The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of MuslimMatters.org.

In Defense Of Zakat for Political Campaigns: An Agument Fom An American Muslim Political Operative

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A Controversial Fatwa

Earlier this month, on Feb 3rd 2026, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) and the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America (AMJA) published a fatwa that has generated significant contention in the American Muslim community across the nation.

The Fatwa opens the possibility for American Muslims to allocate a minority portion of their zakat, should they so optionally choose, towards qualified institutions to spend on Political Campaigns. Conditions include the amount of wealth that can be allocated, and various requirements on the institutions, such as demonstrating “a track record of positive impact” and being “composed of diverse groups of scholars and relevant specialists”, amongst others.

There are likely no institutions right now that meet all the criteria (particularly because of the requirement for the institution to be the one to ‘collect’ the funds).

Rebuttals to the Fatwa

This Fatwa has resulted in substantial pushback, from exhaustive attacks on the underlying structure and derivation of the fatwa such as the one by Imam Suhaib Webb,

Examining The Zakat Fatwa For Lobbyists (Part One): Background and Terminology

to rebuttals by institutions such as Darul Qasim (link) and naturally many other responses online such as this one by MuslimMatters. More recently we have also seen a letter signed by several ulema in the US.

Even within the fatwa itself they share a link to the dissenting opinion by the Fiqh Council scholars that were not in support of the fatwa: link.

I empathise with many of these concerns, however, there is a dearth of voices in support of the fatwa, which is one reason I’ve decided to submit my opinion as a political operative. Note that whilst I’m focused on political donations in this article, I realize that this is just one (albeit important) part of a multi-pronged strategy to impact change in US policy; for example, investing in mass media is another really key part of that, as is civil service, grass-roots organizing, cultural impact, leadership development, get-out-the-vote programs, street dawah, success in startups or high positions at big companies / wealth generation, etc..

Disclaimer: Whilst I was not in any way consulted about this fatwa by any of the ulema, nor have I sought any of their opinions on this article, I am a political donor, and have worked with Muslim political organizations.

A Justification of the Need

The objections I’ve seen generally fall into the following camps:

1. The underlying derivations / methodology that opens the door to all kinds of unacceptable Fatwas: I’ve seen some really strong technical objections here (definitely watch the Imam Webb one shared above to get a taste of that).
2. Attacking the need / justification for the fatwa
3. Objecting to the practical usefulness / effectiveness of this fatwa
4. Concerns on the ultimate use of the zakat funds on campaign ads with questionable content for politicians with questionable character
5. On the Ulema themselves not being sufficiently qualified, not having the necessary ijaza, being only one particular maslak, etc.

I’m not a scholar so I am not going to opine on #1 or #5, even as I continue to follow their beautiful, respectful and intellectual debate. May Allah swt bless and guide both sides of this scholarly debate. And it is indeed important to me that we’re not doing this in a way that would displease Our Lord.

From Humanitarian Crisis to Political Responsibility

Here is my perspective on why I believe this Fatwa is justified, purely from the lens of a Muslim political operative and donor:

1. Zakat is to help the needy.
2. There are many that are needy across the Ummah, but amongst the top would be the women and children of Gaza, many of whom were made to starve to death.
3. Despite the wealth of American Muslims, and despite the even greater wealth of the Monarchies, almost no amount of our zakat or sadaqa was able to feed or clothe or shelter the 2 million people of Gaza.
4. On the contrary, much of our sadaqa and zakat rotted away in trucks blocked by Israel.
5. The reason our charity could not get into Gaza was ultimately because of US policy, as the US permitted Israel to flout international law in this regard and block almost all aid into the strip.
6. Is it that unreasonable then, to argue that the only solution to feeding the needy in Gaza is a political solution?
7. ⁠Is it not reasonable then to argue that this is primarily a responsibility for / a failing of the American Muslims, assuming we had the potential to influence said US policy through our votes, but most especially, our wealth (will justify this assumption later in the article)?
8. And does it not make it even more our responsibility knowing that it is our tax dollars that were used to buy the bombs that bombarded our brethren?
9. And therefore, is it not then the responsibility of the ulema of the United States to find a solution for this?
10. Given that sadaqa is more of a means of extra personal reward for an individual, vs zakat being more of a divinely prescribed system to alleviate the neediness of Muslims at a societal level, is it not reasonable for the ulema to at least evaluate zakat as the most appropriate mechanism to address this?

Whilst my above argument was derived from the plight of Gazans, it also applies to anywhere else in the ummah where Muslims have fallen into need as a direct result of US policy, at least in cases where we could have influenced the policy (even if in those cases, unlike Gaza, policy-change is not ‘necessarily’ the only way to help). For example, is it not more prudent to try and prevent the Iranians from having to become dependent on aid if the US goes to war with Iran? Do we really want to start attending Zakat fundraisers for Iranians affected by some rogue US action, when we may be able to stave that off via political donations?

Instead of constantly being reactive to the issues of the ummah, what if we could be proactive and prevent those people from becoming in need of charity in the first place? Is it more faithful to zakat to repeatedly bandage wounds, or to remove the hand that keeps inflicting them?

Safeguards and Proper Use of Zakat

Given the above, I really welcome the fact that FCNA / AMJA considered these factors to see if zakat could indeed be permitted. Jazakallah Khair to all the ulema involved, both for and against. Respect to all.

If this fatwa is misused to justify partisan tribalism, personal ambition, or reckless endorsement of immoral candidates, it will be a betrayal of the trust of zakat. But I am eased by the conditions in the fatwa, which clearly require that such donations are only zakat eligible if they are through qualified institutions consisting of qualified ulema and collective decision-making, rather than an individual.

On Zakat needing to be for the Local Poor

One strong argument against this fatwa is that Zakat should only be about taking wealth “from their rich and given to the poor”, that zakat is best when local and that it fits into the pattern of self-serving interests.

1. From the perspective of those of us giving to political causes (assuming good intent), it is precisely to help the poor, since we believe that this is the most effective way (if not, as in the case of Gaza, the only way) to feed them, or better yet, to get the out of that state of perpetual poverty, since we believe that it is US policy that is causing them to be in that state.
2. The idea of giving Zakat to the needy in our community can be seen from the perspective of responsibilities: We’re responsible for the needy in our family first, and then our Muslim neighbors, the local community, and eventually the broader ummah. So why should we jump to the ummah when there is so much need in the local community? Because
   1. We’re the ones that caused them to be in that state, and so one can argue we are more directly responsible for them than for the local community, because we personally bought both the bombs and the bombers that besieged their lives. This should be a hard-hitting fact for all of us, especially for those of us who believe we could have done something about it.
   2. We, American Muslims, are amongst the only ones in the ummah that can affect US policy in favor of our ummatis (at the non-governmental public level). The needy in our local communities have access to at least some social welfare options in this nation; those starving children in Gaza had no one.
   3. As we hear in every international fundraiser, we are Alhumdulillah amongst the wealthier communities in the ummah, and therefore should assist the broader ummah.
3. The comparison with this to building mosques etc. is not applicable, because (amongst other reasons) when we build a mosque, we often in turn have some benefit, whether directly to our families in the form of services, or in the form of tax deductions or tax exemptions. Spending money towards politics for the purposes of alleviating the need in places like Gaza has zero personal benefit of any kind (generally speaking; exceptions exist where hosts may seek some personal benefit from the politician like awards or  preferential treatment). Also, building a mosque is not about helping the needy, whereas this is.

Is Political Advocacy Too Indirect?

I appreciate the argument that this is too indirect: the money physically goes into the pockets of a politician’s campaign account rather than directly to the needy. But I would argue, with utmost respect, that this is short-sighted of the ulema: this is a means, if not in some cases the only means, to provide for those needy; when successful, it will open the gates to all those Muslim governments and the broader ummatis in Europe and elsewhere to feed and provide for those needy.

And Insha’Allah it will allow us to go beyond just giving them some temporary fish to eat, but also the fishing boats to help get themselves out of their state of need, Insha’Allah.

Advocacy in Adversity

Jamaal Bowman

Whilst this Fatwa was in the category of “mu’allafah al-qulūb, which may be translated as ‘those whose hearts need to be softened’”, it would be amiss for me to not call out the fact that for those of us on the ground, this also feels like something that ought to qualify under ‘fi sabilillah’ as well. Why? Because we are facing an extremely active adversary. They boast about defeating pro-Palestinian candidates like Jamaal Bowman and Cory Bush, and have openly declared war on our advocacy efforts:

“You can’t fight today, with swords, that doesn’t work very well, and we have to fight with the weapons that apply to the battlefields with which we engage.” – Netanyahu

We try to react to them, and they too react to us. There is much more to share on this topic that definitely goes broader than just directly influencing politicians, but I’m cognizant of the fact that this fatwa is not about fi sabilillah and is therefore out of scope. I bring it up more for our ulema to realize that the battle of influence over the decision-makers of this country has broader dimensions than just a 1:1 engagement with a politician because of this active adversary factor.

Impact on the local Community

There has been a lot of concern that the community may now use this new fatwa in a way that takes away from the real purpose of zakat. I agree with the concern, but at the same time, the fatwa limits the amount of Zakat that may be given to this cause and I don’t expect that this fatwa will suddenly cause a massive increase in the number of people willing to do this anyway given the disillusionment many feel with politics and the Islamic concerns already prevalent in the community.

Rather, I see this more of a benefit for the wealthier Muslims, as it allows them to help with even more races across the nation. We have a severe prioritization issue due to our wealth limits, but with this fatwa, in theory, we could allocate about 0.3% more of our zakatable wealth towards political campaigns than otherwise (the fatwa recommends 1/8 of our 2.5%). That 0.3% could indeed be the difference in outcomes for certain races. For those that need to give a large amount of zakat, they really would love to be able to diversify a bit, and fund proactive efforts that only US Muslims can do, rather than spend on international efforts that anyone else in the Ummah can do.

Intentions, Incentives, and Safeguards

I’ve also seen community members attack this fatwa as relief for the elite / wealthy in our community, for their personal benefit. To this I want to say that ultimately in Islam, actions are based on intent, which only Allah swt truly knows. IF their intent is to help the people of Gaza, and they choose to use this zakat to reduce the burden they have chosen to take on on behalf of the ummah (as opposed to increasing the amount they send), perhaps arguably helping all of us meet a fard-e-kuffiyeh, then let’s not vilify them for that.

Donations to reactive organizations like Islamic Relief are heavily incentivized, where we get a tax deduction AND tax exemption of our capital gains tax (e.g. via a DAF) AND can use our Zakat for, but proactive political donations to solve real problems at the source get no such personal relief and are pure ‘fi sabilillah’ (I mean that in the literal sense). May Allah swt give them even more and grant barakah in whatever they do. So naturally, reading opinions that claim this fatwa “further enables Muslim stinginess and loss of self-identity” does feel a bit off the mark.

Important concerns around abuse, undoubtedly a grave sin, are addressed in the fatwa itself:

“It is known that there is abuse that occurs in some zakat collection and distribution, and this fatwā does not wish to provide any excuse to increase that abuse. The conditions above are clearly laid out, and the members of this Council cannot be responsible for institutes or individuals who do not abide by these conditions.”

