campus life.” [PC: Nathan Dumlao (unsplash)]

A Muslim chaplain is not an imam in the traditional sense, nor are they simply a counselor. Rather, they occupy a multifaceted role spanning pastoral care and counseling, religious mentorship, advocacy, interfaith engagement, and more. Based on their background, a chaplain may provide one-on-one mentorship and support, lead prayers and faith seminars, give academic advice, coordinate with institutional leadership to ensure Muslim student needs are met, or advocate externally for their student body. It is important that they have a solid grounding in Islamic tradition, as well as adequate training in contemporary elements of chaplaincy such as mental health work, to allow them to respond meaningfully to the diverse needs of their students.

The nebulous boundaries defining a chaplain’s responsibilities can be both empowering and challenging. While they may have the freedom to interpret their role as they see fit, they may also become overwhelmed with burdens that are outside of their field of expertise. As Muslim chaplaincy becomes more widespread in higher education, it is crucial to establish shared guidelines about the scope and nature of their role. This includes articulating expectations for prior training, ensuring access to ongoing training and support from older chaplains, and fostering collaborative relationships across university leadership. Doing so not only helps chaplains thrive in their roles, but also ensures that Muslim students receive the holistic, faith-sensitive support they deserve during one of the most formative periods of their lives.

Conclusion: A Call to Invest in Our Students’ Spiritual Future

In an era when students face increasing pressures around identity, purpose, and belonging, the presence of a Muslim chaplain can offer much-needed spiritual grounding, guidance, and advocacy. As institutions of higher education continue to diversify and expand their understanding of student wellness, Muslim chaplaincy stands out as a vital resource that bridges faith and modern campus life. 

But to fully realize the potential of this role, we can’t rely on universities alone. It will take the entire Muslim community – students, alumni, donors, community leaders, and everyday Muslims – to help build the scaffolding around chaplaincy positions and ensure Muslim students are not left spiritually adrift.

Here’s what you can do:

• Support institutions that train Muslim chaplains, such as The Islamic Seminary of America, the Association of Muslim Chaplains, and Boston Islamic Seminary. These programs ensure that chaplains are both Islamically grounded and professionally equipped for pastoral care.
• Reach out to your alma mater. Ask whether they have a Muslim chaplain on staff. If not, advocate for one. Share resources and help them understand the unique challenges Muslim students face.
• Encourage your local masjid or community center to connect with nearby campuses. Even part-time chaplaincy support—one day a week—can provide a lifeline.
• Give if you’re able. Many chaplaincy positions begin as donor-funded roles. A single scholarship, endowment, or fundraising effort can change hundreds of lives.
• Keep Muslim chaplains in your du‘ā. Their work is often quiet, emotionally demanding, and under-recognized. Pray for their strength, sincerity, and impact.

By investing in the development and sustainability of Muslim chaplaincy, we can help colleges and universities cultivate more inclusive, spiritually attentive environments. Let’s ensure that our students don’t walk their journeys alone. Let’s build a future where faith and education grow hand in hand.

 

Related:

– [Podcast] Hospitals And Healing: Islamic Chaplaincy | Ch. Sondos Kholaki

– From The Chaplain’s Desk – Reap The Rewards Of Being Mindful Of Allah

1    Husain, A. (2013, March 4). MSA national: For 50 years, ‘Students’ has been its middle name. HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/msa-national-for-50-years_b_1940707 HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/msa-national-for-50-years_b_19407072    Saliba, S. M. (2024). The contributions of university chaplains, as spiritual care professionals, to suicide prevention: Results from a European expert panel. Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health, 27(2), 222-249. https://doi.org/10.1080/19349637.2024.2341079 3    Dougherty, K. D., Glanzer, P. L., Robinson, J. A., Ratchford, J. L., & Schnitker, S. A. (2021). Baylor faith and character study: Methods and preliminary findings. Christian Higher Education, 21(3), 168-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/15363759.2021.19295644    Astin, A. W., Astin, H. S., & Lindholm, J. A. (n.d.). Overall Findings. Spirituality in Higher Education. https://www.spirituality.ucla.edu/findings/5    Mantas, N. Z. (2023, April 7). How one Muslim chaplain created a Ramadan handbook for campuses. Interfaith America. https://www.interfaithamerica.org/article/muslim-chaplain-ramadan/

The post The Urgent Need For Muslim Chaplaincy On Campus: An Investment In Spiritual Futures appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

By providing the technology, Dell belongs next to Google, Amazon, Intel and Microsoft as a corporate profiteer of occupation, apartheid and mass murder.

Cryptocurrency is Deek’s last chance to succeed in life, and he will not stop, no matter what.

Previous Chapters: Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12

Author’s Note: I consider dreams to be signs from Allah, and as such I never invent dreams for my stories. When I need to know what a character is dreaming, I think of that character before I sleep. I put myself in his mindset, and become him. In the morning, when I wake, I write down my dreams immediately. That’s what happened here. I dreamed this for Deek – with the Thunkan giants, Karkol, the planet Rust, and all.

***

“Lift as you climb.” – African-American proverb

Honey On Sunlight

Abdul Basit Abdul Samad

Rania sat at the kitchen table staring at her laptop screen, studying the city of Fresno’s residential permit guide, as at the same time she listened to the perennial sound of ‘Abdul Basit ‘Abd us-Samad reciting the Quran. The late Egyptian reciter’s voice was like honey on sunlight at times, and at other times was a pelican flying just over the surface of the sea, then a peregrine falcon diving into the water. Suddenly it went deep, and was a subterranean river pouring over a never-seen waterfall. Allahu Akbar, may Allah have mercy on him.

The document she was studying helped homeowners understand what they must do before building a structure on their property. It detailed the required documents, a submittal checklist, review timeline estimates and the city’s fee schedule for things like plan-checks, permits and resubmittals.

Beside her on a table were three empty blueberry yogurt cups, and she had just scooped a large spoonful from a fourth cup into her mouth when the door opened.

“As-salamu alaykum Mom,” Sanaya called out.

“I’m in the kitchen!” Hand to her mouth, swallowing the yogurt.

The girls joined her, dumping their miscellaneous belongings onto the table. Amira checked her phone, looking glum. She missed her Baba, Rania knew. Amira and Deek had always been best friends.

“I thought you were on the keto diet,” Sanaya commented. “You know those yogurts have a lot of sugar.”

“They’re low fat.”

“And high sugar.”

Rania sighed and pushed the yogurt away. Sanaya was right. If she ever wanted to lose the extra weight on her hips and upper arms, she had to get serious about quitting sugar. And she did want to lose weight. Deek always told her she was beautiful, and their love life was healthy, but part of her wondered if her weight gain was one of the reasons he had left. She’d actually cut out all true junk foods in the last several days, and had already lost a few pounds. Deek would like that. The thought made her smile.

She needed to get serious about exercise. When she was young, her go-to sport was swimming. Her own mother had grown up swimming in the Tigris river, and had taught Rania from a young age. Rania was on the school swim team until she turned 12 and began wearing hijab. The problem now was that she didn’t have a private place to swim. She supposed she could make herself a burkini and swim at the community pool. She was quite talented with a sewing machine. Or she could start jogging in the neighborhood.

