Why a war against Iraq is unnecessary

Jan 31 2003, John J Mearsheimer and Stephen M Walt

If the US soon goes to war with Iraq, the immediate cause is likely to be Saddam Hussein's failure to comply with the new UN inspections regime to the satisfaction of the Bush administration. But this failure is not the real reason Hussein and the US have been on a collision course for the past year.

The deeper root of the conflict is the US position that Hussein must be toppled because he cannot be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction. Advocates of preventive war use numerous arguments to make their case, but their trump card is the charge that Hussein's past behaviour proves he is too reckless, relentless and aggressive to be allowed to possess WMD, especially nuclear weapons. They sometimes admit that war against Iraq might be costly, might lead to a lengthy US occupation and might complicate US relations with other countries. But these concerns are eclipsed by the belief that the combination of Hussein plus nuclear weapons is too dangerous to accept. For that reason alone, he has to go.

Even many opponents of preventive war seem to agree deterrence will not work in Iraq. Instead of invading Iraq and overthrowing the regime, however, these moderates favour using the threat of war to compel Hussein to permit new weapons inspections. Their hope is that inspections will eliminate any hidden WMD stockpiles and production facilities and ensure Hussein cannot acquire any of these deadly weapons. Thus, both the hard-line, preventive-war advocates and the more moderate supporters of inspections accept the same basic premise: Hussein is not deterrable, and he cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear arsenal.

There is one problem with this argument: It is almost certainly wrong. The belief that Hussein's past behaviour shows he cannot be contained rests on distorted history and faulty logic. In fact, the historical record shows that the US can contain Iraq effectively - even if Hussein has nuclear weapons - just as it contained the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Regardless of whether Iraq complies with UN inspections or what the inspectors find, the campaign to wage war against Iraq rests on a flimsy foundation.

Those who call for preventive war begin by portraying Hussein as a serial aggressor bent on dominating the Persian Gulf. The war party also contends that Hussein is either irrational or prone to serious miscalculation, which means he may not be deterred by even credible threats of retaliation. Kenneth Pollack, former director for gulf affairs at the US National Security Council and a proponent of war with Iraq, goes so far as to argue that Hussein is "unintentionally suicidal".

The facts, however, tell a different story. Hussein has dominated Iraqi politics for more than 30 years. During that period, he started two wars against his neighbours - Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. Hussein's record in this regard is no worse than that of neighbouring states such as Egypt or Israel, each of which played a role in starting several wars since 1948.

Furthermore, a careful look at Hussein's two wars shows his behaviour was far from reckless. Both times, he attacked because Iraq was vulnerable and because he believed his targets were weak and isolated. In each case, his goal was to rectify Iraq's strategic dilemma with a limited military victory. Such reasoning does not excuse Hussein's aggression, but his willingness to use force on these occasions hardly demonstrates that he cannot be deterred.

The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 Iran was the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s. Its strength was partly due to its large population (roughly three times that of Iraq) and its oil reserves, but it also stemmed from the strong support the shah of Iran received from the US. Relations between Iraq and Iran were quite hostile throughout this period, but Iraq was in no position to defy Iran's regional dominance.

Iran put constant pressure on Hussein's regime in the early 1970s, mostly by fomenting unrest among Iraq's sizeable Kurdish minority. Iraq finally persuaded the shah to stop meddling with the Kurds in 1975, but only by agreeing to cede half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran, a concession that underscored Iraq's weakness.

It is thus not surprising that Hussein welcomed the shah's ouster in 1979. Iraq went to considerable lengths to foster good relations with Iran's revolutionary leadership. Hussein did not exploit the turmoil in Iran to gain strategic advantage over his neighbour and made no attempt to reverse his earlier concessions, even though Iran did not fully comply with the terms of the 1975 agreement. Ruhollah Khomeini, on the other hand, was determined to extend his revolution across the Islamic world, starting with Iraq. By late 1979, Tehran was pushing the Kurdish and Shiite populations in Iraq to revolt and topple Hussein, and Iranian operatives were trying to assassinate senior Iraqi officials. Border clashes became increasingly frequent by April 1980, largely at Iran's instigation.