On the Uncertainty of the Efficacy of Political Advocacy

There are many legitimate questions on how all these efforts to influence US policy are ultimately going to help. Many would even argue, with reason, that voting is useless or that politicians take advantage of our naivety to take our wealth without giving anything in return. Others would argue that advocacy has had very low levels of success and so such spending is wasteful and thus should not be zakat.

The Fatwa itself addresses this:

Firstly, it expects the zakat to only be eligible for funds given to institutions comprising qualified experts in both the deen and the field, so, they would know not to be naïve and how to properly do advocacy. Siyasah is always a trade, and fundraisers must always therefore be subject to both pre and post-conditions, whether explicit or implied. When done right, such institutions can have a reasonable level of efficacy and can have a higher chance of success than failure.

Secondly, the fatwa also says this:

“Note that it is understood that no one can be certain of the future; what is required is a strong presumption, or ghalabat al-ẓann, in looking at the final results, or iʿtibār al-ma’ālāt, since even when the Prophet (SAW) gave, there was no guarantee that it would have an impact on the tribal chieftains.”

In other words, we need to do our best, and leave the outcome to Allah swt, and it’s acknowledged that there is no guarantee that our efforts will have impact.

A Case Study: Congressman Ro Khanna

Many ask if any political advocacy has resulted in concrete successes. An example would be Congressman Ro Khanna, whose local community has gotten him to be far better than the vast majority of congress.

Initially he would refuse to sign a ceasefire resolution and instead signed onto HR771 on standing with Israel that blamed even all resulting Palestinian deaths on Hamas, absolving Israel completely.

But now we see him calling it a genocide, having skirmishes with AIPAC, voting against funding Israel (after voting TO fund it, supposedly by accident), calling for the recognition of Palestine, calling for reinstating UNRWA, exposing and linking the Epstein Files to Israel, and so on. Many people seem to think that politicians just do all this out of their own accord, without realizing that almost everything that comes out is a result of direct and continuous behind-the-scenes advocacy, through a combination of bottom-up street power (Activists Occupy Office of Rep. Ro Khanna After He Refused to Sign On to Ceasefire Resolution), and, critically, top-down donor incentives. You often need both the carrot and the stick.

On the Imperfection of Politicians

Politicians can never be assumed to be principled. Even if at times they may appear principled, and even if somehow in their hearts they truly are, we really have to always assume they are not, even as we should always demand that they be. I know that sentence is confusing, but worded as it is on purpose, to highlight that it requires continuous work to keep them on the right track. And even if a politician were principled, it doesn’t mean they’ll act the correct way without the necessary support and pressure they need from their constituents and donors (and yes, even if they are Muslims).

Politicians play their games. We must expect that. But we also need to learn to play ours (within the bounds of permissibility of Islamic siyasah of course). If a politician doesn’t do as we expect, whilst we should not absolve them of their moral responsibility, we need to consider it as our own failing:

Allah’s Messenger (ﷺ) said, “You see the believers as regards their being merciful among themselves and showing love among themselves and being kind, resembling one body, so that, if any part of the body is not well then the whole body shares the sleeplessness (insomnia) and fever with it.” – Sahih al-Bukhari 6011

Zakat, Public Interest, And Net Outcomes

But if we’re arguing that they are not principled, there is a valid objection on why should our sacred zakat money go to such folk’s campaigns? Additionally, those campaign ads may contain content that is unislamic, and further, these politicians may have other platform policy points that may not match our values.

Firstly, the Fatwa itself addresses this. It says,

“More pertinently, they firmly establish a broader principle: at times, the public interest may require allocating funds even to the wealthy, to non-Muslims, or to those of questionable personal character, when that secures a general benefit for the Muslim community.”

Secondly, remember that the goal of the funding is not to help the politician: it is to move the needle towards our goal. The funds are for two general purposes:

1. To help bring to power the political candidate that is more aligned with our goals, or prevent the political candidate that is against our goals from coming to power.
2. To generate leverage with a politician, so that we have a higher likelihood of influencing their votes by giving more weight to our words.

The result we seek is in the form of better votes, or to use their platform to amplify a narrative more amenable to our prioritized goals. In other words, what matters is what net outcome we’re able to achieve, and whether the net outcome is better or worse. Ultimately, the fatwa argues that “the goal of such funds must be to benefit the welfare of the Muslim community”, then (and only then), can it potentially be zakat eligible.

But can successful advocacy really lead to national policy change?

The US Congress

US policy is technically made by the Legislative branch (although there is a lot the executive branch can do, especially nowadays, without legislative approvals). This consists of 100 senators, and 435 congresspersons. To influence policy, we’d need about half that in each. In congress, if we can influence around 210 of them, we’d be able to push for policy in our favor. So, whilst the Ro Khanna “success” story is nice, it clearly is not enough. We need to do that in hundreds more districts.

However, given that there are (and can effectively only be) two parties, in theory if we can influence party leadership, we can get larger chunks of that support just by the fact that the majority simply follow their leadership or party platform. Investing in folk with the potential to be leaders of the party should be a priority. No doubt the path is very long and very hard to get to actual policy change, but it’s possible.

Folks like Ro Khanna (D) are a good example of that as his profile gets larger within his party, but even a Mamdani, who may not be a legislator but has the potential to influence the party platform as Dem candidates seek his coveted endorsement, which may in turn allow us to get much larger numbers of congressmen and even senators in favor of humanity. Thomas Massie (R) may represent primarily libertarians, but if we show that his positions on Israel can attract enough donors on his side to counter AIPAC’s attempts to unseat him, this can encourage many other Republicans to consider the same.

Influencing the Executive Branch

US policy is ultimately conducted by the executive branch though, the leadership of which is elected to power, and the rest are appointed or careerists. The best way to influence here, again, is to help bring to power the presidential candidates that are most amenable to our goal. Unfortunately, so far this has been a challenge as both party candidates have been extremely pro-Zionists, however, we can see the potential for change by bringing in more America-First republican candidates on the Right, and more Anti-War Democrat candidates on the Left. An effective strategy must involve influencing both parties. This need not be at an individual institution level, as they may choose to focus on one side or the other, but collectively across all Muslim political institutions, we need to make sure we have coverage of both parties.

A key part is going to be funding other activities as well like leadership development organizations or investing in mass media etc., but given that those are 501c3 activities that are already tax deductible, I’m leaving those types of activities out of the discussion (also leaving out 501c4 activities such as endorsements which donors can avoid capital gains tax on if they donate stocks).

Why is money even required?

How do the lawmakers that make the laws of this country, or the executive branch that execute those laws as policy, become our representatives in the first place? There is only one answer: votes. All the money in political campaigns is ultimately to buy those votes. And all that lobbying by AIPAC etc, is to offer the money to buy those votes: buy an Ad to reach a million voters, and they have a chance to buy a million votes. Additionally, the better a candidate is able to do in their fundraising, the more endorsements become available to them, and again, those endorsements in turn help them get even more money, and sometimes even voting blocks.

The point: if we want to affect policy, we have to donate. And today, this is a big ask for our community, as those donations will not be tax deductible, nor receive benefits of tax exemption, nor be allowed to be spent from zakat. The effective cost is quite high, the efficacy is quite low, and therefore the potential impact subdued.

On Geopolitical Strategy and Islam

The fatwa bases its argument on the category of Zakat in the Qur’an called “mu’allafah al-qulūb, which may be translated as ‘those whose hearts need to be softened’”. It goes on to describe how the prophet SAW used spoils of war (not Zakat) to non-Muslim Arab chieftains across Arabia to dissuade them from coalescing together to fight the Muslims. The fatwa argues why this can be extended into this category of Zakat using various precedences set by other individual scholars throughout history with regards to this category, but that’s not what I wish to argue for or against about, since that is the realm of debate for the Ulema, of which I am not.

I do, however, want to highlight the importance of political strategy, and use that story from the seerah (amongst others) to argue that the prophet SAW was, subhanallah, an extremely savvy political strategist, and recognized the role wealth can play in shaping outcomes. For more on this, I would recommend the reader spend the time to get to know the works of Dr. Tareq Al-Suwaidan, who shows that the Seerah has another dimension of study, that of Strategy:

How Prophet Muhammad (SAW) Mastered Strategy | Dr. Tareq Al-Suwaidan

Dr. Al-Suweidan asks some pertinent questions: such as why did the prophet SAW send sahaba such as Usman RA or Jaber bin Abi Taleb RA that were not under any threat of oppression to Abyssinia, or why even after such esteemed sahaba lived 15 years in Abyssinia no one new embraced Islam, and why the prophet SAW didn’t call them back until 7 years after the hijra?

Applying Strategic Lessons Today

The answers to these lie almost entirely in global geopolitical strategy and wargaming. That is just one example (in addition to the one shared in the fatwa on placating the tribal chiefs), and I’d recommend following Dr. Al-Suwaidan for much more, but the point is that geopolitical strategic planning is such a core part of what the prophet SAW was continuously engaged in throughout his prophethood.

Our American ulema should also be versed in this study given how involved our government is in shaping geopolitics around the world. And not just our ulema of course; our political strategists must also learn the strategic lessons the seerah has to offer.

This is how this fatwa can be seen: one part of a multi-pronged strategy to build enough power to influence geopolitics in favor of creating a more just world. And it explicitly invites the two classes of experts to come and work together towards it. The net result would be a win-win for all, as the advocates are able to do more, and the ulema are able to help keep their moral compass straight.

Scholars, Power, and Contemporary Realities

It is encouraging to see scholars grappling not only with textual questions, but also with the geopolitical realities facing American Muslims. One sign of this is how one of the ulema in FCNA, Sh. Yasir Qadhi (in a fascinating study of the history of the Printing Press, all the way from the acquisition of paper-making technology via Chinese POWs in 751 CE, to the Islamic World’s substantial development and proliferation of the process, to the unfortunate rejection of the printing press for Arabic scholarship from its invention in 1440 till the next 400 years), suggests how the ulema should have dealt with the issue of the Printing Press (a relevant example because it’s what Darul Qasim used in their statement to argue against this fatwa):

“The rise and eventual decline of paper and of the printing press is symptomatic of the rise and fall of the ummah…. My point here, if the scholars had adopted the printing press and they had included and incorporated it into their system, they could have incorporated the best of both worlds and they could have taken this and made sure that some new system is built. But by shutting themselves off completely, what happened? Subhanallah, by 1800 the average Muslim has never read a printed book because there’s still the penalty of death.” – Yasir Qadhi

Ideally we have ulema that truly appreciate the fiqhi challenges, whilst at the same time understanding the strategic necessity of things like the printing press for the ummah, “because with the printing press comes knowledge, and with knowledge comes power; every type of power: economic power, political power, religious power” (Yasir Qadhi). And only with power can we play a role in making a more just world. Or be left powerless to stop deliberate policies of starvation against our ummah.