This Time Was Different

In the past, when she and Deek had fought, she had never worried that he might leave her. But this time was different. She knew that in these last few months she’d been nasty to him at times. She’d been under so much stress with the bills, and it had changed her. She wasn’t proud of it. And now Deek was rich.

It wasn’t that she thought Deek would take his money and find a younger, more beautiful woman. He wasn’t like that. But maybe the money gave him options that he didn’t have before. And maybe some of those options were more attractive than a life with Rania.

She hated herself for thinking these things. For all her faults, she had been good to Deek, and loved him, and cared for him, and supported him while he struggled. She was a good wife. She didn’t “deserve” for Deek to leave her, and she shouldn’t blame herself. But she couldn’t help it.

Sanaya snatched up the discarded yogurt and began to eat it.

Fa inna ma’ al-’usra yusraa, Abdul Basit recited:

So, surely with hardship comes ease.
Surely with hardship comes ease!
So once you have fulfilled ˹your duty˺, strive ˹in devotion˺,
turning to your Lord ˹alone˺ with hope.

“This is Abdul Basit, isn’t it?” Sanaya asked. “He’s so good.”

Rania paused the recitation. “Yes, mashaAllah. A great man. Do you know when he used to travel in the Muslim world, presidents would meet him on the tarmac? May Allah elevate him in Jannah.”

Sanaya craned her neck to peek at the screen. “What are you working on?”

“I’m studying the city’s requirements for building an addition to the house. I have a meeting with an architect tomorrow morning, I want to be ready.”

“What are you going to build?”

“An office for your father.”

Amira looked up hopefully. “Is Baba coming home?”

“Of course he is.”

“You talked to him?”

“No, but I -”

Amira tossed her phone onto the table with a clatter, then pulled off her blue amira hijab and threw it randomly onto a kitchen counter. She shook her head, letting her long, wavy brown hair flow to her back.

Drove Him Away

“Come on Miri,” Rania said, using the girl’s nickname. “Don’t be like that.”

“Mom, you know I love you,” Sanaya said in the tone of someone imparting a solemn secret. “But you did drive him away. You need to go see him.”

Rania threw her hands up. “I don’t even know where he is. I’ve been leaving messages but he doesn’t answer. But it’s okay, it’s not the first time we’ve had a fight. We always work it out, inshaAllah. I love your father and he loves me. And what do you mean I drove him away?”

“I was there, Mom, remember? In the driveway when Baba brought home the new car? I heard what you said.”

Amira perked up like a lion scenting a deer. “What did she say?”

“She said Baba was an anchor around her neck, and that she was seeing someone else.”

“Mom!” Amira leaped to her feet.

Rania gave Sanaya a baleful stare. “Yes, I said that about the anchor, but I was under a lot of stress and I didn’t mean it. And I have NOT been seeing someone else. I was having lunch occasionally with Dr. Townsend at the hospital. I’ve stopped doing that. I even transferred departments so as not to be around him.”

“Why did you have to transfer?”

“Because he won’t leave me alone. He thinks there’s something between us, and there isn’t. I love your father and no one else. I would never, ever cheat on him, I swear it.”

Every Penny

Amira sat back down. “Why do guys do that?”

“Do what?”

“They never take the hint. Even when you say no they keep coming like hungry dogs.”

Hearing this out of her 16 year old daughter’s mouth was worrisome, but Rania didn’t have time to deal with it right then. She filed it away, to be addressed later.

“We believe you, mom,” Sanaya said. “Right, Miri?”

“Whatever.”

“How are you going to pay for the new office? How much will it cost?”

“Your father gave me a hundred thousand dollars. It will cost every penny of it, and maybe a little more. But that’s okay, because your father deserves it.”

“So… We’re rich now? Baba succeeded with the crypto thing?”

Rania nodded slowly. “Yes. It would appear so. He bought that little Porsche with crypto. Didn’t even pay cash for it.”

Amira pumped a fist in the air. “Go Baba! That car is bad-ass.”

“Watch your language. What does a person’s bottom have to do with anything?”

The girls laughed uproariously. Sanaya wiped a little yogurt from her chin.

“It’s how people talk, Mom,” Amira explained.

“It’s not how we talk. We choose our language consciously. Everything we do and say is in the service of Allahu Subhanahu wa Ta’aala.”

“Yes, yes.” Sanaya lifted an eyebrow. “So can I get me a slice of that crypto score?”

“Don’t worry,” Rania reassured. “Your father always does what’s right.”

Earth Will Die

Earth was going to die. A terrible catastrophe was coming. Deek saw it in a vision, clearer than the faces of his children. The entire world would ignite in a conflagration that would burn even the seas and rivers. The vision struck him like a sledgehammer.

That evening, Deek gathered Rania, Sanaya, and Amira around the kitchen table. “I’ve seen it,” he began, voice low. “I know Earth will die.”

Rania’s jaw clenched. “A dream, Deek?” she said, arms folded. “What proof do you have?” The lamp’s warm glow revealed the worry etched on his wife’s face and the tightening in Sanaya’s shoulders.

Sanaya’s foot tapped the tile floral. Amira looked down at her phone. “How would we live on some alien planet?” Rania pressed on.

“I have spoken with Karkol,” Deek explained. “The Thunka who deals with my company.”

The Thunka were a race of red-skinned giants from the planet Rust. They ran an interstellar cargo service between Earth and other planets, and Deek happened to know one of them, a purchasing agent named Karkol who Deek had occasionally hired to procure alien antiques.

“Karkol has agreed,” Deek went on, “to transport us to Rust. I know it will be difficult. The atmosphere is breathable, but light. It will take time to adjust. And the gravity is heavier than ours. But you know there are dozens of humans living on Rust. Diplomats, merchants, pilgrims.”

“How would we live?” Rania demanded. “It’s out of the question.”

Sanaya and Amira did not want to leave their comfortable lives and friends. In the end Deek’s family all refused to leave. Their refusal drove a steel spike through his chest. They didn’t understand the urgency. Why wouldn’t they believe him? He had always been honest with them.

Ozone and Oil

There was a little time yet before the catastrophe, he sensed this. He would go on his own, in advance. He would build a home, learn the language, and prepare a welcome for his family.

When he left, Rania turned away. He hugged his daughters. Amira hid her face in her hands.

On the Thunkan ship, everything dwarfed him: the height of the ceiling, the width of the corridors, and his own bed, which he needed a ladder to climb into. The giants were five times his size and he stayed out of their way, except when he needed to follow one through a door, since the 30 foot high circular doors would not open for him, as his weight was not sufficient to trigger the floor sensors.

He was lightheaded due to lack of oxygen, but he would acclimate as his body created more red blood cells. The air smelled of ozone and oil. All around, crates loomed four deep. The shipping labels were in Thunkan, he could not read them, but he knew they were destined for many different worlds.