Facing a grave threat to his regime, but aware that Iran's military readiness had been temporarily disrupted by the revolution, Hussein launched a limited war against his bitter foe on September 22, 1980. His principal aim was to capture a large slice of territory along the Iraq-Iran border, not to conquer Iran or topple Khomeini. "The war began," as military analyst Efraim Karsh writes, "because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbour, Iran, to reshape the regional status quo according to its own image."

Iran and Iraq fought for eight years, and the war cost the two antagonists more than one million casualties and at least $US150 billion. Iraq received considerable outside support from other countries - including the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and France - largely because these states were determined to prevent the spread of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.

Although the war cost Iraq far more than Saddam expected, it also thwarted Khomeini's attempt to topple him and dominate the region. War with Iran was not a reckless adventure; it was an opportunistic response to a significant threat. The Gulf War, 1990-91 But what about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990? Perhaps the earlier war with Iran was essentially defensive, but surely this was not true in the case of Kuwait.

Doesn't Hussein's decision to invade his tiny neighbour prove he is too rash and aggressive to be trusted with the most destructive weaponry? And doesn't his refusal to withdraw, even when confronted by a superior coalition, demonstrate that he is "unintentionally suicidal"?

The answer is no. Once again, a careful look shows Hussein was neither mindlessly aggressive nor particularly reckless. If anything, the evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability.

Iraq's economy, badly damaged by its war with Iran, continued to decline after that war ended. An important cause of Iraq's difficulties was Kuwait's refusal both to lend Iraq $US10 billion and to write off debts Iraq had incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. Hussein believed Iraq was entitled to additional aid because the country helped protect Kuwait and other Gulf states from Iranian expansionism.

To make matters worse, Kuwait was exceeding the quotas set by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which drove down world oil prices and reduced Iraqi oil profits. Hussein tried using diplomacy to solve the problem, but Kuwait hardly budged. As Karsh and fellow Hussein biographer Inari Rautsi note, the Kuwaitis "suspected that some concessions might be necessary, but were determined to reduce them to the barest minimum".

Hussein reportedly decided on war sometime in July 1990, but before sending his army into Kuwait, he approached the US to find out how it would react. In a now famous interview with the Iraqi leader, US ambassador April Glaspie told Hussein, "[W]e have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." The US State Department had earlier told Hussein that Washington had "no special defence or security commitments to Kuwait". The US may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did.

Hussein invaded Kuwait in early August 1990. This act was an obvious violation of international law, and the US was justified in opposing the invasion and organising a coalition against it. But Hussein's decision to invade was hardly irrational or reckless. Deterrence did not fail in this case; it was never tried.

But what about Hussein's failure to leave Kuwait once the US demanded a return to the status quo ante? Wouldn't a prudent leader have abandoned Kuwait before getting clobbered? With hindsight, the answer seems obvious, but Hussein had good reasons to believe hanging tough might work. It was not initially apparent that the US would actually fight, and most Western military experts predicted the Iraqi army would mount a formidable defence. These forecasts seem foolish today, but many people believed them before the war began.

Once the US air campaign had seriously damaged Iraq's armed forces, however, Hussein began searching for a diplomatic solution that would allow him to retreat from Kuwait before a ground war began. Indeed, Hussein made clear he was willing to pull out completely. Instead of allowing Iraq to withdraw and fight another day, then US president George HW Bush and his administration wisely insisted the Iraqi army leave its equipment behind as it withdrew. As the administration had hoped, Hussein could not accept this kind of deal.

Hussein undoubtedly miscalculated when he attacked Kuwait, but the history of warfare is full of cases where leaders have misjudged the prospects for war. Yet no evidence suggests Hussein did not weigh his options carefully. He chose to use force because he was facing a serious challenge and because he had good reasons to think his invasion would not provoke serious opposition.