Institutional Capacity in the American Context

Combining this with the fact that these Ulema have had to deal with the real impact of US policy right at home, like cease and desist orders on Islamic Funeral Homes, attacks on the EPIC City project and interacting with US politicians in countering real-world Islamophobia, the result is that AMJA and FQNA collectively constitute a diverse set of ulema not just with high levels of religious knowledge, but also the political exposure, the deep yet diverse historical knowledge, and most importantly, the strategic thinking ultimately required to address the needs and responsibilities of the modern American Muslim.

At the same time, it is reasonable to expect FQNA / AMJA to have a process that engenders trust from the broader ulema community as well.

What could be improved in the Fatwa

The Fatwa may well have areas of improvements on the Fiqhi elements; dissenting Ulema have already been talking about that. I wish instead to add my opinions on what could be improved from the perspective of a political operative.

The fatwa has the following hard requirement:

“reputable institutions collect and distribute zakat funds on behalf of the body of Muslim in any locality”

It requires institutions to “collect” the funds first, and then distribute; this unfortunately does not meet the majority of the need, which is to do direct donations to a politician on the direction of some reputable institution. Ideally we would have wanted the fatwa to use a word like ‘through’ instead of ‘collect’, because as it stands the practical use of this fatwa is certainly constrained quite a bit because of it.

Zohran Mamdani

Perhaps we could create some PACs, though PACs are only allowed to give up to $5000 to any given candidate, which isn’t sufficient to generate tangible leverage with a candidate. A SuperPAC could work though, however, SuperPACs are typically obscured, e.g., the main one we used for Zohran Mamdani was New Yorkers for Lower Costs, so it may be a challenge to have a SuperPAC meet the requirements of having a diverse set of ulema on its board etc.. As such, building institutions compliant with this Fatwa may require more deliberation.

Perhaps I’m reading too much into the semantics of the word ‘collect’, in which case a clarification from the authors would be welcome.

In Conclusion

There is no doubt that the fatwa is controversial, and that there are many respected scholars that have expressed dissenting opinions. But Alhumdulillah, I for one, as a Muslim political operative, am extremely thankful for this issue being taken so seriously, and for our ulema to try and find solutions, not for our sake, but for the sake of our ummah.

We should see this as a sign of maturity of our community that we’re even talking about the importance of political power, and a sign of hope that this fatwa is symptomatic of a turning point for our influence to rise again to help make America and the world a more just place for all, even as it comes from the sense of despair we felt from our inability to protect the people of Gaza.

May Allah swt bless our intention to move, and may He guide us towards the best path, and may He forgive us for failing the ummah, and may He forgive our American ulema and leaders for their shortcomings, and may He alleviate the suffering of the ummah.

The post Op-Ed: Can Zakat Be Used For Political Campaigning? An Argument In Favor appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

How do you know if you should stop fasting for Ramadan? How does fasting impact insulin resistance, testosterone, fertility, and weight gain? And, of course, we all have those other questions too: do injections break your fast? What about taking eye drops? What about inhalers?

Dr. Saadia Mian is here to cover all these common questions, and more, in the latest episode of the MuslimMatters podcast!

Anse Dr. Saadia Mian serves as an instructor for the Ribaat Academic Institute. She teaches the Quran memorization class entitled ‘The Crowning Venture’ and is also a tajwid instructor. She is board-certified endocrinologist and runs her clinic, ‘The Functional Endocrinologist.’ While in medical school, Anse Saadia traveled to Syria to study Arabic, Quran, and sacred knowledge. She has ijaazah in the Hafs recitation from Shaykh Abu al-Hassan Al-Kurdi (May Allah ﷻ be pleased with him) and Shaykh Krayem ar-Raji, an ijāza in the Forty Hadith of Imam Nawawi (may Allah ﷻ be pleased with him) and the Forty Hadith of Palestine. She is the author of the book, ‘The Crowning Venture: Inspiration from Women Who Have Memorized the Quran’ along with a companion journal, and also ‘Hormones in Sync,’ which will be released in Fall 2026.

Related:

Prepping The Mind, Body, And Soul For Ramadan

[Podcast] Man 2 Man: Decaffeinated – Physical Prep for Ramadan

The post [Podcast] Faith, Fasting, and Metabolic Wellness with Dr. Saadia Mian appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

There’s a certain type of politician and political activist who is quick to take credit when his party wins, but will blame everyone but himself and his allies when they lose, and can be very inventive in doing so. In the aftermath of the 2015 election, when the Liberal Democrats lost many of their seats both in the affluent suburbs and the rural south-west where they were the major exception to the Labour/Tory two-party politics of the rest of England, the theory was put about that they lost so many seats because the public had been warned by the Tories of the danger of a Labour/SNP coalition in the event of a hung parliament (i.e. one with no party majority), anything but admit that their conduct during the coalition government had angered many of their former supporters and that many of the others actually wanted the promised referendum on EU membership. The other day, I came across an article on the previous election, in 2010, in which Labour lost power and were replaced by that Tory/Liberal coalition which implemented austerity measures so as to quickly pay back the debts the previous government had incurred while bailing out banks to ensure that people did not lose their savings, while also sneaking through some tax cuts so that a future Labour government could not reverse them. The blog article blamed the Guardian for endorsing the Lib Dems and the intellectual Left for voting for them instead of Labour.

A brief look at election maps of the 2010 and 2005 elections will show that Labour lost considerably more seats to the Tories than they did to the Lib Dems (though they did lose a few, such as Norwich South). In 2005 there was a swathe of red on the map running eastwards from north Wales to the Humber estuary, taking in all of the urban areas of Yorkshire and Lancashire; in 2010, there were two, smaller, separate red sections. The “Red Wall” had already started to fragment. Labour also lost a swathe of seats running southwards from the Pennines down to the Midlands, which we might call the “Red Column”, to the Tories as well as a number of seats in the Thames estuary and the large towns (as opposed to cities) of the south, the Midlands and East Anglia. The Lib Dems, although they increased their voter share by around 1%, actually lost five seats (this is an estimate, as electoral boundaries had changed). Labour’s vote in the north Midlands was reduced to just the urban areas, while the urban islands further south disappeared.  This could not have been down to a Guardian editorial; the decision of the Sun newspaper to switch its support to the Tories would have been more significant, but there is no reflection on why Labour lost so much support in this part of the country.

Labour’s strategy in the late 90s was to target the same voters who had defected to Thatcher’s Tories in 1979 and after: lower-middle class or ‘C2’ voters, as well as voters in the Midlands and those from working-class backgrounds in places like Essex who had moved beyond the cities as their circumstances improved. The theory of the time was that for Labour, the classes above C2 (meaning the wealthy and salaried professionals, classes A to C1) will never vote Labour in large numbers while those below (D and E) always will, so need not be targeted. To target the working class was seen as electoral suicide; people who talked of it were perceived as Scargillites or dinosaurs. Blair’s government was influenced by the now disgraced (and always regarded with much suspicion) Peter Mandelson, who early on in the Blair government told Peter Hain, a minister of state in early Blair cabinets and a cabinet minister later, that the working class had nowhere else to go. A little over twenty years later, that same working class sent Boris Johnson back into Downing Street with a substantial majority. A major contributory factor may have been Blair’s decision to allow migration of workers from eastern Europe into the UK in 2004, when other EU countries did not, as was the norm when weaker economies joined the union. I have written about the effect this had on the labour market in the UK at the time and it was not as simple as “they’re taking our jobs”: a ready supply of migrant workers frees employers from having to invest in or take risks on local talent, and when many of them are not setting up homes here but living in rooms and sending money home, they will not demand wages appropriate for living and raising a family in the UK. Academics like to stick their fingers in their ears and talk of the “lump of labour fallacy”, but in a country with a labour market as loosely regulated as ours is, a buyer’s market does not favour the working class.

Blair won a landslide in 1997 and a respectable majority in 2001 on a pro-European and pro-Maastricht platform. Leaving the EU was lunatic fringe politics at that time; Labour had lost elections it fought on the pledge of leaving the EEC in the 1980s. By 2010, the Tories could gain the largest share of the vote and by 2015 a majority on the basis of a pledge for an EU referendum in their manifesto. As they were in coalition with the Lib Dems in the 2010 parliament, they could not deliver it as the Lib Dems were opposed; they finally did in 2016. The 2015 election and Labour’s performance is often judged as Miliband’s failure — either by running on an “old left” platform or being too indistinguishable from the Tories — but the 2016 referendum result shows otherwise: that was a Brexit election, and Tony Blair had lost it in 2004 before Ed Miliband ever ran for leadership. It is possible that, had the Tories won a majority in 2010 and held the referendum a few years earlier, maybe in the afterglow of the 2012 Olympics, the result would have gone the other way, but we can only speculate. The Lib Dems in coalition only postponed the inevitable as regards the EU referendum and did little to mitigate the Tories’ austerity drive.

The Blairite faction has a tendency to take the credit for Labour’s wins when they are in charge, but blame everyone else (and especially the Left) for the losses (if one of theirs loses, as with Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband, he will be accused of tacking too far left). They assume Blair won because he was Tony Blair, and because he alone knew what had to be done, and ignore the factors in his favour, particularly the constant scandals that afflict late-term Tory governments and the Tory vote being split with a hardline anti-Europe faction such as the Referendum Party, Brexit Party or Reform UK; they also ignore the fact that his actions led to a dramatic loss in the party’s fortunes in their third term which the new leadership failed to put right after Blair got out before his mess hit the fan. The 2005 result, where Labour won a majority off 35.2% of the popular vote, should have been a wake-up call, but it was not heeded and the party let Gordon Brown run unopposed for the leadership as if he had a right to it (when you point out that Blair won this election by the skin of his teeth, his fans simply counter “he won”). They are also as messianic and blind to their leaders’ faults as the Corbyn cult were to their leader’s: they mistake cowardice and meanness for wisdom and they trivialise major mistakes, even crimes: our involvement with the Iraq war in Blair’s case, the collusion in the Gaza genocide in Starmer’s. They expect lifelong Labour supporters to just accept this as the cost of winning. They expect whole sections of society to just accept getting shafted for the same reason, because they’re not as important as another group of people whose votes they need, whether it’s the old working class under Blair or Muslims under Starmer, and are shocked and angry when there is no acceptance.

There is also a tendency towards superstitious reasoning. This also affects Democrat supporters in the US. The previous two times a Labour party went into an election in government but with a different prime minister to the elected one, Labour lost, they say, so Labour should just get behind Starmer despite such things as the party’s persistent low opinion poll ratings, sometimes well below 20% with Reform UK polling over 30%. Labour have never actually ousted a sitting prime minister; Harold Wilson resigned of his own accord in 1976, and Blair in 2007 having stated in 2004 that he would not seek a fourth term, i.e. contest an election in 2009 or 2010. I heard the same reasoning from the late Victoria Brownworth, a Democrat-supporting journalist in the US, about whether Joe Biden should have stood down as candidate on account of his failing mental state during his presidency: the last time a Democratic president declined to stand for a second term (Lyndon Johnson in 1968), his successor lost, as did Kamala Harris, Biden’s vice-president who succeeded him as candidate. That’s two occasions each in each country. There just aren’t enough cases to establish a pattern; James Callaghan and Gordon Brown served three years each and failed to be re-elected for different reasons.