Translating

I need to contact Earth,” he told one giant. The great creature led him to a panel computer. Deek spoke into it.

“Call my wife. Rania Al-Rashid in Fresno, California.”

A disc swirled on the screen, then a word appeared: TRANSLATING. A moment later the computer spoke in a metallic rasp:

“PROVIDE TRACKING NUMBER FOR WALL LIGHTS FROM FRESNO CALIFORNIA.”

Frustration flared. Deek waved his arms. “I need to call my wife!”

“FRUITS FOR YOUR LIFE.”

It was hopeless.

Buildings Like Cliffs

On the planet Rust, he staggered through the city, its buildings towering like cliffs, every door and window yawning wide.

Ochre dust swirled through the city’s broad avenues. Masks—dust-coated and ritual-bright—covered every face, including his. Immense red-skinned trees, trunks wider than buildings, reached toward a salmon sky. The call to prayer sounded from burnished bronze temples that rose like cathedral spires, and giants flowed from all directions to worship. They were not all red-skinned, as he saw now. Some were green, and others brown.

He entered a cafeteria the size of a stadium. Food was considered a Thunkan right, and was free. Tables grown from living stone bore steaming blue fruits and braided pastries. Hunger and hope warred in his chest. He sampled a fruit—and spat out its bitter flesh. Glyphs curved across a holo-menu, but he could not decipher the symbols.

A Sponsor

At his lowest moment, a green-skinned giantess in a finely cut gray suit approached with a tray of food. In spite of her obviously feminine contours and jewelry, her voice rumbled like an avalanche as in passable English she explained the foodstuffs. She was a university professor, specializing in alien languages. Her name was Anako.

Anako informed Deek that he must find a sponsor within one month, or he would be sent back to Earth. She herself could sponsor him, and get him a job teaching English at the university. With that income, he could build a house suited to his size.

Deek sighed in relief. Everything would be okay. He and his family could survive here. Anako took him to a computer terminal that specialized in alien communications, and he called his family.

“You’re asking too much, habibi,” Rania said. “You should return home. The scientists say they can repair the problem.”

Deek’s heart leapt to his throat. “What problem?”

“The ozone layer is degrading.”

“You must come to Thunka immediately!”

But Rania would not have it. Crushed, he returned to his temporary dormitory home and lay on his bunk.

Bound To Perish

Anako found him with the news. Chemical pollutants in Earth’s atmosphere had ignited the ozone layer, burning it away and allowing solar and interstellar radiation to flood in. Everything on the surface of the planet was dead.

In a daze, Deek wandered the city. It was night time, and a warm breeze rippled his shirt. Looking up, he saw myriad lights of freighters landing and taking off. In a city park, a sea of violet grass waved in the wind.

He found Rabiah Al-Adawiyyah sitting with her back against a tree as wide as a house, rocking back and forth as she recited the Quran. He fell to his knees, averting his eyes from her pious visage.

“It’s all gone,” he said numbly.

In answer, Rabiah recited in Arabic from Surat Ar-Rahman:

Every being on Earth is bound to perish.
Only your Lord Himself, full of Majesty and Honor, will remain.
Then which of your Lord’s favours will you both deny?

Deek pressed his face into the grass. “Why did this happen?”

“Great doubt,” Rabiah said, “will eventually lead to great awakening.”

Deek stumbled away, mumbling, “Everything is gone.”

“Deek!” Rabiah called after him.

“Gone.”

———- “Mister Saghir!” ———-

Deep Yellow Sunlight

With a gasp, Deek jerked awake. He was in the back seat of November Evans’s car, which sat idling at a red light. They were on the outskirts of Fresno. Fields and roads were illuminated with that deep yellow hue that only occurs in the hour before sunset. Deek blinked, heartbeat thundering, and pressed his palms to his eyes.

“You were dreaming. I was about to come back there and shake you awake.”

On the radio, a man’s voice crooned:

She’s gone like last week’s moon
Gone like a forgotten tune.

November’s slender fingers brushed the volume knob as she turned the music off. “Are you alright?” Her voice was gentle.

“I guess.” In his mind he was still stuck on Rust, smelling the sour grass as the warm wind whipped at his clothing. The lights of ships above. Shaykha Rabiah saying, “Great doubt will eventually lead to great awakening.”

Why had Rania been so stubborn? Why wouldn’t she and the girls come with him?

And maybe more importantly, why had he left them behind? Why hadn’t he remained on Earth to die with them? That would have been more honorable.

A Heavy Dreamer

With shaking hands, he texted his daughters and asked them to meet him at the hotel restaurant tomorrow for lunch.

Then he texted Lubna to let her know he’d be dropping by in an hour or so. Lubna didn’t like surprise visits, at least not from Deek.

He would also visit Rania tonight, but he did not text her. He wanted to surprise her.

“You’re a heavy dreamer,” November commented.

“Not always. Things on my mind right now.”

“I apologize,” the driver said, “if I overstepped in our conversation about your family.”

Deek waved this off. “I’m having trouble adjusting.”

“You’ll find clarity. You have a good heart.”

“How do you know?”

“It’s part of my job to assess character.”

“I was thinking of changing my name,” Deek said out of the blue, “to Asad. It means lion.”

November Evans rolled the towncar right up to the Marco Polo’s front door. She turned to study him. “I don’t see it,” she remarked, “but sometimes we grow into our names.”

I Like You Too Much

Not knowing what else to say, Deek exited then stepped up to the open driver’s window. “You want to work for me?”

November winked at him with one pretty brown eye. “Negative. I like you too much for that.”

Deek regarded her. Part of his mind was still on the planet Rust, standing beneath trees the size of buildings, feeling the hot wind pull at his shirt.

“Lift as you climb,” he said.

November nodded solemnly. “Lift as you climb. Take care of yourself, Mr. Saghir.” With that, she drove away.

Deek’s phone buzzed with a reply from Lubna: “No visits today. I’m not in the mood.”

Deek’s mouth formed a firm line. He knew, and Allah knew, that he had not been a good brother to Lubna. He thought about the San Francisco woman’s cardboard sign: “Tried Everything.” That was true for Deek himself, and Lubna, and Marco, and even Zaid Karim. All of them struggling alone, like castaways on remote planets, each thinking they were alone in their particular world. But they all lived on the same planet. They were all part of each other’s world. And Deek wasn’t leaving anyone behind this time.

Not even taking the time to go up to his hotel room, he walked to his car, started it, and headed for Lubna’s house. What he intended to do would be tricky. She, like Deek, was proud. Plus, she didn’t like him much, and didn’t trust him. Which was his fault, and was something he must rectify at all costs.

[Part 14 will be published next week inshaAllah]

Reader comments and constructive criticism are important to me, so please comment!

* * *

See the Story Index for Wael Abdelgawad’s other stories on this website.

Wael Abdelgawad’s novels – including Pieces of a Dream, The Repeaters and Zaid Karim Private Investigator – are available in ebook and print form on his author page at Amazon.com.