Nor should anyone forget that the Iraqi tyrant survived the Kuwait debacle, just as he has survived other threats against his regime. He is now beginning his fourth decade in power. If he is really "unintentionally suicidal", then his survival instincts appear to be even more finely honed.

History provides at least two more pieces of evidence that demonstrate Hussein is deterrable. First, although he launched conventionally armed Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Gulf War, he did not launch chemical or biological weapons at the coalition forces that were decimating the Iraqi military.

Moreover, senior Iraqi officials - including deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz and the former head of military intelligence Wafiq al-Samarrai - have said that Iraq refrained from using chemical weapons because the administration of Bush snr had made ambiguous but unmistakable threats to retaliate if Iraq used WMD. Second, in 1994 Iraq mobilised the remnants of its army on the Kuwaiti border in an apparent attempt to force a modification of the UN Special Commission's weapons inspection regime.

But when the UN issued a new warning and the US reinforced its troops in Kuwait, Iraq backed down quickly. On both occasions, the allegedly irrational Iraqi leader was deterred. Chemical weapons Preventive-war advocates also use a second line of argument. They point out that Hussein has used WMD against his own people (the Kurds) and against Iran and that therefore he is likely to use them against the US.

Thus, the present US president, George W Bush, recently warned in Cincinnati that the Iraqi WMD threat against the US "is already significant, and it only grows worse with time". The US, in other words, is in imminent danger.

Hussein's record of chemical weapons use is deplorable, but none of his victims had a similar arsenal and thus could not threaten to respond in kind. Iraq's calculations would be entirely different when facing the US because Washington could retaliate with WMD if Iraq ever decided to use these weapons first. Hussein thus has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the US and its allies - unless his survival is threatened. This simple logic explains why he did not use WMD against US forces during the Gulf War and has not fired chemical or biological warheads at Israel.

Furthermore, if Hussein cannot be deterred, what is stopping him from using WMD against US forces in the Persian Gulf, which have bombed Iraq repeatedly over the past decade? The bottom line: Deterrence has worked well against Hussein in the past, and there is no reason to think it cannot work equally well in the future.

President Bush's repeated claim that the threat from Iraq is growing makes little sense in light of Hussein's past record, and these statements should be viewed as transparent attempts to scare Americans into supporting a war. CIA director George Tenet flatly contradicted the president in an October 2002 letter to Congress, explaining that Hussein was unlikely to initiate a WMD attack against any US target unless Washington provoked him. Even if Iraq did acquire a larger WMD arsenal, the US would still retain a massive nuclear retaliatory capability. And if Hussein would use WMD only if the US threatened his regime, then one wonders why advocates of war are trying to do just that.

Hawks do have a fallback position on this issue. Yes, the US can try to deter Hussein by threatening to retaliate with massive force. But this strategy may not work because Iraq's past use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran shows that Saddam is a warped human being who might use WMD without regard for the consequences.

Unfortunately for those who now favour war, this argument is difficult to reconcile with past US support for Iraq, support that coincided with some of the behaviour now being invoked to portray him as an irrational madman. The US backed Iraq during the 1980s - when Saddam was gassing Kurds and Iranians - and helped Iraq use chemical weapons more effectively by providing it with satellite imagery of Iranian troop positions.

The Reagan administration also facilitated Iraq's efforts to develop biological weapons by allowing Baghdad to import disease-producing biological materials such as anthrax, West Nile virus and botulinal toxin.

A central figure in the effort to court Iraq was none other than the present US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was then Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East. He visited Baghdad and met with Hussein in 1983, with the explicit aim of fostering better relations between the US and Iraq.

In October 1989, about a year after Hussein gassed the Kurds, Bush snr signed a formal national security directive declaring, "Normal relations between the US and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East."

If Hussein's use of chemical weapons so clearly indicates he is a madman and cannot be contained, why did the US fail to see that in the 1980s? Why were Rumsfeld and Bush snr then so unconcerned about his chemical and biological weapons? The most likely answer is that US policy-makers correctly understood Hussein was unlikely to use those weapons against the US and its allies unless Washington threatened him directly.