Labour are a year and a half into a five year term; they have all that time to give people a reason to vote Labour in 2029. Mid-term blues are not a new thing but Labour or the Tories continually scoring 21% or less definitely is. It could be that the Reform vote will tear itself apart come 2029 as Restore Britain absorbs much of the racist vote that previously went to Farage’s party, but that is not a risk Labour can take. Labour must understand that if they do not cater to people’s needs, Reform or Restore Britain will cater to their prejudices while their “thinking vote” will not show up if there is any alternative and sometimes even where there is none. There is a sense that we expect better of the Labour party: this sentiment was heard often during the antisemitism debate, and should be heard louder in any debate on the Government’s support for Israel during its genocide in Gaza and its repression towards those who oppose it here. We also do not vote Labour expecting swingeing cuts to disability benefits or special educational needs and disability (SEND) provision in schools. The prospect of a far-right government led by Nigel Farage, let alone Rupert Lowe, off 30% of the vote because of the legacy parties’ unpopularity is a dire one; the leaders will get by on law work, public speaking and think tanks, while ordinary people suffer. If Keir Starmer cannot take this on, he should step aside and leave the job to someone who can; if the party continues to perform poorly in local elections and by-elections, it must take the initiative before it is too late; if you go into the next election and poll the predicted 19% to Farage’s 30%, you will not have the Left or the Guardian to blame.

This series is a collaboration between Dr. Ali and MuslimMatters, bringing Quranic wisdom to the questions Muslim youth are actually facing.

The Loneliness No One Talks About

There’s a specific kind of loneliness that Muslim teens experience that most parents don’t fully grasp:

It’s not just being physically alone. It’s being the only one who:

• Doesn’t drink or smoke weed (marijuana) at parties
• Steps away to pray during lunch
• Fasts during Ramadan while everyone else eats
• Can’t go on a date like everyone else
• Sits quietly while friends talk about their weekends

It’s the loneliness of being visibly different in every single space.

And the constant question underneath: “Is it worth it? To be the weird one? The one who doesn’t fit? The one that other people always have to make exceptions for?”

The Two Types of Compromise

In the video above, Dr. Ali explores how Muslim teens face two simultaneous pressures:

External Pressure:

• “Just one drink or one hit, no one will know”
• “Why can’t you just be like everyone else?”
• “You’re taking this religion thing too seriously”

Internal Pressure:

• “What if they’re right? Am I being extreme?”
• “Everyone else seems fine. Maybe I’m the problem.”
• “If no one here knows I’m Muslim, does it even matter?”

Here’s what makes it dangerous: The compromise always feels small at first.

Just one prayer missed to avoid awkwardness. Just one lie about why you can’t go to that party. Just one time staying silent when someone disrespects the Prophet ﷺ.

But these “small” compromises add up slowly. And eventually, you look in the mirror and don’t even recognize who’s looking back.

The Prophet Who Was Completely Alone

Prophet Yusuf’s situation was extreme:

• No community – Enslaved in Egypt, zero Muslim friends
• No freedom – Literal slave with no autonomy
• No support – Separated from family, isolated
• Maximum temptation – Powerful, beautiful woman who wanted him
• Zero consequences – “She locked the doors… no one would ever know”

If anyone had an excuse to compromise, it was Yusuf.

But his response Surah Yusuf, [12:23]:

“I seek refuge in Allah! He is my master, who has treated me well. Indeed, wrongdoers never succeed.”

Notice what Yusuf does:

1. Immediately centers Allah

• Not “I can’t”
• “Ma’adh Allah”—I seek refuge in Allah
• His refusal is rooted in his relationship with Allah, not fear of consequences

2. Remembers his identity

• “He is my master, who has treated me well”
• Even in slavery, even isolated, Yusuf knows doesn’t forget gratitude
• His identity isn’t tied to his circumstances

3. States a principle

• “Wrongdoers never succeed”
• This isn’t judgment of her
• It’s truth: Compromising never leads where you think it will

What Happened Next (The Part We Skip)

Here’s what most people forget: Yusuf went to prison. For years.

He did the right thing. He refused to compromise. And he suffered for it.

No miracle rescue. No immediate reward. Just years in a cell because he chose integrity over comfort.

Sit with that.

Because this is what we don’t tell Muslim teens: Sometimes doing the right thing costs you. Sometimes being the only Muslim in the room means you pay a price.

But here’s what the Quran shows us: Even in prison, Yusuf didn’t lose himself.

He taught tawheed to his cellmates. He served them spiritually. He remained Yusuf.

The cost of compromise is always higher than the cost of integrity.

The Surprising Truth About Integrity

Here is a point that challenges conventional wisdom:

“People don’t respect compromise. They respect conviction—even when they don’t share it.”

This is backed by research:

Studies on “moral credibility” show that people trust and respect individuals who maintain consistent values, even when they disagree with those values.

Translation for teens:

• When you water down who you are to fit in, people tolerate you—they don’t respect you
• When you own your identity confidently, people might disagree—but they will respect you

The college student in Dr. Ali’s story learned this:

“When you stopped being yourself, did people actually like you more? Or did they just tolerate a version of you that’s easier to ignore?”

Answer: “I think they stopped respecting me.”

For Parents: What Your Teen Isn’t Telling You

1. The pressure is relentless

You experienced Islamophobia. But you had a Muslim community to retreat to AND you already had developed your identity years before.

Your teen is often the ONLY Muslim in:

• Their friend group
• Their sports team
• Their classes
• Their workplace

They don’t have the luxury of retreat. It’s constant navigation.

2. Compromise happens in secret

You see them pray at home. You don’t see them skip prayers at school.

You see them fast. You don’t see them lie about why they’re not eating lunch to avoid the questions.

You see hijab. You don’t see the internal debate every morning about taking it off.

By the time you notice, the compromise is already deep.

3. They need tools, not lectures

Telling them “just be strong” doesn’t help when they’re the only one not drinking or partying.

What helps:

• Roleplay responses to common scenarios
• Connect them with other Muslim teens who are navigating this
• Share YOUR stories of standing alone (if you have them)
• Celebrate when they make hard choices, even small ones

For Teens: Practical Tools for Being Yusuf

1. Pre-decide your boundaries

Don’t wait until you’re in the moment to figure out what you’ll do.

Decide NOW:

• Will I pray even if I have to explain it?
• Will I correct people when they mispronounce my name?
• Will I skip events that require me to compromise?

Yusuf didn’t deliberate when tempted. He’d already decided who he was.

2. Find your “prison mission”

Yusuf found purpose even in prison—he served his cellmates spiritually.

Where can you be “Yusuf” in your hardest space?

• Be the one person with integrity in your group
• Be the one who doesn’t participate in gossip or bullying or ridiculing someone weaker
• Be the one who helps others even when you’re struggling

PURPOSE BEATS PRESSURE EVERY TIME.

3. Know that being alone doesn’t mean you’re wrong

Sometimes being the only one means you’re the only one brave enough.

The Prophet ﷺ said:

“Islam began as something strange and will return to being strange, so glad tidings to the strangers.” (Muslim)

You’re not weird or a freak for staying true to yourself. You’re exactly where you should be.

4. Build your refuge

The Prophet Yusuf had Allah. Who/what do you have?

• A Muslim friend who gets it (even if they’re far away)
• A weekly halaqa or youth group
• Daily Quran that reminds you who you are
• Regular check-ins with someone who holds you accountable
• Remember that as you build and develop your relationship with Allah, you too will find immense comfort and relief in your own personal relationship with Allah, just like the Prophet Yusuf

You can’t survive isolation without a refuge.

Discussion Questions for Families

For Teens:

1. Where are you currently compromising to fit in? Be specific.
2. What would it cost you to stop compromising? What’s it costing you to continue?
3. Who is your “refuge” when you feel alone in your values?

For Parents:

1. When was the last time you stood alone for your values? Share that story with your teen.
2. How can you create a home environment where your teen feels safe admitting when they’ve compromised or fallen?
3. Are you celebrating when they make hard choices, or only noticing when they fail?

For Discussion Together:

1. What does “success” look like? Material comfort? Or integrity maintained?
2. How can we support each other when doing the right thing costs something?
3. What’s one area where we can all be more “Yusuf”—uncompromising in our values?

The Ultimate Question

Yusuf spent years in prison for his integrity. But he never spent a single day unsure of who he was.

Can you say the same?

Or have you compromised so much that you’ve forgotten your own name?

This Ramadan, maybe the question isn’t “How do I fit in?”

Maybe it’s “Who do I become when I stop trying to?”

Continue the Journey

This is Night 4 of Dr. Ali’s 30-part Ramadan series, “30 Nights with the Quran: Stories for the Seeking Soul.”

Tomorrow, insha Allah: Night 5 tackles “The Comparison Trap”—why measuring yourself against others is destroying your peace, and what Surat al-Hujuraat teaches about true worth.

For daily extended reflections with journaling prompts, personal stories, and deeper resources, join Dr. Ali’s email community: https://30nightswithquran.beehiiv.com/

Related:

When Honoring Parents Feels Like Erasing Yourself | Night 3 with the Qur’an

5 Signs Your Teen is Struggling with Imposter Syndrome | Night 2 with the Qur’an

The post When You’re the Only Muslim in the Room | Night 4 with the Qur’an appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

I see it every year. Two weeks before the moon is sighted, a specific “Ramadan Anxiety” starts to settle in.

It’s a heavy, unspoken pressure. We feel the sudden, frantic need to “fix” fractured family ties that have been broken for years, as if a change in month could magically override years of boundary violations and deep-seated trauma. We are told this is the month to ask for what we want—to cry in Tahajjud—as if our spiritual performance is a transaction that will force the universe to grant the wishes our hearts desire. But what if we’re too numb to even know what to ask for? What if the tears just won’t come?

So, we put on the mask.

We have turned Ramadan into a competition. Who reads the most Quran? Who stayed up the latest for Taraweeh? Who has the most “productive” schedule? We post polished pictures of our Ramadan decor and our perfectly set Iftar tables, but let’s address the elephant in the room: Many of us are faking the “Ramadan High.”

The Exhaustion of the Competition

When we focus on the competition, we are essentially performing for an audience of people—even when we’re standing alone in the dark at 3:00 AM. We worry about how our journey looks to others because if we aren’t “doing,” we’re forced to “be.”

And “being” is terrifying.

“Being” means admitting that you’re entering the holiest month feeling burnt out. It means acknowledging that you’re angry, or that you’re struggling with your mental health, or that you feel like a fraud. We mask because we’re afraid that if we show our true, messy selves, we won’t be worthy of the Rahma (mercy) we’re seeking.

The “NPC” Muslim

In our digital age, it’s easy to slip into being the “NPC” version of a Muslim—the non-player character who just mindlessly follows a script, reciting words we don’t feel and smiling through the burnout because that’s what the “level” requires.