 

Related:

Kill the Courier |Part 1 – Hiding in Plain Sight

No, My Son | A Short Story

 

The post Moonshot [Part 13] – The Planet Rust appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

We speak to Asem Alnabih in Gaza. Wel also talk about how EU’s decision not to impose sanctions on Israel is a greenlight for genocide. Why Israel bombed Syria and much more.

Delegations seek to pressure their own governments after Egyptian crackdown.

The British Muslim Trust is expected to begin monitoring incidents from early autumn, the government says

The UK government has appointed a new partner to monitor anti-Muslim hatred, months after its relationship with the Islamophobia reporting service Tell Mama broke down.

The British Muslim Trust (BMT) – a new organisation – is expected to begin receiving reports and monitoring incidents from early autumn, after being “selected as the recipient of the government’s new combatting hate against Muslims fund”, a statement from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government said on Monday.

Continue reading...

By Ibrahim Moiz
15 July 2025

Bism Allah Al-Rahman Al-Rahim

A Terrible Anniversary

Srebrenica, Bosnia

This month marks thirty years since one of the most vicious massacres of recent history, of eight thousand Muslim men and boys at the eastern Bosnian border town Srebrenica in July 1995. The Srebrenica massacre was simply the most climactic massacre in a genocidal campaign by Serb ethnonationalists, which helped break up the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s a most viciously directed its violence at Bosnia.

Though there has been much coverage of the Bosnian genocide, with Muslims worldwide shaken to solidarity, the war’s general trajectory and the escalation to genocide are little-understood by many foreign Muslims even as their implications continue to reverberate beyond Bosnia.

This first article in our series will examine the background and political-military history of the Bosnian war, before we move on to its dynamics in the context of Muslim solidarity, anti-Muslim propaganda and pseudo-nativism, and international institutional feebleness.

I. Ethnonationalism and Islam in Yugoslavia The Balkan Tinderbox

Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina showing major frontlines and regions during the 1992–1995 war (Public domain, U.S. CIA)

Since the nineteenth century, it has been a cliche to call the Balkans a tinderbox of local parochialism and competition by neighbouring powers. An early site of nationalisms, such as Serbian and Albanian, that in turn were exploited by foreign rivals of the Ottoman sultanate or Austro-Hungarian empire, it is often noted that Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo witnessed the assassination, by a Serb ethnonationalist against the Austro-Hungarian heir-apparent, that kicked off the First World War. The region suffered many wars in the first half of the twentieth century, and though under Broz Tito it became a stronghold of the Non-Aligned Movement, his celebrated balancing act between different ethnic groups was improvisational and occasionally repressive, if less than the Soviet Union or neighbouring Albania.

Yugoslavia’s partial federalism, with a certain regional autonomy, contained but institutionalized differences. Both at the capital Belgrade and in the various regions, ruling bodies and state institutions–such as the military, local militia, and security–were balanced among communists of different ethnic groups. Serbs comprised the largest, most far-flung group, and were often suspicious of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, both because of Kosovo’s importance to Serbia’s identity and because of rivalry with neighbouring Albania.

By the 1980s, with the communist edifice in decline and replaced increasingly by ethnic nationalism, ideologues such as Dobrica Cosic were presenting Serbs as natural but long-aggrieved defenders of the region. Such discourse often entered not only ethnic but also religious bigotry, with the largely Catholic Croats and largely Muslim Albanians and Bosniaks a target. Though partly reactive ethnonationalism also surged among Albanians and Croats, it was Serb ethnonationalists who presented themselves as defenders of Yugoslavia’s unity even as they increasingly engineered state institutions to their exclusive favour.

Slobodan Milosevic And Ethnonationalism

Nobody exploited this ethnonationalism to greater effect than Slobodan Milosevic, boss of the Serbian region, who shot to prominence in the late 1980s in a manner that will be familiar today: turning corruption into an ethnic issue, manufacturing hysteria against minorities, and playacting as a champion of his kin against a supposedly oppressive state apparatus–an apparatus that was, in fact, exceedingly indulgent of and increasingly politicized in his favour.

Rival nationalism was stoked with particular success by Franjo Tudjman, a former general, in Croatia. While the West widely applauded nationalist alternatives to communism in these last days of the Cold War, in fact nationalists in the Balkans were largely former communist apparatchiks, most of whom came to lead their region in Yugoslavia.

Alija Izetbegovic And Fikret Abdic

Alija Izetbegović, Bosniak leader and first President of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina

A major exception was the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) ideologist Alija Izetbegovic, the only regional leader from outside the Yugoslavia elite; he had been put on a show trial in 1983 for a supposed plan to create an Islamic state. In fact he had simply written on basic Islamic political principles, none of which entailed forcing the religion; he saw moral persuasion as the best route to Islamic revivalism, religious and cultural rather than politics as ideal for Islamic revivalism in a largely secularized society. Though critics suspicious of “Islamic fundamentalism” would labor to equivocate him with nationalists because of his Islamic convictions, those same convictions abhorred nationalism and he aimed to preserve, not force, Islam–a far cry from the clumsy, exclusivist amalgamations of Serbian nationalism with Eastern Orthodoxy or Croatian nationalism with the Catholic faith by recently transformed former establishmentarians such as Slobodan Milosevic and Tudjman.

A very different, but initially popular, type of Bosniak leader was Fikret Abdic, a tycoon whose northwest Bihac region had a rare amount of inter-ethnic harmony that ensured his popularity even after he was embroiled in a corruption scandal. He actually secured more votes than Izetbegovic in the 1990 regional election, and was made a member of a coalition Bosnian council.

II. The Breakup of Yugoslavia Summer 1991

Albania, whose communist regime succumbed to protests, was a warning sign, especially because Kosovar Albanians led by Ibrahim Rugova fled there to found an exile opposition. It was clear that Yugoslavia would either reform, rupture, or both: Croatia, led by Tudjman, and Slovenia favoured rupture; both Bosnia, where Izetbegovic had recently come to power, and Serbia ironically opposed secession, for opposite reasons: Izetbegovic favoured a federalist Yugoslavia with reforms, especially since ethnic secession would hit Bosnia hardest; Milosevic marketed himself as the champion of Yugoslav unity, portraying any reform as treasonous; by the year’s end a series of palace intrigues had collapsed the government and put him in charge of not only Serbia but the collapsing Yugoslavia state.

The fact that a reunified Germany, in particular, was encouraging Slovenia and Croatia to declare independence also rallied Yugoslav state institutions like the army behind Milosevic, who portrayed Serbs as the guardians of the state. In summer 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia broke away; Slovenia had very few Serbs, so after a brief military campaign it was let go. Essentially this led to a precedent where a Yugoslavia-versus-separatists stance was replaced with an ethnic war.

Serb-Croat War

Typical communist-era architecture in Belgrade, the former capital of Yugoslavia.

Croatia was a different matter, its sizable Serb periphery led by Milan Babic calling to join Serbia. This would only be connected via Bosnia, whose most influential Serb ethnonationalist – Radovan Karadzic – assumed a similar posture. A vicious war soon broke out between Serbs, joined by the Yugoslavia army, and Croats on Bosnia’s border.