The real puzzle is why they think it would be impossible to deter him today. Nuclear weapons The third strike against a policy of containment, according to those who have called for war, is that such a policy is unlikely to stop Hussein from getting nuclear weapons. Once he gets them, so the argument runs, a host of really bad things will happen. For example, Bush has warned that Hussein intends to "blackmail the world"; likewise, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice believes that he would use nuclear weapons to "blackmail the entire international community".

Others fear a nuclear arsenal would enable Iraq to invade its neighbours and then deter the US from ousting the Iraqi army as it did in 1991. Even worse, Hussein might surreptitiously slip a nuclear weapon to al-Qaeda or some like-minded terrorist organisation, and thereby make it possible for these groups to attack America directly.

The administration and its supporters may be right in one sense: Containment may not be enough to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons someday. Only the conquest and permanent occupation of Iraq could guarantee that. Yet the US can contain a nuclear Iraq, just as it contained the Soviet Union. None of the nightmare scenarios invoked by preventive-war advocates are likely to happen.

Consider the claim that Hussein would employ nuclear blackmail against his adversaries. To force another state to make concessions, a blackmailer must make clear that he would use nuclear weapons against the target state if he does not get his way. But this strategy is feasible only if the blackmailer has nuclear weapons but neither the target state nor its allies do.

If the blackmailer and the target state both have nuclear weapons, however, the blackmailer's threat is an empty one because the blackmailer cannot carry out the threat without triggering his own destruction. This logic explains why the Soviet Union, which had a vast nuclear arsenal for much of the Cold War, was never able to blackmail the US or its allies and did not even try.

But what if Hussein invaded Kuwait again and then said he would use nuclear weapons if the US attempted another Desert Storm? Again, this threat is not credible. If Hussein initiated nuclear war against the US over Kuwait, he would bring US nuclear warheads down on his own head. Given the choice between withdrawing or dying, he would almost certainly choose the former. Thus, the US could wage Desert Storm II against a nuclear-armed Hussein without precipitating nuclear war.

Ironically, some of the officials now advocating war used to recognise that Hussein could not employ nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. In the January-February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, for example, Rice described how the US should react if Iraq acquired WMD. "The first line of defence," she wrote, "should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence - if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration."

If she believed Iraq's weapons would be unusable in 2000, why does she now think Hussein must be toppled before he gets them? For that matter, why does she now think a nuclear arsenal would enable Hussein to blackmail the entire international community, when she did not even mention this possibility in 2000? A nuclear hand-off Of course, now the real nightmare scenario is that Hussein would give nuclear weapons secretly to al-Qaeda or some other terrorist group.

Groups like al-Qaeda would almost certainly try to use those weapons against Israel or the US, and so these countries have a powerful incentive to take all reasonable measures to keep these weapons out of their hands.

However, the likelihood of clandestine transfer by Iraq is extremely small. First of all, there is no credible evidence that Iraq had anything to do with the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon or more generally that Iraq is collaborating with al-Qaeda against the US. Hawks inside and outside the Bush administration have gone to extraordinary lengths over the past months to find a link, but they have come up empty-handed.

The lack of evidence of any genuine connection between Hussein and al-Qaeda is not surprising because relations between Hussein and al-Qaeda have been quite poor in the past. Osama bin Laden is a radical fundamentalist (like Khomeini), and he detests secular leaders like Hussein. Similarly, Hussein has consistently repressed fundamentalist movements within Iraq. Given this history of enmity, the Iraqi dictator is unlikely to give al-Qaeda nuclear weapons, which it might use in ways he could not control.