Why do we do this? Because looking within is painful. It’s much easier to finish a reading goal than it is to sit in silence and ask: “Why am I so disconnected from my own heart?” But as a therapist, I have to tell you: We cannot bypass our humanity to get to our spirituality. Allah doesn’t want the programmed version of you. He didn’t ask for a filtered, hollowed-out performance.

He asked for YOU.

The one who is tired. The one who is struggling. The one who doesn’t have it all together. If we spend thirty days ignoring our internal reality just to keep up with the competition, we aren’t “growing”—we’re just suppressing. True ‘ibaadah isn’t found in mindless rituals; it’s found in the raw, honest space where your real life meets your faith.

Trading Performance for Presence

As a therapist, I want to challenge you to drop the “perfect” act this year. Honesty with ourselves and others is the only way to actually experience the healing this month offers. Here’s what that looks like:

 – Honest Du’a (The “Unfiltered” Prayer): Instead of reciting a laundry list of things you think you should want, try being radical. “Ya Allah, I feel nothing right now. Please meet me in this numbness.” That is a more sincere prayer than a thousand words you don’t mean.

 – Authentic Boundaries: If “fixing family ties” means breaking your mental health to sit with people who belittle you, honesty looks like protecting your heart while praying for theirs from a distance. Healing isn’t a performance for the relatives.

 – Measuring “State” over “Stats”: At the end of the day, instead of asking “How many pages did I read?”, ask yourself: “Was I present for one minute today? Did I let myself feel a real emotion without judging it?”

 – Community Vulnerability: When someone asks “How is your Ramadan going?”, try dropping the “Alhamdulillah, amazing!” mask if it isn’t true. Try: “Honestly, it’s been a bit of a struggle for me mentally this year, but I’m taking it one day at a time.”

The mask protects us from being seen, but it also prevents us from being loved and healed. This year, let’s try something different. Stop “performing” Ramadan, and let it just be. Bring your actual, messy, aching self to the prayer rug and see what happens when you finally stop pretending.

 

Related:

– Recognizing Allah’s Mercy For What It Is: Reclaiming Agency Through Ramadan

– Ramadan In The Quiet Moments: The Spiritual Power Of What We Don’t Do

 

The post The Ramadan Mask: Why We Perform Piety And Bypass The Soul appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

The Guardian’s picture editors select photographs from around the world

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Massive US file release withholds the telling facts leaving investigative journalists, historians and bloggers to speculate on the larger picture from the crumbs on offer.

Co-authored by Mufti Abdullah Nana and Dr. Shafi Lodhi

Picture the last time you donated during Ramadan. Maybe you were scrolling through your phone after taraweeh, watching a video of children in Gaza searching through rubble. Or perhaps you sat in your masjid as a charismatic speaker painted scenes of suffering so vivid you reached for your wallet/purse before he finished talking. You gave $100, $500, maybe more. You felt that catch in your throat, that pull of obligation and compassion.

Now answer this: what if someone told you that $30 of your $100 donation went not to buy food or care for children, but into the personal bank account of the person who asked you to give?

Would you want to know? Would it matter to you?

In early February 2026, a review of IRS Form 990 filings revealed that Human Appeal USA had listed $2,040,887 in payments to legal scholar and activist Khaled Beydoun for “professional fundraising services” during the fiscal year ending in 2024. According to the same filing, Beydoun had raised $7,120,440 for the charity through online crowdfunding campaigns. In other words, nearly 29 cents of every dollar donated was recorded as compensation for a single fundraiser.

Beydoun has denied receiving any personal payment, calling the filing a “clerical error” and stating that the funds were directed to a nonprofit organization focused on combating Islamophobia rather than to him personally. Human Appeal USA has echoed this explanation. But as advocacy groups have pointed out, no proof has been provided that the money was transferred to such an organization, and the charity has not amended its IRS filings to correct the alleged error.

Whether the specifics of this case are ultimately resolved in Beydoun’s favor or not, the controversy has forced the Muslim community to confront a systemic problem it has long avoided discussing. That problem is the widespread, undisclosed practice of commission-based fundraising that is far bigger than one person or one charity.

The Gold Rush

Every Ramadan and Dhul Hijjah, when Muslim giving reaches its annual peak, a well-oiled machine kicks into gear. Crowdfunding platforms compete for donor dollars. Influencers and professional speakers fan out across the country, appearing at masajid and speaking events. Their appeals are polished, their rhetoric powerful. Children are dying. Families are starving. The ummah is bleeding. Give now. Give generously. Allah is watching.

Millions of dollars flow in. Six-figure paydays for individual fundraisers during Ramadan alone aren’t unusual.

Meanwhile, at your local masjid, a different version of the same story unfolds. A visiting speaker arrives, often someone with name recognition and social media following. He delivers a moving khutbah. He talks about our duty to the suffering, about standing before Allah on the Day of Judgment and being asked what we did when our brothers and sisters needed us. Then comes the appeal. Checks are written. Cash is collected. The speaker leaves with his cut, a percentage negotiated privately with the masjid board, unknown to the congregation who just opened their wallets.

This is not overhead, the legitimate costs of running a charity that everyone accepts. This is a commission. A finder’s fee that scales infinitely with how much emotional urgency the fundraiser can generate.

Ask yourself: Did you consent to this? Did anyone tell you? Did you have a choice?

When the Experts Settled This Debate

Outside the Muslim nonprofit bubble, this question has been settled for years.

The Association of Fundraising Professionals, the largest professional body representing fundraisers in the world, is unequivocal. Standards 21 through 24 of the AFP Code of Ethical Standards explicitly prohibit percentage-based compensation, finder’s fees, and commissions tied to the amount of money raised. Standard 23 states that compensation “may include bonuses or merit pay in line with organizational practices but may never be based on a percentage of funds raised.” Standard 24 directs members to “decline receiving or paying finder’s fees, commissions, or compensation based on a percentage of funds raised.”

The National Council of Nonprofits is equally direct: “It is NOT appropriate for a nonprofit to compensate a fundraising professional based on a percentage of the money raised.”

These are not obscure positions. They represent the consensus of the entire professional fundraising world, built on decades of experience and hard learned lessons. The charity scandals of previous decades taught the nonprofit sector a painful lesson about what happens when financial incentives are misaligned with charitable missions.

The reasoning behind the prohibition is straightforward. Commission-based compensation puts personal financial gain above the donor’s trust and the organization’s mission. It incentivizes short-term cash grabs over long-term relationship building with donors. It creates pressure to use manipulative tactics that maximize the amount raised in a given moment rather than tactics that serve the organization’s genuine needs. And when donors eventually discover that their heartfelt contributions were significantly diverted to pay a commissioned agent, it erodes trust not just in one organization but in the entire charitable sector.

Percentage-based compensation doesn’t just create a conflict of interest; it makes the conflict the entire structure of the relationship. The fundraiser’s personal income directly competes with the donor’s intent and the charity’s mission. The more they take, the less it reaches the cause. Every charity dollar that goes into the fundraiser’s pocket is a dollar that doesn’t feed a hungry child or rebuild a destroyed home.

The Muslim nonprofit sector is operating as if it is exempt from these standards, as if the rules of ethical fundraising don’t apply to Muslim organizations.

What Islam Actually Says About This

Some defenders of commission-based fundraising in the Muslim community invoke the Quranic concept of al-amileen alayha,  those employed in the collection and distribution of zakat, who are themselves entitled to a share of the funds they collect. This is mentioned in Surah At-Tawbah as one of the eight categories of zakat recipients.

“Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed to collect [zakah] and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt and for the cause of Allah and for the [stranded] traveler – an obligation [imposed] by Allah . And Allah is Knowing and Wise.” [Surah At-Tawbah: 9;60]

The argument goes that since Islam itself recognizes that those who collect charitable funds may be compensated from those funds, there is nothing wrong with paying fundraisers a percentage.

This argument confuses categories in a way that does not survive scrutiny. The Quranic provision for zakat collectors envisions fair compensation for the labor of collection and distribution.  It does not create a percentage-based commission structure that scales infinitely with the amount collected. There is a fundamental difference between paying a worker a fair wage for their time and effort, and paying an agent 29% of every dollar that passes through their hands. The classical jurists who discussed the share of the amil (collector) debated appropriate limits precisely because they understood the moral hazard of allowing collectors to enrich themselves disproportionately from funds intended for the poor.

This distinction was recognized not only in theory but in lived institutional practice. Maulana Ashraf ʿAlī Thānwī explicitly condemned the commission model in the context of religious fundraising. He wrote1:

“Madāris kī ṭaraf se kamīshan par safīr rakhna sharṭ fāsid hai.”
 “Appointing an agent on a commission basis on behalf of madrasas is an invalid condition.”

In the terminology of fiqh, sharṭ fāsid is not a mild critique. It denotes a legally defective contractual condition that corrupts the agreement itself. In other words, the problem is not merely optics or excessiveness; the very structure of tying religious fundraising to a percentage incentive is considered unsound because it distorts intention, creates exploitation risk, and undermines the trust inherent in charitable transactions.

Islamic contract law (fiqh al-mu’amalat) provides additional clarity. The principles governing hiring and employment (ijara) emphasize that compensation must be clearly agreed upon, transparent to all relevant parties, and free from gharar (ambiguity, uncertainty, or deception). When a donor gives sadaqah or zakat believing that their contribution is going to feed a starving child, and a significant undisclosed portion instead goes to compensate a fundraiser, the element of gharar is plain. The donor did not consent to that allocation. They were not informed. The transaction, as presented to them, was misleading.

There is a broader principle at stake as well. Muslims are called to a standard of honesty and transparency in financial dealings that should exceed, not fall below, the ethical norms of the societies in which they live. If the mainstream nonprofit world has concluded that commission-based fundraising is unethical, the Muslim community should be leading the conversation, not trailing behind it, and not exploiting the gap.

The Crisis of Knowledge

Most Muslim donors have absolutely no idea any of this is happening. They see appeals for Gaza relief, Yemen famine aid, and Syria orphan care. They give because they want to help desperate people. The campaign page doesn’t mention commissions. The masjid announcement doesn’t mention commissions.

The emotional context makes this even worse. These appeals weaponize human suffering and religious duty. Images of dying children. Stories of families fleeing genocide. Reports of famine and disease. Donors give out of religious obligation and emotional urgency, often during Ramadan when they’re fasting and spiritually heightened. Taking undisclosed percentage cuts during these campaigns—campaigns that exploit the most vulnerable human beings on earth to open wallets—should shock our collective conscience.

“Donors give from a place of spiritual obligation and moral anguish. To exploit that emotional state while concealing how their money will actually be divided is a betrayal of trust that carries weight in this life and in the next.”

Technically, some of this information is discoverable. IRS Form 990 filings (the same documents that brought the Beydoun arrangement to light) require that nonprofits disclose payments to professional fundraisers. But these filings are dense, technical documents buried in databases that ordinary donors never access. The information is legally available in the way that a needle is technically available in a haystack. No one browsing a crowdfunding campaign page encounters a disclosure that reads: “28.7% of your donation will go to compensate the fundraiser promoting this campaign.”