Croat-Serb polarization affected both Belgrade–where a bloodless coup replaced the Croat figurehead ruler of Yugoslavia, Stjepan Mesic, with the Serb Milosevic–and Bosnia, where rival ethnic enclaves were set up, Mate Boban leading a Croat enclave that favoured Croatia and Karadzic taking the opposite stand.

Institutions, including Izetbegovic’s ruling council in Sarajevo had been carefully split between Bosnia’s Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs: Bosniak security chief Alija Delimustafic and Serb militia commander Dragan Vukosavljevic backed Belgrade against Croatia. The Yugoslav army’s commanders from the war against Croatia–notably Milutin Kukanjac and Ratko Mladic–also armed Serb militias, setting up Karadzic’s headquarters in the mountains outside Sarajevo, and the war occasionally spilled over against Croat villages in Bosnia. Izetbegovic did form a militia, led by Sefer Halilovic, that was loosely linked to his Akcije party, but its role was strictly defensive.

Croatian Independence

By 1992 Tudjman had won recognition of Croatian independence, effectively confirming Yugoslavia’s death. In spring 1992 a referendum secured Bosnia’s independence and left Milosevic in charge of the rest, now called Serbia. Croatia was strongly supported by the West, Serbia by Russia; Bosnia had neither.

The United Nations had rushed a force of peacekeepers to the scene, but its Canadian commander Lewis Mackenzie remained openly hostile to Bosnia. The United Nations then reached a typically untimely bandaid solution in the form of an arms embargo: this came after Serbia had already armed Karadzic’s militants to the teeth and retained a major army force led by Kukanjac in the country. It left Bosnia, easily the weakest of the newly independent states, with very little defense.

III. Encirclement and Attack Spring 1992: Serbs Converge on Bosnia

Sarajevo residents fetching water under sniper fire, winter 1992–1993. (Photo: Christian Maréchal)

In spring 1992 not only Serb ethnonationalists but the Serbian army converged on Bosnia. There were three major prongs: in the centre, Kukanjac and Karadzic laid siege to Sarajevo; in the west, Mladic thundered south from the Croatian battlefield through the Kupres and Neretva river valleys; and in the east, Dragoljub Ojdanic crossed the eastern border and swept south through Zvornik, hoping to cross southern Bosnia and meet up with Mladic in the southwest. Only in isolated cases–Zepa, where Avdo Palic ambushed the Serbian army, and Gorazde and Srebrenica, where Zaim Imamovic and Naser Oric held out under siege for three years–were they interrupted.

Ethnic Cleansing and Atrocity Campaigns

The Serbian army employed Serb ethnonationalists from throughout the old Yugoslavia, such as Arkan Raznjatovic, Mirko Jovic, and Vojeslav Seselj: they openly spoke of Islam as an alien and inferior presence, often describing Bosniaks as alien Turks, and armed to the teeth they regularly rounded up non-Serbs, Bosniak and Croat, and massacred them. For Serb ethnonationalists massacres were intended to eliminate or at least expel non-Serb populaces in order to claim their land as part of the Serb homeland; rape was a frequent phenomenon intended to break the spirit of their victims’ communities.

Political Defections and Siege Dynamics

Sefer Halilović, Bosnian army commander

Any illusions the Bosnian government maintained of keeping the peace soon evaporated. The Serb members of the Bosnian government, academics Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic defected to join Karadzic, as would their replacement Nenad Kecmanovic, and constable Vukosavljevic led a slew of similar defections by Serb officers. While Izetbegovic negotiated abroad, two Bosniak government leaders–his tycoon rival Abdic, also on the ruling council, and interior minister Delimustafic–also attempted a coup on the same day that the Serbian besiegers launched a major attack; Izetbegovic, rushing back from Lisbon, was captured at the airport by Serbian soldiers.

Fortunately for Sarajevo, Izetbegovic’s deputy Ejup Ganic as well as military commanders Hasan Efendic and Halilovic kept their wits about and captured Serbian army commander Kukanjac. He was only released in exchange for Izetbegovic, but Halilovic promptly captured him again. The aggressive Halilovic, now Bosnian army commander, was at the centre of considerable misgivings between the Bosnian leaders. Particularly controversial, though certainly necessary at the time, was his reliance on Sarajevo’s unsavoury mobsters to help man the front until the army built up; not till late summer 1992 was an army corps, led by Mustafa Hajrullahovic, ready.

IV. A Common Enemy: Bosnia against the Ethnonationalists Bosniak–Croat Military Cooperation

Mostar in Southwest Bosnia, a major battleground during the war.

Caught unawares and unready by the Serbian offensive, Bosnia had relied heavily on the more experienced Croat militia against their common Serbian rival. Croat nationalism had a more mixed view of Muslims at this stage than did Serb nationalism; indeed the Croatian army included a large number of Albanians from Kosovo. Within Bosnia, the Bosniak mayors of the cosmopolitan towns Tuzla and Mostar, respectively Selim Beslagic and Ismet Hadziosmanic, cooperated closely with Croat commanders Zeljko Knez and the Muslim Jasmin Jaganac. Another friendly Croat commander, Blaz Kraljevic, had helped take Trebinje from the Serb forces, and soon Izetbegovic and Tudjman were aiming to formalize their cooperation.

Boban–Karadzic Conspiracy and Betrayal

Yet behind the scenes the respective Croat and Serb ethnonationalist leaders, Boban and Karadzic, decided that it was best to split Bosnia, whose defence was easily the weakest and whose Muslim population both despised, between them: an early hint of this conspiracy came with the murder of Kraljevic, and it exploded to the fore in autumn 1992. The plotters’ takeover of Bosanski Brod hamstrung the government’s attempt to retake Zvornik from Serb militants. In an ironic twist, the government’s commander here, Knez, was an ethnic Croat, while the Bosanski garrison was led by Armin Pohara, a Bosniak actor with links to different sides of the conflict who appears to have been confused by circumstances beyond his control.

Escalation to the Bosniak–Croat War

Such local nuances did not prevent the Croat ethnonationalists from plundering or expelling Muslims from other towns they captured, including Jajce, Prozor, and Travnik. While Croat militants were never as uniform in hostility to Muslims as Serb militants, by 1993 a general war between Bosniaks and Croats was underway; Croats who cooperated with Muslims were increasingly sidelined.

In spring 1993 Boban’s deputy Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskovic, particularly brutal commanders, blazed through the Lasva valley, massacring and expelling Muslims; having jointly fought the Serb rebels at Mostar, Croat commanders Slobodan Praljak and Milivoj Petkovic turned on their Muslim counterparts Arif Pasalic and Sulejman Budakovic.

Despite talks between Boban and Alija Izetbegovic, Blaskovic rejected any reconciliation and even replaced the tolerant Croat commandant in Fojnica, Stjepan Tuke, with a vicious lieutenant Ivica Rajic, who advanced to Vares and massacred Muslims.