Intense US pressure, of course, might eventually force these unlikely allies together, just as the US and Communist Russia became allies in World War II. Hussein would still be unlikely to share his most valuable weaponry with al-Qaeda, however, because he could not be confident it would not be used in ways that place his own survival in jeopardy. During the Cold War, the US did not share all its WMD expertise with its own allies, and the Soviet Union baulked at giving nuclear weapons to China despite their ideological sympathies and repeated Chinese requests. No evidence suggests that Hussein would act differently.

Second, Hussein could hardly be confident that the transfer would go undetected. Since September 11, US intelligence agencies and those of its allies have been riveted on al-Qaeda and Iraq, paying special attention to finding links between them. If Iraq possessed nuclear weapons, US monitoring of those two adversaries would be further intensified. To give nuclear materials to al-Qaeda, Hussein would have to bet he could elude the eyes and ears of numerous intelligence services determined to catch him if he tries a nuclear hand-off. This bet would not be a safe one.

But even if Hussein thought he could covertly smuggle nuclear weapons to bin Laden, he would still be unlikely to do so. Hussein has been trying to acquire these weapons for over 20 years, at great cost and risk. Is it likely he would then turn around and give them away? Furthermore, giving nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda would be extremely risky for Hussein - even if he could do so without being detected - because he would lose all control over when and where they would be used. And Hussein could never be sure the US would not incinerate him anyway if it merely suspected he had made it possible for anyone to strike the US with nuclear weapons. The US government and a clear majority of Americans are already deeply suspicious of Iraq, and a nuclear attack against the US or its allies would raise that hostility to fever pitch. Hussein does not have to be certain the US would retaliate to be wary of giving his nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda; he merely has to suspect it might.

In sum, Hussein cannot afford to guess wrong on whether he would be detected providing al-Qaeda with nuclear weapons, nor can he afford to guess wrong that Iraq would be spared if al-Qaeda launched a nuclear strike against the US or its allies. And the threat of US retaliation is not as far-fetched as one might think.

The US has enhanced its flexible nuclear options in recent years, and no-one knows just how vengeful Americans might feel if WMD were ever used against the US homeland. Indeed, nuclear terrorism is as dangerous for Hussein as it is for Americans, and he has no more incentive to give al-Qaeda nuclear weapons than the US does - unless, of course, the US makes clear it is trying to overthrow him. Instead of attacking Iraq and giving Hussein nothing to lose, the Bush administration should be signalling it would hold him responsible if some terrorist group used WMD against the US, even if it cannot prove he is to blame.

Vigilant containment It is not surprising that those who favour war with Iraq portray Hussein as an inveterate and only partly rational aggressor. They are in the business of selling a preventive war, so they must try to make remaining at peace seem unacceptably dangerous. And the best way to do that is to inflate the threat, either by exaggerating Iraq's capabilities or by suggesting horrible things will happen if the US does not act soon.

It is equally unsurprising that advocates of war are willing to distort the historical record to make their case. As former US secretary of state Dean Acheson famously remarked, in politics, advocacy "must be clearer than truth".

In this case, however, the truth points the other way. Both logic and historical evidence suggest a policy of vigilant containment would work, both now and in the event Iraq acquires a nuclear arsenal. Why? Because the US and its regional allies are far stronger than Iraq. And because it does not take a genius to figure out what would happen if Iraq tried to use WMD to blackmail its neighbours, expand its territory or attack another state directly. It only takes a leader who wants to stay alive and who wants to remain in power. Throughout his lengthy and brutal career, Hussein has repeatedly shown that these two goals are absolutely paramount. That is why deterrence and containment would work.

If the US is soon at war with Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight. Even if such a war goes well and has positive long-range consequences, it will still have been unnecessary. And if it goes badly - whether in the form of high US casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the US in the Arab and Islamic world - then its architects will have even more to answer for.

John J Mearsheimer is the R Wendell Harrison distinguished service professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he codirects the program in international security policy. He is the author of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton, 2001).

Stephen M Walt is the academic dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard's John F Kennedy School of Government. He is faculty chair of the international security program at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs and is writing a book on global responses to American primacy. Reprinted with permission from Foreign Policy, Issue No134 ©Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.