At the masjid level, the opacity is even worse. When a traveling fundraiser stands at the minbar during the last ten nights of Ramadan and delivers a devastating account of children dying in a war zone, and then the donation requests are made, there is no announcement that the speaker will be taking 15% or 30% of whatever is collected. The congregants who give, often sacrificially, often from modest means, often with tears in their eyes, are making a decision based on incomplete information. They believe their money is going to the cause. They are not told otherwise.

The emotional context makes this worse. These fundraising appeals are not selling magazine subscriptions. They are tied to the most visceral human suffering: genocide, famine, orphaned children, bombed hospitals. Donors give from a place of spiritual obligation and moral anguish. To exploit that emotional state while concealing how their money will actually be divided is a betrayal of trust that carries weight in this life and in the next.

The Reform We Need

The path forward requires action from institutions that already exist and already claim moral authority over the Muslim community’s collective life.

 – National Muslim organizations, fiqh councils, and nonprofit networks must develop and publish explicit ethical fundraising guidelines. These guidelines should be modeled on the AFP Code of Ethical Standards and should contain clear, unambiguous language banning commission-based compensation for fundraisers. Fundraisers should be paid fair salaries, flat fees, or hourly rates for their work, never a percentage of the money they raise. This is the established standard in every other sector of professional fundraising, and it is long past time for the Muslim nonprofit world to adopt it.

 – Every fundraising effort must include mandatory disclosure at the point of donation. Whether online or at a masjid, donors must be told before they give how much of their donation will go to fundraising costs, administrative overhead, and third-party compensation. This information should be prominently displayed, not buried in fine print or tax filings that no one reads. Informed consent is a basic Islamic requirement for a valid transaction.

 – Masjid boards must ban commission-based fundraisers and publicly disclose the flat fee that they pay visiting fundraisers. The figure should be announced to the congregation before the appeal begins. It should not be buried in obscure filings or hidden away. If a fundraiser is being paid 20% of whatever is raised, the people writing the checks deserve to know that before they write them.

 – Crowdfunding platforms serving the Muslim community must require charities to disclose fundraiser compensation arrangements on the campaign page itself. Donors should not need to file FOIA requests or dig through ProPublica databases to learn how their money is being allocated. The information should be right there, next to the donate button.

 – Every Muslim nonprofit should publish an accessible, plain-language annual report showing how funds were allocated. Not just an IRS Form 990. Instead, a clear, readable document that any donor can understand, showing what percentage of funds went to programs, what went to administration, and what went to fundraising compensation.

Why This Hasn’t Happened

There is an uncomfortable reason why these reforms have not already happened.

Many individuals who sit on the boards of major Muslim organizations, who speak at their conventions, who would be tasked with writing these ethical guidelines, are themselves participants in commission-based fundraising. Some are the most prominent voices in Muslim America.

The conflict of interest is structural. The people with authority to reform the system are often the ones profiting from it. Asking them to write guidelines that ban commission-based fundraising is like asking someone to vote for a pay cut. It is not impossible; people of conscience do act against their own financial interests, but it requires acknowledging why this conversation has been avoided for so long.

This is also why reform cannot be left to insiders alone. The donor community, the millions of ordinary Muslims who fund these organizations with their charitable contributions, must demand change from below. Donors should ask direct questions before giving: How is the fundraiser being compensated? What percentage of my donation goes to the cause? Will you show me a breakdown? If the answers are evasive, the donor should give elsewhere.

Scholars and community leaders who are not entangled in the fundraising circuit bear a particular responsibility to speak on this issue clearly, without hedging, and without worrying about alienating colleagues who benefit from the current arrangement. The community needs voices that are not compromised by the very practice being examined.

The Trust We’re Breaking

Every dollar a Muslim donates in the name of Allah is an amanah. It is a trust placed in the hands of the charity, the platform, the fundraiser, and every person in the chain between the donor’s intention and the beneficiary’s relief. The Quran warns, in Surah Al-Anfal:

“O you who believe, do not betray Allah and the Messenger, nor betray your trusts while you know.” [Surah Al-Anfal; 8:27]

The Beydoun controversy is not one person’s scandal. It is a window into a system that has operated for years without adequate scrutiny, accountability, or transparency. The question is not whether Khaled Beydoun personally did or did not receive $2 million. The question is how many other arrangements like this exist across the Muslim nonprofit landscape, undisclosed, unexamined, and unknown to the donors who fund them.

Ramadan is days away. Millions of Muslims will open their hearts and their wallets in pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, giving to causes they believe in with a sincerity that should humble anyone involved in the process of collecting and distributing those funds. They deserve to know where their money is going. They deserve honesty. They deserve a community that holds its institutions to a standard worthy of the trust being placed in them.

Donors: ask questions before you give. Masjid boards: adopt transparent policies and disclose what you pay fundraisers. Existing Muslim institutions and fiqh councils: draft and publish clear ethical guidelines, even when doing so is inconvenient for those in your own ranks. Scholars: speak on this without equivocation, even if doing so costs you your speaking fees.

The time for this conversation was years ago. The next best time is now, before another Ramadan passes with millions of dollars flowing through a system that betrays both the donors and the beneficiaries.

 

Related:

– Zakat Eligibility of Islamic Organizations

– This Article Could be Zakat-Eligible

1    Ashraf ʿAlī Thānwī, Ashraf al-Aḥkām (Tatimmah Imdād al-Fatāwā), Karachi: Idārah al-Taʿlīfāt, 318.

The post Where Does Your Dollar Go? – How We Can Avoid Another Beydoun Controversy appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

This is Lakemba – the suburb that Pauline Hanson claims makes people ‘feel unwelcome’ – on the first night of Ramadan

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Muslims donate four times more than the average adult in Britain but banking restrictions mean many humanitarian projects already affected by aid cuts will not get donations

Buckets passed around mosques, fundraisers shared on WhatsApp groups and televised appeals will raise hundreds of millions of pounds for charity over the coming weeks of Ramadan.

Much of the £2bn raised by British Muslims each year comes when giving surges during the holy month, but the full potential of that support – especially at a time of US, British and European government aid cuts – is being limited by challenges charities say they face in sending money abroad.

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Exclusive: AFP comment comes as Bilal El-Hayek, mayor of Canterbury Bankstown, says One Nation leader’s comments ‘will incite someone’

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Federal police say they have “received reports of a crime” in relation to comments made to the media by Pauline Hanson this week.

But an AFP spokesperson did not say whether they had begun a criminal investigation, only that they would have more to say “at an appropriate time”.

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Israeli police raid compound, arrest staff and curb Muslims’ access as Ramadan begins

A six-decade agreement governing Muslim and Jewish prayer at Jerusalem’s most sensitive holy site has “collapsed” under pressure from Jewish extremists backed by the Israeli government, experts have warned.

A series of arrests of Muslim caretaker staff, bans on access for hundreds of Muslims, and escalating incursions by radical Jewish groups culminated this week in the arrest of an imam of al-Aqsa mosque and an Israeli police raid during evening prayers on the first night of Ramadan.

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This series is a collaboration between Dr. Ali and MuslimMatters, bringing Quranic wisdom to the questions Muslim families are actually navigating.

The Question That Sometimes Breaks Families

“How do I choose between obeying my parents and preserving my deen?”

This is the question I hear most often from Muslim teens in my practice. And it’s the question most parents never expect their children to ask.

For parents who sacrificed everything—left their countries, worked multiple jobs, endured discrimination—to give their children “a better life,” this question feels like ingratitude. Like rejection.

For teens navigating dual identities, generational gaps, and pressure from all sides, this question feels like survival. Like breathing.

And the tragedy is: Both are right.

The Real Conflict Isn’t Islam—It’s Culture

Here’s what makes this so painful: Most parent-teen conflicts aren’t about Islam at all. They’re about culture masquerading as religion.

Common scenarios:

• Marriage: Parents insist on someone from “back home” who speaks the language. Teen wants to marry a convert or someone from a different ethnic background. Both parties claim “Islamic values.”
• Education: Parents push medical/engineering/law careers (financial security). Teen wants to study Islamic studies or social work (meaningful impact). Both claim they’re honoring Islam.
• Mental health: Teen needs therapy for anxiety/depression. Parents say “just pray more” because therapy wasn’t available in their generation or because of the social stigma surrounding mental illness in the community. Both want the teen to be “strong in faith.”

The pattern: Parents equate their cultural experience with Islam. Teens separate the two. Neither side realizes they’re arguing about different things.

What Surat Luqman Actually Teaches

In the video above, Dr. Ali unpacks ayaat 14-15 of Surat Luqman, which present a revolutionary framework:

First, the obligation [31:14]:

“And We have commanded people to honor their parents. Your mother bore you through hardship after hardship…”

Clear. Non-negotiable. Honor your parents. Especially your mother, whose sacrifice is beyond measure.

Then, the boundary [31:15]:

“But if they pressure you to associate with Me what you have no knowledge of, do not obey them. Still keep their company in this world courteously…”

The Quran itself creates space for respectful disagreement.

The Five-Step Process Before Disobedience

But—and this is critical—the ayah about “do not obey them” is not a free pass. Classical scholars emphasize that this is a last resort after exhausting all other options.

The Islamic Process:

1. Make extensive du’a

• For Allah to guide you AND your parents
• For Allah to soften hearts (yours AND theirs)
• For Allah to show you if you’re wrong
• Duration: Weeks, not days. Months if necessary.

2. Consult knowledgeable, righteous scholars

• Not friends who’ll validate you
• Not random internet fatwas or AI
• Actual scholars who know you, know both fiqh and understand the circumstances of your dilemma, and will tell you hard truths
• Ask: “Am I obligated to obey in this situation?”

3. Examine your intentions brutally

• Is this really about protecting your deen?
• Or is it about wanting things your way?
• Are you certain this will cause harm, or just discomfort?
• Your nafs (ego) is a skilled liar—be honest before Allah

4. Try every respectful avenue

• Involve family mediators
• Involve community elders that your parents respect
• Give it TIME (parents sometimes need months to process)
• Show maturity through actions, not just arguments

5. Understand what “harm” actually means

Clear harm:

• Forcing you into marriage without consent
• Preventing halal marriage while you’re at serious risk of sin
• Demanding participation in shirk or explicit haram

NOT harm:

• Discomfort
• Disagreement with their timeline
• Thinking they’re “old-fashioned”
• Wanting to study something they don’t approve of

If you’re unsure which category applies, that’s exactly why you need scholars, not solo decision-making.

What Parents Need to Understand

If you’re a parent reading this, here’s what your teen might not be able to articulate:

1. The world they’re navigating is genuinely different

You grew up surrounded by Muslims. They’re often the only Muslim in the room.

You had clear cultural scripts. They’re writing new ones, sometimes on a daily basis.

You could be Muslim without explaining. They have to justify their existence daily.

This doesn’t make them weaker. It makes their challenge different.