Not till summer 1993 did Bosniaks respond with anything like the same ruthlessness. A Bosnian attack led by Enver Hadzihasanovic captured Fojnica and Bugojno, and in contrast to previous or future practice expelled the towns’ Croats. This was quickly seized upon by foreign outlets as proof that the Bosniaks were “no angels”–as if that was a prerequisite to avoid genocide. The fact was that even at their worst Bosniak soldiers did not resort to ethnic cleansing, systemic massacres, or cultural destruction: there was no equivalence with Croat or Serb ethnonationalist atrocities.

V. International Institutions: Hurting not Helping The Vance–Owen Peace Plan

Ethnonationalism was further incentivized by a gormless international response: in early 1993 United Nations envoy Cyrus Vance, whose earlier mediations in the Balkans had hardly been helpful, joined with United Nations envoy David Owen to argue for the splinter of Bosnia into ethnic cantonments. Portrayed as statesmanlike nuance, this in effect only encouraged Serb and Croat ethnonationalists to carve up Bosnia between them.

UN Peacekeeper Failures

Such pompously harmful edicts underscored a general tendency in international institutions like the United Nations: recognizing the Western support for Croatia and the weakness of Bosnia, they opted for the laziest and easiest presumption that Bosnia should be sacrificed for the “greater good” rather than moralize Serbia. Like his Canadian predecessor Mackenzie, United Nations commander Philippe Morillon of France inclined toward Serbian commander Mladic, whose swaggering confidence endeared him to fellow officers.

Western Prejudice and Muslim Solidarity

While Western states had been glad to advocate for Croatia against Serbia, they were quite willing to sacrifice Bosnia and dress this up as a necessary sop to Russia: at the highest levels France and, with only slightly less distasteful enthusiasm, Britain evinced their distaste for a Muslim state in Europe.

Hasan Cengić, Bosnian Finance Minister (1992–1995), known as the “Flying Imam” for his diplomatic fundraising flights.

Washington was not as prejudiced against Bosnia, but inclined to side foremost with Croatia and definitely suspicious of Sarajevo’s links to Muslims abroad in an age where “Islamic fundamentalism” was beginning to emerge as a post-Cold War enemy of choice. Croatian leader Tudjman, so recently hobnobbing with Izetbegovic, now expounded on the “alien” nature of Muslims in Europe, echoing Serb propaganda. In a region torn apart by ethnonationalism, the one government that transcended it, Sarajevo, was portrayed as a wildcard for its Islamic links, epitomized in the energetic activity of finance minister Hasan Cengic, whose frequent trips for support earned him the nickname “flying imam”.

Such links were of course a natural response to Bosnia’s plight, and a number of state and private Muslim actors did chip in. From pro-American regimes Saudi Arabia’s future king Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and Kuwait’s emir Jabir bin Ahmed sent support. Hussein Abdel-Razek from Egypt, Fazlur-Rahman from Bangladesh, and Qasim Qureshi from Pakistan led United Nations units and tried to bypass institutional apathy. But U.S. policymakers fretted over support from Sudan’s Hassanayn, Iran’s Akbar Torkān, and Pakistan’s spymaster Javed Nasir—whom Washington forced out as “fundamentalist.”

Propaganda, Media Bias, and High-Profile Abductions

Non-state actors were viewed with even more suspicion: these included civilian aid administrators, such as Muhammad Sharhan of Kuwait; a Hadrami Islamist called Mahmoud Bahaziq, often called “Abu Abdul-Aziz Barbaros” in disproportionate media focus; and foreign volunteer battalions led by the North Africans Doctor Abul-Harith and Jamal Abul-Maali, the Arabian Muhammad Habshi (Abul-Zubair), and even Ali Fayad, who led a unit from the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The Bosnians’ enemies latched onto this solidarity as proof of a villainous Muslim plot to infiltrate Europe; several Israeli propagandists, such as Yossef Bodansky, seconded themselves to Serbia to lobby against Bosnia as part of general Israeli support for Serbia. In fact, despite such innuendo, Muslim volunteers were guilty of little more than a culture shock; late in the war Abul-Maali would execute fifty captured Serb fighters, but this paled compared to the systemic and repeated crimes against civilians by Bosnia’s enemies.

Nonetheless, institutional biases toward Muslims, not only foreigners, often prevailed: this was epitomized by the coverage of Srebrenica’s tough sheriff Naser Oric. In early 1993 he led a breakout and raided Serb villages in order to feed the starving town; Serb nationalists immediately portrayed this as an assault on Serbs and an unimaginable war crime, an angle that was widely spread abroad.

Foreign coverage preferred United Nations commander Morillon, who–mobbed by desperate Srebrenica families as he visited the besieged enclave–solemnly promised never to abandon them. Despite a glowing foreign reception for this theatre, Morillon would manifestly fail to keep his promise and would in fact go on to obfuscate in Serbia’s favour. Perhaps nothing epitomized international failure as obviously as the abduction of Bosnian vice-prime minister Hakija Turajlic by Serb separatists in Sarajevo; seized under the noses of indifferent United Nations “peacekeepers”, he was quickly murdered in an indictment of international institutions.

VI. American Mediation and its Limits Reorganizing Sarajevo’s Defense

General Atif Dudaković, Commander of the 5th Corps, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In summer 1993 Sarajevo’s defense was overhauled: the irascible Halilovic, whose uncompromising opposition to Croat militants and support for the Sarajevo cartels had earned him a black mark, was unceremoniously sacked in favour of a more discreet Rasim Delic.

Halilovic’s rivals Fikret Muslimovic and Enver Mujezinov cracked down on the mobsters–one of whom, Caco Topalovic, was killed: instead of such unsavoury militias, the army took a more organized approach in the city’s defence.

New Corps Commanders in the Field

Mehmed Alagić, Bosnian Army Corps Commander at Travnik.

Similarly the Akcije government began to establish control, both emphasizing the Islamic nature of their struggle and trying to restore confidence abroad. In the field they promoted commanders who were not only experienced but also reliable: for example, Tuzla’s new corps commander Sead Delic was more reliable than his wilful predecessors Knez and Hazim Sadic.

Salko Gusic was sent to shore up the sensitive Konjic front; Vahid Karavelic at Sarajevo, Mehmed Alagic at Travnik, Sakib Mahmuljin at Zenica, and Atif Dudakovic at Bihac were experienced and loyal to the regime.

The 1994 Washington Accord

Externally, American commitment to Croatia had precluded support to Bosnia, but their priority had been Serbia and now they sought to end the 1993 Bosniak-Croat war. One promising sign was the replacement of the Croat separatist Mate Boban with Kresimir Zubak, who negotiated under the auspices of American leader Bill Clinton with Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic. This culminated in the spring 1994 Washington Accord, joined by Izetbegovic and Tudjman, that effectively ended the 1993 Bosniak-Croat war and redirected them against Serbia.

The coalition kicked off when Croat forces helped Alagic and Kadir Jusic break the Serb siege of Maglaj. Another siege, led by Serb commander Dragisa Masal against Gorazde commander Zaim Imamovic, was only narrowly averted when United Nations commander Michael Rose unprecedentedly launched airstrikes — Masal and his boss Ratko Mladic vented their spleen at this narrow loss by, respectively, massacring Muslims and seizing United Nations soldiers. The Serb commander at Ozren, Novak Djucic, had more success in repulsing a three-pronged assault led by Sadic, Jusic, and Refik Lendo.

Fikret Abdić’s Mutiny and the Bihać Siege

A Bosnian-Croatian detente also complicated life for Fikret Abdic; having failed to oust Izetbegovic in 1992, this tycoon had in autumn 1993 conspired with Boban to turn over Bihac, on the Croatia-Bosnia border. Abdic had wealth and influence in this region, so when he incited a mutiny against Bosnian commander Ramiz Drekovic it had put the Bosnian regime at a quandary. He enjoyed portraying the Akcije regime as fanatics and won the trust of such credulous diplomats as Owen by confirming their prejudices.

But with Boban and Croatian protection gone, Abdic’s prospects looked uncertain. He thus jumped at an opportunity when Bosnian soldiers offered another mutiny, and quickly ordered his supporters to join them. To their horror, they walked into a trap laid by the formidable new commander Atif Dudakovic, who quickly apprehended them and marched on Abdic’s stronghold Velika Kladusa. Mladic responded with a two-pronged assault, but it backfired and the Serbian commander only narrowly evaded capture. Abdic now allied himself in open with Serbia; two Serb separatist corps, led by Momir Talic and Radivoje Tomanovic, pushed Dudakovic back to Bihac and put him under siege.

VII. An Enabled Massacre Shift in UN/US Priorities

The undisguised motivation of the American and United Nations intervention in 1994 had been to pressure Serbia, rather than help Bosnia per se; indeed their commander Rose, who had helped save Gorazde only months earlier, balked when the Bosnian army tried to break the siege of Sarajevo. Independent Bosnian action was anathema, and when the Bosnian army tried to recover strategic heights in spring 1995 the United Nations turned firmly against them.

Failed Bosnian Summer Offensive and the Fall of Srebrenica

Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, masterminds of Bosnian genocide.

In turn, the Bosnian army made a major, and rash, attempt to break the Sarajevo siege in summer 1995, when Sead sent forces from Tuzla to help Karavelic’s offensive. Not only was this repulsed with heavy casualties, but it left eastern Bosnia dangerously undermanned.

Ratko Mladic seized advantage of this, and concentrated his far larger army on the long-besieged Srebrenica enclave. Its dashing commander Naser Oric, widely vilified abroad, had recently been recalled to Sarajevo; instead a small garrison was left under the command of the ailing Ramiz Becirovic. Two years earlier the United Nations had pledged to help Srebrenica, but their only unit, a Dutch force led by Thom Karremans, put up no resistance; instead Mladic, who always disguised his brutality toward civilians with roguish humour toward foreign soldiers, regaled him with alcohol.

With relish, Mladic flaunted his power over the captured Bosniaks, and had as many as eight thousand butchered in cold blood, many lured to the slaughterhouse by their coerced families. Bosnia had seen many massacres over the past few years, the vast majority at the hands of Serb ethnonationalists, but this marked the crescendo of a full decade of hate-mongering, ethnic supremacism, and ultimately genocide under the banner of Serb ethnonationalism.

VIII. Blitz and Betrayal The Split Accord and Joint Counter-Offensive

Military action surrounding Sarajevo, Bosnia in June 1995

The only way forward from such unrepentant genocidal brutality is down, and so it happened. Serbia overreached by assigning its army in the west, led by Mile Mrksic, to finish off the campaign in western Bosnia opposite the Croatian army. To mend any remaining splits, the Bosnian and Croatian leaders signed the Split Accord–so named for the Croatian corps’ headquarters on the western coast–and, assisted by Dudakovic’s Bihac corps, blitzed the Serbian army and its vassals in Bosnia and Croatia– Karadzic, Milan Martic, and Bosniak quisling Abdic.

Recapture of Bosnian Territories

In autumn 1995 Croatian corps commander Ante Gotovina joined his Bosnian counterparts Dudakovic, Alagic, Mahmuljin, and even the foreign Muslims led by Abul-Maali in recapturing Bosnian towns such as Jajce, Petrovic, Donji Vakuf, and Vozuca; Zaim Imamovic, who had braved years under siege in Gorazde, was martyred on the campaign’s last day. Among the Serb opposition they routed was the infamous Arkan Raznjatovic, recently dispatched by Milosevic from Serbia in a vain attempt to reconcile the squabbling Mladic and Karadzic.

The Dayton Accord

Yet this avalanche of good news screeched to a halt when the United States, under bullish mediator Richard Holbrooke, called a ceasefire and hammered out the most flawed of compromises in the Dayton Accord. Not dissimilar to the 1993 proposals of Owen and Vance, it created an ethnic enclave for Serbs in Bosnia, essentially rewarding Karadzic’s three years of ethnic cleansing and ensuring an island of Serb ethnonationalism remained in Bosnia. It also slapped a foreign commission for Bosnia, led first by former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, that would act as a sort of viceroy; the Americans, naturally, would enjoy a veto on great matters.

Izetbegovic’s Reluctance and Silajdzic’s Break

The Accord should put paid to any delusions that the United States had entered Bosnia as a friend to its people, and at first Izetbegovic was too appalled to sign. But he lacked the cards to do anything about it–he could just about face off Serbia, but a United States at the peak of its power, backed by Europe, including the important Croatia, was beyond his capability after three years of horrendous war. The Akcije regime was exhausted and struggling; in summer 1995, prime minister Silajdzic had broken away.

Assassinations and Disappearances

Already as Commissioner Bildt arrived to take up his seat, signs of the more sinister side of American power had appeared; several Arab officers, including Abul-Maali, were murdered. The first known case of disappearance had also occurred, when an Egyptian ideologue called Talaat Qassemi, who had some informal links with some Arab fighters, was abducted in Croatia.

Growing Suspicion of Muslim Volunteers

The United States might not have been as unhelpful as several European states, but though it was less indiscriminate its mounting antipathy to “Islamic fundamentalism” was a rare point of agreement with Milosevic. Though Izetbegovic would do his best to shield them, foreign Muslim volunteers would come under an increasing American and European cloud over the years.

Milosevic’s Kosovo Pivot and a Forgotten Lesson

As for Milosevic, the results of the Dayton Accord were satisfactory enough for him that he turned on his original target of choice, the (similarly largely Muslim) Albanians of Kosovo. It was here that he would overstep, giving Washington a pretext to finish him. But it was a shame that it took thousands of Bosnian lives to hammer home the lesson that bigotry, ethnic cleansing, and genocide should not be rewarded. Unfortunately, the lesson is once more forgotten today.

Check back for part 2: Continued relevance of the Bosnia war in today’s climate of hate.