2. “We sacrificed for you” can become a weapon

Your sacrifice is real and valid. But when it’s used to shut down every conversation, it becomes:

• A debt they can never repay
• A guilt that poisons the relationship
• A barrier to honest communication

Try: “We sacrificed because we love you, not so you’d owe us your entire future.”

3. Your timeline isn’t universal

You married maybe at 20. The economy has changed.

You never needed therapy. Mental health wasn’t discussed; that doesn’t mean it wasn’t needed.

Your arranged marriage worked. That doesn’t make all arranged marriages right for everyone.

Their path can honor Islam AND look different from yours.

4. Involvement ≠ Control

You can be part of their decisions without making all their decisions.

Teen wants to marry someone you didn’t choose? Be involved in the vetting process, but don’t veto based purely on ethnicity.

Teen wants a different career? Discuss practicalities, but don’t threaten to cut them off for not following your dream.

What Teens Need to Understand

And if you’re a teen reading this, here’s what you might not see yet:

1. Your parent’s fear comes from love

When they say no to early marriage, they’re thinking: “What if it fails and ruins your education?” or “He’s just not mature enough to handle such a complex situation and I don’t want him to get hurt.”

When they push a certain career, they’re thinking: “I don’t want you to struggle like I did.”

When they resist therapy, they’re thinking: “What if people think we’re bad parents?”

Their methods might be wrong. Their motivation is usually love.

2. You don’t have all the information

You see your situation. They’ve seen hundreds of similar situations—and the outcomes.

You think they don’t understand. Sometimes they understand too well because they’ve watched others fail.

This doesn’t make them automatically right. But it should make you pause before assuming they’re automatically wrong.

3. Obedience in good matters builds trust for hard matters

If you fight them on everything—curfew, chores, family gatherings—they’ll assume your “religious” disagreements are just more rebellion.

But if you show responsibility in the small things, they’re more likely to trust your judgment on big things.

Strategic obedience in neutral matters = earned trust in crucial matters.

4. Boundaries with honor is an art

You can disagree respectfully. You can say no kindly. You can set boundaries without cutting them off.

The Quran model: “Do not obey them” AND “keep their company courteously.”

Both. At the same time. But once again, only as a last resort.

Discussion Questions for Families

For Parents:

1. Which of your expectations for your child are Islamic requirements vs. cultural preferences?
2. Are you willing to be involved in their decision without controlling it?
3. What would it take for you to trust their judgment on a major life decision?

For Teens:

1. Have you completed all five steps of the Islamic process before considering disobedience? Be honest.
2. If your parents said yes to what you want, would the problem be solved? Or would you find something else to disagree about?
3. What does “keeping their company courteously” look like practically in your situation?

For Discussion Together:

1. Can we separate “I disagree with you” from “I don’t respect you”?
2. What would it look like to honor each other even when we disagree?
3. How can we bring in trusted mediators before conflicts escalate?

The Both/And Approach

Here’s what Surah Luqman teaches: It’s not parents OR yourself. It’s parents AND yourself.

You can honor them AND maintain boundaries. You can love them AND choose differently. You can be grateful AND establish your own identity.

But this requires:

• For teens: Exhausting all respectful options first
• For parents: Creating space for respectful disagreement
• For everyone: Assuming good faith, not bad intentions

When to Seek Help

If your family dynamic includes:

• Threats of violence or disownment
• Abuse masked as “discipline”
• Complete refusal to communicate

This goes beyond normal parent-teen tension. Get help from:

• Trusted imam or scholar
• Muslim family counselor
• Community support organizations

Don’t suffer alone. Islam provides resources for these situations.

Continue the Journey

This is Night 3 of Dr. Ali’s 30-part Ramadan series, “30 Nights with the Quran: Stories for the Seeking Soul.”

Tomorrow, insha Allah: Night 4 explores “Being Muslim in Non-Muslim Spaces”—the story of the Prophet Yusuf maintaining his integrity in Egypt, the most un-Islamic environment possible.

For daily extended reflections with journaling prompts, personal stories, and deeper resources, join Dr. Ali’s email community: https://30nightswithquran.beehiiv.com/

Related:

Who Am I Really? What Surat Al-‘Asr Teaches Muslim Teens About Identity | Night 1 with the Qur’an

5 Signs Your Teen is Struggling with Imposter Syndrome | Night 2 with the Qur’an

The post When Honoring Parents Feels Like Erasing Yourself | Night 3 with the Qur’an appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

Beyond disproving the tired tropes of Muslims hating the west, Australian Muslims can show us what a month of practising to be a better person looks like

As Australian Muslims prepared for Ramadan this week, the leader of the second most popular political party in the country, Senator Pauline Hanson, said of them: “Their religion concerns me because [of] what it says in the Qur’an … They hate Westerners … You say, ‘Well, there’s good Muslims out there.’ Well, I’m sorry. How can you tell me there are good Muslims?”

None of this is surprising. This same senator has twice worn a burqa into parliament, wrongly claimed that halal certification funds terrorism, and wanted a royal commission into Islam.

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Pro-Palestine activism received a respite from longstanding official and unofficial repression in Britain this week with a legal order to overturn a government ban on Palestine Action, an activist organization that was banned in the summer of 2025. The High Court ruled that the ban was unlawful, giving some relief to thousands of people who had been imprisoned under the ban.

Aiming to challenge Britain’s armament of Israel through direct action, Palestine Action was founded in the early 2020s by Huda Ammori, a British researcher and activist of Palestinian-Iraqi stock, and Richard Barnard. Urgency was lent to their work by the subsequent genocide that began in Gaza from 2023, to which the British government and assorted weapons companies were linked. In a remarkable leap, the government cited the group’s raid on an arms manufacturer’s Bristol warehouse as evidence of its terrorist nature. The result was that thousands of people, including many pensioners, were imprisoned for public solidarity with the group, which the government presented as support for terrorism.

The legal proceedings launched by the British state, first under Yvette Cooper, who has since been given the foreign minister’s role, and then under Shabana Mahmood, have been notable for a reliance on rhetoric, with “terrorism” the most obvious example, in favour of legal rights and facts. Even in court, the Palestine Action legal team was at first deprived of key footage that showed armed guards bearing down on the activists who had supposedly “assaulted” them: footage with the potential to turn the claim of unprovoked assault by the “terrorist” activists on its head. Unsurprisingly, the court ruled against the ban.

Yet, the case of Palestine Action is simply part of a major campaign to crack down against Palestine support and criticism of Israel that the British state has pursued since the genocide ended. Owing to Britain’s relative familiarity with the Middle East, where its colonial conquest and misrule of the region during and immediately after the World Wars set in motion the foundation of Israel amid a mass expulsion of Palestinians, there has long been a relatively informed debate on the issue of the type that is rare across the Atlantic in the United States. In the period since, Britain has usually at least overtly avoided the tasteless partisanship with Israel characteristic of the United States.

However, this has changed enormously in the past twenty years. It changed first under Tony Blair (1997-2007), whose New Labour regime eagerly identified itself with pro-Israel neoconservatives in Washington, and who even after leaving office has personally been an unofficial eminence grise in Anglo-American policy toward the Muslim world, most recently as the prospective viceroy for Donald Trump’s grotesquely misnamed “Board of Peace” that aims to turn the wreckage of Gaza into a “pacified” colony.

Israeli Encroachment During the Tory Decade

The process intensified during the 2010s, a decade dominated by the right-wing Tory party, whose leaders were each closely identified with Israel, though some more than others. One particularly noxious mainstay was the rabidly anti-Muslim minister Michael Gove, who, as education minister, whipped up an entirely contrived Green Scare about Muslim schools acting as a societal fifth column, and also spearheaded the “Brexit” campaign to leave Europe that produced major economic repercussions for which Muslims, immigrants, and minorities more generally are repeatedly blamed. Unsurprisingly, Gove is also a major cheerleader of Israel, recently suggesting that the Israeli military be given a prize for its supposed clemency in genociding Gaza.

British Parliamentarian, Michael Gove [PC: The BBC]

Such ministers and other pro-Israel networksput constant pressure on British policy, as well as institutions such as the state-sponsored media outlet British Broadcasting Corporation, in a more pro-Israel direction. Less personally extreme figures also fell into line: cases in point were successive prime ministers David Cameron (2010-16) and Theresa May (2016-19).

May, who had been interior minister during Gove’s crusade against Muslim schools before succeeding Cameron, was nonetheless seen as insufficiently malleable: in November 2017, she had to dismiss her own interior minister, Gove’s frequent collaborator Priti Patel, for unauthorized secret meetings with Israeli leaders. In turn, the infamous American powerbroker, sex trafficker, and undisguised supporter of Israel, Jeffrey Epstein, conspired against her with her successor and then-foreign minister, Boris Johnson, and with far-right ideologue Steve Bannon.

Johnson’s own interior minister, Suella Braverman, was as ruthless a partisan of Israel as Patel: as soon as the genocide began in autumn 2023, she ordered a draconian crackdown, characterized by dogwhistling rhetoric and spurious targeting of even mild dissidence. Her cabinet colleague, defence minister Grant Shapps, arranged weapons transfers to Israel at the same time as his daughter was publicly denouncing pro-Palestine activism as a threat to Jews. This, despite the sizeable number of Jewish activists in such activism: their struggle, like that of pro-Palestine activists of other faiths, was discounted.

Braverman resigned after lambasting her own police for what she considered insufficient ruthlessness, and has since left the Tories to join the far-right party of Nigel Farage, the rabble-rouser whose views include vilification of foreigners and support of Israel, and to whom Bannon and Epstein were also linked. Farage forms part of a circle of far-right figures that pressure successive regimes to move further right and, among other things, to side with Israel. They include fascist-curious polemicist Douglas Murray and nativist thug “Tommy Robinson” Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, both of whom have since the 2000s whipped up hatred against Muslims and have gone out of their way to cheerlead Israel, frequently meeting with its officials and echoing its propaganda, since the genocide began in 2023.

Nativism with International Links

This propaganda, often relying on Artificial Intelligence-generated imagery and blatant invective, often overlaps with anti-Muslim state propaganda from India and the United Arab Emirates. India has been ruled since 2014 by the far-right Bharatiya Janata Party, which has often made violent anti-Muslim agitation a centrepiece of its policy and is, once more, particularly close with Israel. Patel and Braverman, the former British interior ministers who have so unabashedly pinned their flags to the Israeli mast, both support Modi.

The Emirates, whose Mohammad bin Zayed is infamous for an international antipathy against “political Islam”, which usually overlaps with any Muslim presence but the most obeisant to him, has likewise whipped up agitation against Muslims in the West: anti-Muslim circles frequently cite its foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed, the ruler’s brother, when he criticized the West for its supposed tolerance of Muslim extremists. These are all talking points meant to increase pressure on Muslims in the West, as Murray has advocated for at least twenty years, and in turn dampen opposition to Western support for Israeli policy.

The crackdown on Palestine Action, and similarly heavy-handed clampdowns in France and Germany, are thus the result of years of pressure by foreign governments and local nativists, invariably linked to support of Israel.