Related Posts:

Rising To The Moment: What Muslim American Activists Of Today Can Learn From Successful Community Movements During The Bosnian Genocide

Oped: The Treachery Of Spreading Bosnia Genocide Denial In The Muslim Community

 

The post History of the Bosnia War [Part 1] – Thirty Years After Srebrenica appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

The New York mayoral candidate has piqued the interest of South Asian Americans and Muslims – not only because of his identity, but his platform, too

Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic primary for mayor has a group of Pakistani American aunties and uncles so excited that they are wondering if they should have given their own children more freedom in choosing their careers. “What if we let our kids become politicians, and not just doctors and engineers?” a member of the grassroots political organizing group, DRUM Beats, asked at a small celebration held at an Islamic school last month in south Brooklyn.

DRUM Beats, which represents New York City’s working class South Asian and Indo-Caribbean populations, was one of the first grassroots groups to endorse Mamdani, when he launched his campaign in October – long before he became a household name. More than 300 volunteers, who spoke near a dozen languages, knocked on at least 10,000 doors to support him. DRUM Beats says these efforts helped increase voter turnout by almost 90% among Indo Caribbean and South Asians in some neighborhoods.

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Diane Abbott, 2010

Diane Abbott, Britain’s longest-serving woman MP, was yesterday suspended from the Labour party after a BBC Radio 4 interview in which she reiterated remarks she made in a letter to the Observer in 2023, for which she was suspended at the time (though later allowed to defend her east London seat as a Labour candidate, and won) about the racism experienced by white minorities, specifically mentioning Irish, Jews, Gypsies and Travellers, compared to that experienced by Black and Asian people who can easily be identified by their skin colour which the aforementioned minorities could not. This week an interview with the Radio 4 presenter James Naughtie, recorded in May, was broadcast in which she reiterated the point she had made in her original letter to the Observer: that racism against people identifiable by skin colour was just not the same as against those who aren’t, and it is just silly to pretend otherwise. (The interview can be listened to on BBC Sounds here.) Ava Vidal wrote a response to the controversy for the Independent. What Diane Abbott said in both this interview and in her original letter has been the standard view of anti-racist activists for decades, and many Black and Asian listeners will think her observations were self-evident, but the sticking point with her list of groups which aren’t oppressed quite like Black people is that includes Travellers, who are one of the country’s most openly despised minorities.

Admittedly, a Traveller can be walking down a street which is far from any Travellers’ site, or a location where there is a dispute over a Travellers’ site, and not be recognised as such. However, Travellers face intense resistance when seeking to establish new sites as well as legal and political efforts to remove them, and as research by Katherine Quarmby notes, Travellers’ sites are often in “risky and unhealthy” locations, nearly always within 500 metres of a major road, railway line, canal, sewage or refuse plant or industrial estate (more than half were within 100 metres), and often these sites are miles away from amenities such as schools and clinics. Intersecting the Traveller and Irish experiences, only last year the holiday camp chain Pontin’s were found to have discriminated racially by blacklisting a number of Irish surnames, such as Boyle and Gallagher, on the basis that they were common surnames of “undesirable guests”, and telling call centre staff to refuse or cancel bookings on the basis that a guest had an Irish accent (see these tweets from Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC from last year — KC, for my overseas readers, means King’s Counsel or a senior lawyer). People use anti-Traveller slurs, or thin euphemisms such as “do-as-you-likeys”, quite openly in a way they would not use more ‘traditional’ racial slurs against Black and Asian people.

Speaking as someone of Irish descent on my mother’s side (not with one of the surnames on the “undesirable guest” list), I can honestly say I’ve never experienced anything close to racial abuse. I’m white, and I speak with an English accent, as does everyone related to me on my mother’s side of her generation. By the 80s when I was growing up, people of Irish background had anglicised, and although still Catholic (and often more practising than they are now), were not particularly Irish by culture. Actual Irish people did experience discrimination, and suspicion of association with the IRA, during the early years of the Troubles in the late 60s and early 70s. There is still prejudice against Jews and violent, organised antisemitism on the Far Right and James Naughtie mentioned to Abbott that synagogues usually have guards to protect worshippers from violence. However, the majority of claims of antisemitism that blighted the Labour party in the five years of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership had nothing to do with violence, discrimination, slurs or anything else that would be recognised as racism if it concerned any other group; it was about intemperate speech on Israel (at a time when their oppression of Palestinians in the West Bank was ratcheting up) and criticism of individual Jews which fitted a list of so-called “antisemitic tropes”, frequently strained through the needle’s eye to justify an accusation. While there are Jewish dissenters who openly criticise or condemn Israel’s actions, the mainstream Jewish representative bodies are openly aligned with Israel and openly cheer on its genocide while denying that one is taking place. Such accusations were commonly levelled at Black and Asian Labour activists during the Corbyn years.

Labour’s policy on racism appears to be a convenient mishmash of different doctrines around racism. On antisemitism, they demand we accept Jewish definitions, despite the ample history of false claims levelled in response to justified criticism of Israeli actions; they fail to uphold this standard when it comes to anti-Black and anti-Asian racism. Anti-racism activism has traditionally held that racism is not prejudice alone but prejudice combined with power. This is significant, because plenty of Black people can tell stories of Black children being punished for shouting back “honky” or “white pig” at groups of racist white bullies who themselves went unpunished, or who turned on the tears and got sympathy from a teacher. Labour only seem to be quick to deal with perceived racism on the recipients’ terms when the recipients are the one minority which is more likely to be white and middle-class, and many of the loudest voices in accusing all and sundry of ‘antisemitism’ are anglicised white Jews. Whether Starmer’s reaction to Diane Abbott’s interview is yet another cave-in to that racist mob or yet another example of his authoritarian behaviour as leader, exiling Abbott because she is a relapsed heretic, is debatable. As was the case at the last election, if her health permits, she could easily win her seat with or without Labour’s blessing at the next election, much as Corbyn could. However, while it is not antisemitic to say that Jews are not principal victims of racism or oppression in modern Britain and have not been for decades — it’s fact — her principal injury is to the Traveller community whose oppression she belittles just because it is not exactly like what Black people experience. It says much about official attitudes to that community that this injury goes unnoticed in this whole debate.

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900 Palestinians killed by live fire, suffocation or stampedes at US-Israeli “aid” sites in seven weeks.

Conversations show that everyone in Gaza is struggling.

Teenager thought killed survived four days under rubble. Her immediate family did not.

Islamophobic attacks on Zohran Mamdani are a reminder of the difference between individual and structural prejudice

My only interaction with the FBI came soon after 11 September 2001. A man and woman visited my family’s home in Philadelphia – we had recently moved from Palestine – showed their credentials and asked to enter. My parents invited them in and a conversation about political views followed. They left soon afterwards but I knew we were suspect, and I understood why.

At the time, I was in high school. Two or three years later, one of my sisters, who wore the hijab then, was confronted by an elderly white man at a department store. “What’s the significance of the trash you’re wearing on your head?” he asked.

Ahmed Moor is a writer and fellow at the Foundation for Middle East Peace

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