Along with a web of ostensibly private actors linked to Israel’s government, Israeli ambassadors have constantly pressured Britain to crack down more robustly: its ambassador Mark Regev’s push to censor the presentation she arranged of a pro-Palestine Jewish speaker helped push Ammori, the Palestine Action founder, to more direct activism. This blatant case of interference in a private campus was just part of the steady inroads into British institutions that Israel’s supporters made during the Tory years. These inroads threaten the party structure itself: this winter, Robert Jenrick, another particular Israel cheerleader seen as a rising star within the Tories, was forced out of the party by its leader, Kemi Badenoch, after another plot; like Braverman, he joined Farage.

None of this is to signify moderation on the part of the plotters’ targets: with a singular lack of self-respect, the Tory leaders targeted by pro-Israel competitors have themselves gone out of their way to kowtow to Tel Aviv. Badenoch has shrilly supported Israel’s “fight against Islamist terror”, while Cameron, who had been forced to resign by Gove’s Brexit misadventure, returned to serve as foreign minister in 2024 and took such a skewed pro-Israel stance that he is even reported to have threatened the International Criminal Court’s head Karim Khan. Ironically, and underlining the regularity with which Israel’s supporters turn on one another, Khan had himself been first supported by Israel’s supporters but outraged them by investigating South African accusations of genocide.

A Laborious Campaign of Persecution

Nor should corrosively slavish partisanship to Israel be considered an exclusively Tory malady: under Keir Starmer, whose Labour party has ruled since 2024, the state has only doubled down. Starmer took over the party after his leftist predecessor, Jeremy Corbyn, had been viciously smeared with, among other things, spurious accusations of anti-Semitism for his outspoken sympathy with Palestine. At the outset of the genocide, Starmer infamously endorsed Israel’s right to block the Palestinians from water, and his regime has continued its predecessor’s policy of crackdowns and frivolous “lawfare” against pro-Palestine activism. These reached a state of farce in autumn 2025 when a police ban on a notoriously violent far-right Israeli club, which had already attacked Muslims abroad, prompted keening howls of grief and outrage about alleged anti-Semitism virtually across a British political elite – only for Israel itself to cancel a local match with the club from fears of violence. The fact that legitimate fears about a demonstrably violent set of anti-Muslim hooligans could be reimagined and portrayed across the British political spectrum as anti-Semitism underscored the state of obeisance to which the British elite has subjected itself.

This month, Starmer was forced to dismiss his ambassador to the United States, Peter Mandelson, a longstanding intimate of both Blair and Epstein, already controversial before his close ties to the latter were unearthed. The revelations also prompted a gaffe from minister Wes Streeting, who had only very narrowly held onto his seat against Palestinian activist Leanne Mohamad in the 2024 election. By his own admission, no “shrinking violet” on Israel, Streeting released his 2025 texts to Mandelson, which showed his knowledge of Israel’s “rogue state behaviour” that “Israel is committing war crimes before our eyes”. These texts show that ministers were privately aware that the same critics they were persecuting at home were correct in their condemnation of Israel and the British links to it.

An undated photograph released by the U.S. Justice Department showing Jeffrey Epstein, right, and Peter Mandelson. [PC: The NYT]

The regime has been far more sensitive to far-right agitation by Farage and Robinson, which relied heavily on the same anti-Muslim propaganda promoted by Israel: the 2020s have seen a series of protests and riots aimed at foreigners in general and Muslims most specifically, gleefully supported by far-right oligarch Elon Musk who has regularly promoted, even with the most childish attempts, the claim that Muslim immigration is destroying Britain. Rather than confront these head-on, the British government has tried to prove their patriotism with more and more draconian crackdowns that, in their haste to classify political opponents as terrorists, intersect with the crackdown on such groups as Palestine Action. That any number of corrosive, destructive precedents that bode ill for British institutions and public life are being set seems to be of no concern.

Conclusion

Palestine was impacted by Britain during the colonial period, but today the genocide in Palestine has reverberated right back into British politics, into its streets, and its public discourse. The tumultuous events of mid-2020s Britain have not only shown a moral rot at the heart of British politics, but also the fact that steadfastness of the sort that Palestine Action so sturdily displayed under so much maliciously constructed pressure, ultimately pays off.

As Allah tells us in the Quran:

“And say, ‘Truth has come, and falsehood has departed. Indeed is falsehood, [by nature], ever bound to depart.” [Surah Al’Isra: 17;81]

 

Related:

– Damning Report On PREVENT Program In The UK

– Quranic Verses For Steadfastness For The Valiant Protesters On Campus

The post Bipartisan Rot Uncovered As British Crackdown On Pro-Palestine Activists Falters appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

Around the world, Muslims rejoice with anticipation and excitement for the blessed month. They get to wake up before dawn with lights on for suhoor, set “Ramadan goals,” deepen their relationship with the Qur’an, stand shoulder-to-shoulder in taraweeh prayers, retreat into the masjid for i‘tikaf, and ultimately celebrate Eid with their families in lit-up mosques. 

But for other Uyghurs and myself in the diaspora, this experience summons a different reality — one where our hearts turn to our people in Chinese-occupied East Turkistan (Xinjiang), a land whose occupation and suffering still remain largely forgotten by the ummah.

I describe the Ramadan most Muslims know, because it feels increasingly necessary to name what Uyghur Muslims have been denied, in a land where Islam has been woven into the fabric of life since the 10th century. And it still feels like the community has so much more to do and learn to understand the gravity of our genocide. 

How many years has it been since Uyghurs in East Turkistan last heard the adhan echo through their neighborhoods? How many years have they been forced to eat suhoor in darkness, fearing that a lit kitchen might be flagged as “extremism,” a suspicion that can lead to a decade or more behind torture and death-ridden prison walls? 

How many Uyghur students have been compelled to eat in daylight under the watchful eyes of teachers, forced to prove they are not fasting? How many have been publicly humiliated, coerced into drinking alcohol or eating pork during the holiest month, performing loyalty to a state that criminalizes Islam in its entirety?

What does Eid even look like when often at least one family member is in prison, parents are separated from their children because they are forcibly sent to state-run orphanages, and thousands of mosques are either closed, or demolished and repurposed into propaganda centers? What does Eid look like when the Chinese government criminalizes gatherings, despite the centrality of family visits and communal celebration in Uyghur culture?

What depths of trauma have the more than one million detainees and prisoners endured inside a system that not only stripped them of religious freedom, but twisted Islam itself into an instrument of suffering and death? What depths of trauma must someone endure to be sent to these prisons for praying, naming a child Muhammad, or owning a Qur’an — only then to be locked up, tortured, indoctrinated, and forced to renounce one’s faith?

I will never forget the stories and testimonies of Uyghur prisoners, like that of Adil Abdulghufur, an Uyghur man who told me the unfathomable horrors he experienced for 18 years behind Chinese prison walls. I interviewed him in 2016, one year before the Chinese government started rounding up over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic people into concentration camps and prisons.

“Adil Abdulghufur during an interview with the author in Istanbul, Türkiye, 2016.

 

Below are two excerpts from Adil’s interview highlighting China’s crackdown on religion in prison:

Adil: “I will tell you about one disaster that happened to me. In 2002 or 2003, they said I called the adhan in my sleep. Even saying bismillah is forbidden. We are not allowed to pray. If we sit still, they accuse us of praying. We are expected to constantly read and memorize Chinese laws.

That night, they dragged me from my bunk by my feet. I was naked. As they pulled me across the floor, the skin on my back and head tore. There was blood.

It was January. The snow outside had frozen like ice.

In the prison office, soldiers demanded to know what I had done. I told them I must have been talking in my sleep.

They said, ‘You screamed “Allahu Akbar.”’

I said I had not prayed. They accused me of lying and beat me — like wool rolled and kicked to make kighiz (a rug)  — until they were exhausted.

After nearly half an hour, I could no longer feel the blows. My body was drenched in sweat, dirt, and mud.

They threw clothes at me. Then they chained my hands and feet.

Finally, they hung a 25-kilogram cement board around my neck. Carved into it were the words: ‘For stubborn prisoners who refuse to bow to Chinese rule.’”

———

There is something else the Chinese authorities do, something the international community must hear.

Every year in March, they would administer a questionnaire to prisoners like us. Hundreds of questions are placed before those considered “patriotic” or “faithful” Turkistanis, or prisoners accused of opposing the Chinese government.

The first question is always the same:

“Is there a God or not?”

We are not allowed to explain. Only “yes” or “no.”

Then the following questions would come up:

“Were the heavens and the earth created by God or by nature?”
“Can the Holy Qur’an save mankind?”
“Is East Turkistan part of China, or is it a separate country?”
“Are you praying in prison?”
“Will you pray in the future?”
“What will you do once released?”
“What kind of person is Osama Bin Laden?”
“If Chinese and Uyghurs live together, will society flourish?”

Each answer must be reduced to a single word. Yes or no. No context. No explanation.

Based on those answers, we are sorted into four groups, each marked by a colored card.

Those assigned a red card are permitted to walk upright. They are the ones deemed compliant: prisoners who deny God, who affirm that East Turkistan is China, who give the “correct” answers.

Those given a yellow card must walk with their hands locked behind their heads. Those with brown cards are forced to move bent over, hands behind their heads. And those given green cards, my group, are not allowed to walk at all. We must crawl.

In 2002, my mother was allowed to visit for the first time. I had not seen her in four or five years. When the guards asked whether I wanted to see her, how could I refuse?

The distance from my cell to the visitors’ center was nearly a mile. They told me I could see my mother, but only if I crawled. I told them I would roll if I had to.

So I crawled.”

———

According to Gene Bunin, founder of the Xinjiang Victims Database, an online archive documenting known individuals detained in East Turkistan, more than 500,000 individuals are estimated to have been imprisoned, with roughly half believed to have been released after completing their sentences. Many of the charges stem from ordinary religious practices, prosecuted under vague accusations such as ‘extremism,’ ‘inciting religious hatred,’ and similar offenses.

The Uyghurs do not have the means to freely broadcast their suffering. Their cries are muffled by walls of fear, propaganda, and relentless censorship imposed by the Chinese government.

Ramadan is not meant to be only a personal, spiritual retreat. To isolate ourselves from the world and grow numb to suffering runs contrary to its very purpose. Rather, Ramadan should sharpen our awareness, soften our hearts, and move us toward action.

The least we can do this month is keep the Uyghurs in our conversations and our du‘a, learn their history and their stories, and strive to stand more consciously for the betterment of the ummah.

May Allah uplift and ease the suffering of our brothers and sisters in Chinese-occupied East Turkistan, Indian-occupied Kashmir, Burma, Palestine, and for Muslims oppressed in all corners of the earth.

May He grant us the strength to do more for our brethren, and never allow us to grow weary of doing even the bare minimum.

 

Related:

– Ramadan At The Uyghur Mosque: Community, Prayers, And Grief

– Is Your Temu Package Made With Uyghur Forced Labour?

The post An Unending Grief: Uyghurs And Ramadan Under Chinese Occupation appeared first on MuslimMatters.org.

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